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Disclaimer 
The Utah Judicial Council Study Committee on the Representation of Indigent Criminal 
Defendants commissioned this report. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) generously 
funded the work through two sources. The DOJ Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), National 
Training and Technical Assistance Center (NTTAC), enabled work to begin regarding prelim-
inary research on state statutes, case law, and criminal justice procedures. Site visits in two 
counties (Tooele and Uintah) were conducted under the NTTAC funding. A second major 
BJA grant funded the balance of the work: Answering Gideon’s Call: National Assistance To 
Improve the Effectiveness of Right to Counsel Services. (DOJ Office of Justice Programs Grant 
Award #: 2013-MU-BX-k002.)
The report solely reflects the opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the 
views of the Utah Judicial Council Study Committee on the Representation of Indigent 
Criminal Defendants, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, or the 
National Training and Technical Assistance Center. 
Under Supreme Court case law, the provision of Sixth Amendment indigent defense 
services is a state obligation through the Fourteenth Amendment. Utah is one of just 
two states requiring local governments to fund and administer all indigent defense ser-
vices. Though it is not believed to be unconstitutional for a state to delegate its consti-
tutional responsibilities to its counties and cities, in doing so the state must guarantee 
that local governments are not only capable of providing adequate representation, but 
that they are in fact doing so. The state of Utah, however, has no institutional statewide 
presence, and a limited statewide capacity, to ensure that its constitutional obligations 
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments are being met at the local level.
The result is that more people accused of misdemeanors are processed through Utah’s 
justice courts without a lawyer than are represented by counsel – upwards of 62 percent 
of defendants statewide, according to the state Administrative Office of Courts’ data. In 
fact, the data suggests that in most misdemeanor justice courts, the number of misde-
meanor defendants proceeding without representation is closer to 75 percent. To the 
degree that many of these defendants are entitled to a lawyer, the U.S. Supreme Court 
calls this an “actual denial of counsel.”
Right to counsel issues in Utah’s felony courts are different in kind than those of the 
misdemeanor courts. There, most indigent defendants are indeed provided with a law-
yer. However, depending on the local jurisdiction, that lawyer may work under finan-
cial conflicts of interest, or may be beholden to a prosecutor to secure future work, or 
may be appointed too late in the process or be juggling too many cases to be effective. 
The U.S. Supreme Court calls this a “constructive” denial of counsel.
These conclusions were reached after an 18-month study of public defense services in 
ten sample counties (Cache, Davis, Salt Lake, San Juan, Sanpete, Tooele, Uintah, Utah, 
Washington and Weber). The sample counties encompass 90 percent of the state’s pop-
ulation and represent all eight felony-level trial court districts. The Utah Judicial Coun-
cil Study Committee on the Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants (“Study 
Committee”) authorized the report funded through the U.S. Department of Justice, 
Bureau of Justice Assistance. Chapter 1 (pages 3 to 18) sets out the study methodology 
and assessment criteria adopted by the Study Committee.
Chapter 2 (pages 19 to 38) details the actual denial of counsel in Utah’s justice courts. 
Courtroom observations confirm that a majority of misdemeanor defendants in Utah’s 
justice courts plead without a lawyer for two main reasons:
executive summary
A. A misapplication of Sixth Amendment case law related to: i) the early ap-
pointment of counsel; ii) the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases, especial-
ly those with suspended sentences; and, iii) valid waivers of counsel.
B. Prosecutors directly entering into plea agreements with uncounselled de-
fendants, or, in the absence of prosecutors at arraignment, judges advising 
defendants and negotiating pleas.
Specifically: 
• Despite U.S. Supreme Court case law defining an “arraignment” as a criti-
cal stage requiring the appointment of counsel to those of limited financial 
means, in every justice court observed, with the exception of Salt Lake City 
and County justice courts, defendants were arraigned and subsequently 
sentenced (another critical stage) to jail time or suspended sentences without 
any defense attorney present.
• Although Supreme Court case law requires the appointment of counsel in 
cases where a loss of personal liberty is at stake no matter how remote the 
possibility, Utah’s justice courts frequently deny counsel to defendants solely 
because the immediate threat of jail is lifted and a suspended sentence is im-
posed as a condition of probation. In every justice court observed, defendants 
without counsel were given suspended sentences and probationary terms 
that, if revoked, would result in a loss of liberty, and defendants appeared for 
probation revocation hearings on charges for which they had not originally 
been represented by counsel.
• While Supreme Court case law determining that a defendant may waive the 
right to counsel only if the court determines that the decision is being made 
“knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently,” Utah justice courts were observed 
regularly allowing defendants to waive counsel without individualized inqui-
ries into their decision to go without counsel.
• Supreme Court case law defines the plea negotiation as a critical stage of the 
case, meaning the negotiation cannot happen unless counsel is present or 
the defendant’s right to counsel has been knowingly, voluntarily, and intelli-
gently waived. Yet it is the practice of many justice courts to have prosecutors 
meet with unrepresented defendants to attempt to resolve the case prior to 
the defendant appearing before the judge. In others, the opportunity to meet 
with the prosecution is offered as though it is a chance to consult with an 
attorney who is looking out for the defendant’s interests.
• In many justice courts, there are no prosecutors present and there are also no 
defense attorneys present. This leaves justice court judges responsible for all 
sides of the adjudicative process. Having judges judging, negotiating pleas, 
and advising defendants all at once creates a criminal process that is, in a 
word, non-adversarial.
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vExecutive Summary
Utah’s appellate system is not set up to rectify any actual denial of counsel that occurs 
in justice courts. Utah’s justice courts are not courts of record so there is no official 
record from which cases can be appealed. Instead, defendants have a right to a “do 
over” in district court, known as a de novo review. But without counsel to advise them 
of this procedure, poor defendants simply do not know how to get a higher court to 
take a second look. In 2013, there were 79,730 total misdemeanors and misdemeanor 
DUI cases heard in all justice courts statewide. Only 711 of such cases were reviewed de 
novo in all district courts combined (an appellate rate of 0.89%). Further still, a de novo 
review can never change the underlying systemic flaws that resulted in the denial of the 
right to counsel in the first place.
“Constructive denial of counsel” in Utah’s felony district courts is more complicated 
to assess and explain. This is because a public defense lawyer is indeed present in the 
courtroom with the indigent accused, but systemic deficiencies prevent that lawyer 
from effectively advocating for the stated interests of each and every defendant as-
signed. Accordingly, the analysis of constructive denial of counsel is divided into three 
chapters explaining: 
• How a lack of structural accountability and independence encourages con-
structive denials of counsel, Chapter 3 (pages 39 to 62);
• How systemic financial conflicts of interest encourages constructive denials 
of counsel, Chapter 4 (pages 63 to 76); and,
• How systemic structures interfere with the sufficiency of time needed to 
effectively defend indigent defense cases, Chapter 5 (pages 77 to 88). 
At the outset of this project, no statewide government entity could detail how public 
defense services are provided in each and every district and justice court or give the 
names of all of the lawyers who represent the accused. Approximately one-third (46 of 
139) of private attorneys providing public defense in Utah hold more than three indi-
gent defense contracts (these can be with district or justice courts within a county, or 
in other counties). As a result, unbeknownst to policymakers, the bulk of the indigent 
defense workload outside of the two largest counties is handled by a small number 
of private attorneys. This is important because Utah cannot determine for itself the 
effectiveness of its right to counsel services if it does not first know who handles public 
defense cases from one county to the next.
The absence of state oversight is perhaps most apparent in the realm of managing pub-
lic defense workload. Although local governments may believe the number of cases as-
signed to a particular lawyer in a particular courtroom in their county is not excessive 
on its own, there is currently no mechanism for government to know if the additional 
work that attorney is doing elsewhere (in a neighboring county, or in a juvenile court, 
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or a justice court, or on behalf of their retained clients) pushes the attorney’s workload 
to the point that the lawyer begins triaging the duty owed to each and every person 
appointed to them to defend. For example:
• One of three contract defenders in Cache County District Court also pro-
vides public defense services in the Hyrum Justice Court and the North 
Logan/Hyde Park Justice Court. On first pass, the lawyer’s combined felony 
caseload (134) and misdemeanor caseload (84) do not appear too egregious. 
However, he also handled 270 delinquency cases and appeared at 432 depen-
dency cases in 2013.
Thirty-five percent of Utah’s private defense contractors have excessive caseloads. In 
the absence of Utah-specific workload standards that take into account local criminal 
practices and procedures, geography, court locations, and other variances, it is difficult 
to determine whether the remaining 65 percent of indigent defense attorneys’ work-
loads are, in fact, reasonable. 
The primary cause of attorneys having insufficient time to advocate for the stated inter-
ests of defendants is due to the prevalence of “flat fee contracting.” Outside of the insti-
tutional defender offices in Utah and Salt Lake counties, lawyers are paid a single fixed 
fee to provide services in an undefined number of cases, such that the defense providers 
have negative financial incentives to dispose of cases quickly, rather than effectively. 
The conflicts of interest such flat fee contracts create are compounded in some juris-
dictions, because they reduce a lawyer’s take home pay if he seeks trial-related expenses 
(e.g., investigators, or experts). 
To give context to the way flat fee contracts create financial conflicts of interest and 
lead to excessive caseloads, consider the following:
• One rural justice court pays its misdemeanor attorney a flat $600 per month 
to handle the representation of everyone determined to be indigent. In 2013, 
this attorney was appointed to 246 justice court cases – an average of 20.5 
assignments per month. This means he is compensated at approximately $30 
per case regardless of if the case goes to trial or is disposed immediately. Be-
cause there is no independent supervision of this attorney, the attorney also 
handles representation in the county district court and conflict representa-
tion in the county juvenile court. In total, this attorney handled 423 cases on 
behalf of indigent defendants in 2013, including 101 felonies. 
Altogether, the attorney is paid $37,200 annually (his public caseload does not allow 
him to engage in private work). That means, on average, he is compensated just $87.94 
for each and every case, regardless of the complexity of his felony and delinquency 
cases. To put it another way, if the attorney works 40 hours every single week of the 
viiExecutive Summary
year (or 2,080 hours annually), the attorney is paid $17.88 per hour. Though $18 per 
hour may sound like a lot of money to the average person trying to scrape by in hard 
economic times in rural Utah, it is not a lot of money given the parameters of what is 
required of a practicing attorney. 
The maintenance costs to operate a law practice in Utah – commonly referred to as 
“overhead expenses” – are many (e.g., office rent, telecommunications, utilities, ac-
counting, bar dues, business travel, and professional liability insurance). As a means 
of comparison, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined, in a case challenging that 
state’s assigned counsel compensation rate, that indigent defense attorneys are entitled 
to a reasonable hourly fee in addition to overhead expenses. Although that case is now 
nearly 25 years old, the Mississippi Court heard testimony from the Mississippi State 
Bar Association that the average overhead rate in that state was $34.86 per hour at that 
time (or nearly twice the 2014 hourly rate paid to this attorney in rural Utah without 
taking into account overhead costs).
Flat fee contracting is exacerbated in Utah by the fact that in the more rural parts of 
the states, county attorneys are involved to varying degrees in the selection of defense 
counsel, the negotiation of defense attorney compensation, and the oversight of de-
fense counsel performance. Having county attorneys involved in right to counsel deci-
sions means that the defender’s courtroom adversary is the one ultimately responsible 
for whether the defender gets the next appointment or contract. Such involvement is 
an undue infringement on the constitutional obligation to ensure independence of the 
defense function and is rarely seen anywhere else in the country.
To be clear, the degree to which constructive denial of counsel impacts district court 
services varies a great deal from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in Utah. For example, Utah 
County and Salt Lake County have many structural safeguards to prevent construc-
tive denial of counsel. Yet, the systemic safeguards in both counties do not extend to 
the secondary systems for providing representation in conflict cases. The Constitution 
requires the same minimum level of effectiveness for each and every indigent accused, 
regardless of whether a person is deemed co-defendant #1 or #2. 
Despite the fact that actual and constructive denials of counsel occur in Utah courts, it 
is wrong to conclude that Utah’s criminal justice system and its stakeholders hold ill in-
tent toward the indigent accused. Indeed, the very opposite appears true. In every juris-
diction visited, conscientious people were striving to do well by both victims of crime 
and the accused. It is simply the case that even the most well-meaning local stakehold-
ers will, at times, fail to meet the dictates of right to counsel case law without appropri-
ate guidance and supervision. This report is about the failure of the state of Utah and 
not a condemnation of the local people working to fill the gap left by the state.
Chapter 6 (pages 89 to 98) offers two broad recommendations to criminal justice stake-
holders and policymakers to remedy the identified systemic deficiencies.
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1. Insulate the provision of right to counsel services from political, judicial, and 
prosecutorial interference through the establishment of a statewide indepen-
dent oversight commission, authorized to enact right to counsel standards 
and to actively monitor and enforce ongoing compliance with those stan-
dards for, at a minimum: workload, attorney performance, attorney qualifi-
cations, training, supervision, contracting, and ensuring independence of the 
defense function.
Thirty-three states (66 percent of all states) currently have some form of a statewide 
indigent defense commission. A statewide indigent defense commission does not re-
quire services to be administered and funded at the state level. Rather, commissions set 
standards and monitor compliance against those standards.
 
2. Prohibit contracts that create financial incentives for attorneys to fail to pro-
vide effective representation.
Utah should follow the lead of other states that have banned these practices, including: 
Michigan, Idaho, South Dakota, Nevada and Washington.
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PREFACE
Misdemeanors matter. For most people, our nation’s misdemeanor courts are the place 
of initial contact with our criminal justice systems. Much of a citizenry’s confidence 
in the courts as a whole – their faith in the state’s ability to dispense justice fairly and 
effectively – is framed through these initial encounters. Although a misdemeanor 
conviction carries less incarceration time than a felony, the collateral consequences can 
be just as great. Going to jail for even a few days may result in a person’s loss of profes-
sional licenses, exclusion from public housing, inability to secure student loans, or even 
deportation. A misdemeanor conviction and jail term may contribute to the break-up 
of the family, the loss of a job, or other consequences that may increase the need for 
both government-sponsored social services and future court hearings (e.g., matters 
involving parental rights) at taxpayers’ expense. 
The U.S. Supreme Court requires states to provide an attorney to an indigent person 
accused of a misdemeanor offense that carries the potential of jail as a penalty, regard-
less of how remote the possibility of jail-time may be. Despite this, people of limited 
means accused of misdemeanors in Utah’s justice courts, more regularly than not, have 
no legal representation at all. 
The absence of counsel is detailed in this report through a combination of data analysis 
and the retelling of defendants’ stories directly observed in various Utah justice courts. 
Members of the Utah Judicial Council Study Committee on the Representation of 
Indigent Criminal Defendants (“Study Committee”) questioned this approach, inquir-
ing whether only the most inflammatory stories were selected for the report. They were 
not. The accounts detailed in the pages that follow are demonstrative of the various 
reasons why the actual denial of counsel exists in Utah’s justice courts. Any number of 
other observations could have been told in their place.
Right to counsel issues in Utah’s felony courts are different in kind than those of the 
misdemeanor courts. There, most indigent defendants are indeed provided with a law-
yer. However, depending on the local jurisdiction, that lawyer may work under finan-
cial conflicts of interest, or may be beholden to a prosecutor to secure future work, or 
may be appointed too late in the process or be juggling too many cases to be effective. 
The U.S. Supreme Court calls this a “constructive” denial of counsel.  
The degree to which constructive denial of counsel impacts district court services varies 
a great deal from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in Utah. For example, Utah County and 
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Salt Lake County have many structural safeguards to prevent constructive denial of 
counsel. Yet, the systemic safeguards in both counties do not extend to the secondary 
systems for providing representation in conflict cases. The Constitution requires the 
same minimum level of effectiveness for each and every indigent accused, regardless of 
whether a person is deemed co-defendant #1 or #2. 
Despite the fact that actual and constructive denials of counsel occur in Utah courts, 
it is wrong to conclude that Utah’s criminal justice system and its stakeholders hold 
ill intent toward the indigent accused. Indeed, the very opposite appears true. In every 
jurisdiction visited, we met conscientious people striving to do well by both victims of 
crime and the accused – an attitude that also resulted in local criminal justice stake-
holders giving generously of their time for interviews before, during, and after site 
visits. 
Nevertheless, even the most well-meaning local stakeholders will, at times, fail to meet 
the dictates of right to counsel case law without appropriate guidance and supervision. 
The state of Utah currently sets only very general standards for the proper implemen-
tation of the right to counsel and has only limited statewide means for holding local 
government accountable to those standards. Therefore, this report is about the failure 
of the state of Utah to guarantee that each and every person eligible for public counsel 
receives effective representation, as is its constitutional obligation under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. It is not a condemnation of the local people working to fill 
the gap left by the state.
And therein lies the good news. Even as right to counsel deficiencies were discovered 
and preliminarily reported, the Study Committee began working to rectify those issues 
that could be addressed immediately (e.g., providing judicial training on the right to 
counsel for justice court judges). Other criminal justice changes occurred contempo-
raneously with our work that are also reflective of Utah criminal justice stakeholders’ 
willingness to improve practices when deficiencies are identified. Here are two such 
examples:
1. During the Salt Lake County site visit, the county had a program that sought 
to resolve criminal cases quickly. However, this early case resolution program 
prevented the public defenders from conducting the necessary consultation, 
thoroughgoing investigation, and preparation to be effective. Local stake-
holders independently terminated the program without us having to docu-
ment our concerns.
2. Court observations revealed that indigent people charged with traffic vio-
lations carrying jail terms often were denied counsel in Utah justice courts. 
Last legislative session, Utah policymakers independently passed a reclassi-
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fication bill that converted many of these traffic violations into infractions 
carrying a monetary fine, but no jail time. Without jail as a possible sanction, 
the right to counsel is no longer required in these cases.
Finally, the citizenry of Utah should know that, when presented with an early draft of 
the report, the Study Committee confronted the report earnestly, challenged it where 
they disagreed, and ultimately resolved to work over the summer of 2015 to devise 
Utah-specific answers to the problems identified herein. Such actions bode well for the 
future of the right to counsel in Utah.
David Carroll, Executive Director
Sixth Amendment Center
The right to counsel 
in Utah
October 2015
Authored by the Sixth Amendment Center &
The Defender Initiative at Seattle University School of Law
Prepared on behalf of the Utah Judicial Council 
Study Committee on the Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants
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“An accused’s right to be represented by counsel is a fundamental component 
of our criminal justice system. Lawyers in criminal cases ‘are necessities, not 
luxuries.’ Their presence is essential because they are the means through which 
the other rights of the person on trial are secured. Without counsel, the right to 
a trial itself would be ‘of little avail,’ as this Court has recognized repeatedly. ‘Of 
all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel 
is by far the most pervasive for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he 
may have.’”
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1984) 
[internal citations omitted]
Chapter 1
Introduction
The Utah Judicial Council is a 14-member body1 of the judicial branch of government, 
charged with the promulgation of uniform rules and standards to ensure the proper 
administration of justice across the state.2 In 2008, the Judicial Council created the 
Study Committee on Appellate Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants to 
examine the delivery of appellate right to counsel services. Its January 2011 report 
determined, among other things, that the prevailing use of flat fee contracts3 created 
significant financial and ethical hurdles to quality appellate representation. Specifically, 
most appellate contracts “lack any limitations on caseloads.”4 And, where attorneys are 
paid a single flat rate for services, “such contracts may create a natural incentive for 
attorneys to devote less time to indigent defense cases.”5
1 Article VIII, section 12, of the Utah Constitution establishes the Utah Judicial Council. Utah Code 
Ann. §78A-2-104(1) requires the Council to “be composed of: a) the chief justice of the Supreme Court; 
b) one member elected by the justices of the Supreme Court; c) one member elected by the judges of the 
Court of Appeals; d) five members elected by the judges of the district courts; e) two members elected by 
the judges of the juvenile courts; f) three members elected by the justice court judges; and, g) a member 
or ex officio member of the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar who is an active member and 
in good standing at the time of election by the Board of Commissioners.” 
2 Utah Code Ann. §78A-2-104(4) determines that the Utah Judicial Council is “responsible for the 
development of uniform administrative policy for the courts throughout the state. The presiding officer 
of the Judicial Council is responsible for the implementation of the policies developed by the council and 
for the general management of the courts, with the aid of the administrator. The council has authority 
and responsibility to: a) establish and assure compliance with policies for the operation of the courts, 
including uniform rules and forms; and b) publish and submit to the governor, the chief justice of the 
Supreme Court, and the Legislature an annual report of the operations of the courts, which shall include 
financial and statistical data and may include suggestions and recommendations for legislation.”
3 Rather than hiring private lawyers on a per-case or hourly basis, it is common for county govern-
ments in Utah to contract with indigent defense providers on an annual basis. The phrase “flat fee 
contracting” is used throughout this report to connote indigent defense services in which an attorney, 
consortia of attorneys, law firm, or non-profit defender office is paid a single fixed fee to provide services 
in an undefined number of cases, such that the defense provider(s) have negative financial incentives to 
dispose of cases quickly, rather than effectively.
4 Utah Judicial Council Study Committee on Appellate Representation of Indigent Crimi-
nal Defendants, Final Report 9 (2011). 
5 Id. The Utah Judicial Council Study Committee on Appellate Representation of Indigent Criminal 
Defendants made a number of recommendations to overcome these issues, including incorporating a 
model contract that: a) separates trial and appellate representation; b) avoids attorney compensation 
disincentives; and, c) does not punish attorneys that declare conflicts. 
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Recognizing that some of the identified appellate issues may be exacerbated by similar 
contracts at the trial level, the Judicial Council reconstituted the appellate commit-
tee as the Study Committee on the Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants 
(hereinafter “Study Committee”)6 in 2011 to examine the delivery of trial-level indigent 
defense services in criminal courts.7 At the outset, members of the Study Committee 
held varying opinions regarding potential trial-level problems and how best to evalu-
ate services. Additionally, with trial-level services constituting the bulk of the criminal 
justice workload, the Study Committee acknowledged that a review of those services 
would require significantly more time and resources than its appellate review. 
The Study Committee therefore sought outside assistance at no cost to the taxpayers of 
Utah.8 Subsequently, the Study Committee devised a statewide evaluation based on a 
sample of ten counties that reflect diversity of population size, indigent defense delivery 
service model, and geographic region, among others.9 (See side bar, next page.)
i. 
METHODOLOGY
Site work in the ten sample counties began in October 2013 and finished in August 
2014. The site work was carried out through three basic components:
Data collection: Basic information about how a jurisdiction provides right to 
counsel services is often available in a variety of documents, from statistical 
information to policies and procedures. All relevant hard copy or electronic 
information, including copies of indigent defense contracts, policies, and pro-
cedures, were obtained at the local level and reviewed. Additionally, the state of 
Utah has a unified court data collection system that houses a significant amount 
of information on indigent defense services.10 
6 The Study Committee membership includes representatives from the judiciary, the executive branch, 
the legislature, the attorney general’s office, the prosecuting attorneys’ association, the criminal defense 
bar, and the association of counties, among others. 
7 Though the federal right to counsel extends to cases of indigent juveniles accused of delinquent acts, 
delinquency representation is not a focus of this report. In many instances in Utah, however, the same 
organization or group of attorneys responsible for providing representation to adults is also charged 
with providing juvenile representation. Where this is the case, the time and money expended by those 
attorneys on juvenile representation does affect the time and money available for the representation of 
indigent adults.
8 See inside cover of this report for information on the authors and funding source. 
9 In any statewide report, it is important that the sample counties used for the evaluation be represen-
tative of the state. The ten counties (Cache, Davis, Salt Lake, San Juan, Sanpete, Tooele, Uintah, Utah, 
Washington, and Weber) represent all eight felony-level trial court districts. Based on 2010 U.S. Census 
data, population in the ten counties (2,468,077) is 89.3% of the state total (2,763,885). 
10 In more populated regions of the states – generally those employing a legal defender model or a 
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Cache County
Pop: 112,656
Model: individual 
private attorneys
Weber County
Pop: 231,236
Model: coordinated 
contract panel
Davis County
Pop: 306,479
Model: coordinated 
contract panel
Tooele County
Pop: 58,218
Model: individual 
private attorneys
Sanpete County
Pop: 27,822
Model: individual 
private attorneys
Washington County
Pop: 138,115
Model: coordinated 
contract panel
Uintah County
Pop: 32,588
Model: individual 
private attorneys
San Juan County
Pop: 14,746
Model: individual 
private attorneys
Utah County
Pop: 516,564
Model: defender oce 
& contract attys
Salt Lake County
Pop: 1,029,655
Model: defender oce 
& contract attys
the statewide sample of counties
In any statewide report, it is important that the 
sample counties used for the evaluation be 
representative of the state. The Study Commit-
tee, therefore, devised a statewide evaluation 
based on a sample of ten counties that reflect 
diversity of population size, indigent defense 
delivery service model, and geographic region.
The Study Committee selected Cache, Davis, 
Salt Lake, San Juan, Sanpete, Tooele, Uintah, 
Utah, Washington, and Weber counties. The 
counties, shown below, encompass nearly 90 
percent of the state’s population and represent 
all eight felony-level trial court districts. Based 
on 2010 U.S. Census data, population in the ten 
counties (2,468,077) is 89.3% of the state total 
(2,763,885).
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Court observations: Understanding how the right to counsel works in any 
jurisdiction requires an understanding of two critical processes: (a) the process 
the individual defendant experiences as a case is processed from arrest through 
to disposition; and, (b) the process the attorney experiences while representing 
that individual at the various stages of the defendant’s case. Courtroom obser-
vations were conducted in the respective district courts of each sample county. 
Court observations were also conducted in 29 justice courts – approximately a 
third of the 91 various justice courts in the sample counties.11
Interviews: No individual component of the criminal justice system operates in 
a vacuum. Rather, the policy decisions of one component necessarily impact 
another. Because of this, interviews were conducted with a broad cross-section 
of stakeholder groups during each site visit. In addition to speaking with in-
digent defense attorneys, interviews were conducted with district and justice 
court judges, county administrators, prosecutors, sheriffs, court clerks, proba-
tion officers, and law enforcement. More than 175 interviews were conducted 
across the state.12
While the majority of states have an independent statewide public defense commission 
authorized to promulgate and enforce indigent defense standards,13 Utah has no such 
more coordinated assigned counsel model – local caseload data was available in addition to the statewide 
data collected by the Administrative Office of Courts (AOC). At times, the caseload numbers collected 
locally differed from the statewide information provided. This report acknowledges and explains those 
differences, but generally relies on the AOC data.
11 This is a conservative statement. Particularly in less populated counties, it is often the case that the 
same public defense attorney(s) practice in front of the same judge(s) in multiple justice courts through-
out the jurisdiction. Therefore, it is possible to have observed all of the judges and attorneys involved 
in the provision of indigent defense in less populated counties even where less than 100% of the justice 
courts were visited. The justice courts visited are: Cache County (Hyrum Justice, Logan Justice, North 
Logan/Hyde Park Justice); Davis County (Clearfield Justice; Davis County Justice); Weber County (Har-
risville Justice; Ogden Justice; Pleasant View Justice); Salt Lake County (Salt Lake City Justice; Salt Lake 
County Justice; Taylorsville Justice; West Valley Justice); San Juan County (Blanding Justice; Monticello 
Justice; San Juan County Justice); Sanpete County (Mt. Pleasant Justice; Sanpete County Justice); Tooele 
County (Grantsville, Tooele County Justice); Uintah County (Uintah County Justice); Utah County 
(American Fork District; Genola Justice; Goshen Justice; Provo City Justice; Santaquin Justice; Utah 
County Justice); and, Washington County (Santa Clara Justice; Washington City Justice; Washington 
County Justice). 
12 Sample questions from interviews are available at page 9. Interviews with policymakers and crim-
inal justice stakeholders were not uniform. Rather, questions were specific to the interviewee’s area of 
expertise. That is, questions to sheriffs may involve issues related to pretrial detention or the impact of 
drug courts on jail populations. Similarly, questions to county commissioners were generally about fiscal 
policies and selection of attorneys, whereas prosecutors, judges, and defense practitioners were ques-
tioned about the adversarial process, workload, government interference, etc.
13 Thirty-three states (or, 66% of all states) currently have some form of a statewide indigent defense 
commission. 
Twenty-one (21) of these have commissions that oversee all aspects of indigent defense services. For 
7Introduction
agency. However, the lack of state oversight is not by itself outcome-determinative. 
That is, the absence of institutionalized statewide oversight does not mean that all right 
to counsel services provided by county and municipal governments are constitutionally 
inadequate. 
To aid the assessment, the Study Committee developed seven criteria14 by which to 
gauge the efficacy of right to counsel services. It is these seven criteria that formed the 
basis of the interviews and courtroom observations. (Although each criterion is ex-
plained throughout the report, a quick reference table is provided on page 9.) 
The Study Committee’s seven criteria are interdependent. That is, even if the Study 
Committee desired a “pass/fail” grade assessed to each county for each criterion (which 
the Study Committee expressly did not want), it is impossible to apply each standard 
in isolation. This is because the right to counsel is an absolute right of the defendant. 
It matters not to the defendant, for example, that an attorney experiences no financial 
conflict of interest if excessive caseload still forces the attorney to triage the quality of 
services delivered. All criteria must be met for the services to be deemed structurally 
sound.15 The Study Committee Standards are not aspirational, i.e., standards set to 
achieve some “best practice” level of representation. Instead, they represent the consti-
tutional minimum of effective representation, as discussed below.
ease of explanation, we include in this group both Colorado and Michigan. Each of those states has two 
statewide commissions. Colorado has one commission over the primary system and a second oversee-
ing conflict representation, while Michigan has one commission overseeing appellate services and a 
second overseeing trial level representation. The 21 states are Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New 
Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wiscon-
sin.
Twelve (12) states have commissions with limited authority. Six of these cover only part of the 
state’s indigent defense system: Idaho (trial-level only); Illinois (appellate only); Kansas (felony and ap-
pellate representation only); Nebraska (capital trials/appeals, and limited non-capital felonies); Oklaho-
ma (rural jurisdictions only); and Tennessee (capital post-conviction only). Six have commissions that 
offer state support to county-based systems: Georgia; Indiana; New York; Ohio; South Carolina; and, 
Texas.
14 Derek P. Pullan, The Constitutional Right to Counsel: Evaluating the Health of Utah’s 
Indigent Defense System, 1 Utah J. Crim. L. 5 (2014) (hereinafter “Study Committee Standards”), 
infra at Appendix A. 
15 Rather than conducting individual assessments of each of the ten counties’ services in isolation, the 
Study Committee directed the authors of the report to look broadly to determine what deficiencies (if 
any) exist across counties that prohibit effective and efficient services, while noting best practices that 
could be imported from one county to another. 
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Ii. 
ASSESSMENT CRITERIA
Two principal U.S. Supreme Court cases, heard on the same day and then decided on 
the same day, are employed to determine the constitutional effectiveness of right to 
counsel services: United States v. Cronic16 and Strickland v. Washington.17 These two 
landmark cases create a continuum whereby each successive criterion must be satisfied 
before moving on to the next. Strickland’s two-prong criteria, in which a defendant 
seeking to overturn a conviction based on the ineffectiveness of her court-appointed 
lawyer must prove that the appointed lawyer’s actions were unreasonable and preju-
diced the outcome of the case, is at the far end of the continuum. At the initial end of 
the continuum exists Cronic. 
Cronic states that, if certain systemic factors are present at the outset of the case, then a 
court should presume that ineffective assistance of counsel will occur. The Study Com-
mittee Standards mirror Cronic’s end of the continuum. (See chart, page 10.)
For example, the first factor that triggers a presumption of ineffectiveness is the ab-
sence of counsel for the accused at the “critical stages” of a case, as defined by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Over the decades, the Supreme Court has inch-by-inch delineated 
many criminal case events as being critical stages, though it has never purported to 
have capped the list of events that might potentially fall into this category. For example, 
both arraignments18 and sentencing hearings19 are critical stages of a case. Therefore, 
Study Committee Standard #4 (requiring representation at all critical stages) is the first 
prong of Cronic.
Next, the U.S. Supreme Court explains in Cronic that there are systemic deficiencies 
that make any lawyer – even the best attorney – perform in a non-adversarial way. As 
opposed to the “actual” denial of counsel of Cronic’s first prong, the Court calls this a 
“constructive” denial of counsel.20 The overarching principle in Cronic is that the pro-
cess must be a “fair fight” (Study Committee Standard #5). Cronic notes that the “fair 
fight” standard does not necessitate one-for-one parity between the prosecution and 
the defense (Study Committee Standard #6a). Ensuring that both functions have the re-
sources they need, at a level their respective roles demand, is all the adversarial process 
16 466 U.S. 648 (1984). 
17 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
18 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961). 
19 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1386 (2012); see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 538 (2003); 
Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203-04 (2001); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). 
20 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 683 (“The Court has considered Sixth Amendment claims based on actual or 
constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether, as well as claims based on state interference 
with the ability of counsel to render effective assistance to the accused.” (citing Cronic)). 
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STANDARD DEMONSTRATIVE QUESTIONS
1. INDEPENDENT 
REPRESENTATION
Are defense providers free to zealously advocate for their clients’ 
stated interests without fear of personal financial retaliation (e.g., 
termination of employment) or systemic reprisals (e.g., undue re-
duction in government resources)?
2. REPRESENTATION 
WITHOUT CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST
Do the interests of the defense provider or system come in conflict 
with the interests of the client? For example, do defense attorney 
contracts create financial incentives or disincentives to dispose of 
cases prematurely?
3. REPRESENTATION 
WITHOUT INTERFERENCE
Does the state or local government unduly interfere with the rep-
resentation in any way? For example, are there court processes, 
statutes, or local policies that lead to non-zealous representation, or 
produce conflicts between the defense attorney and the accused, or 
result in attorneys not appearing at critical stages of the case?
4. REPRESENTATION AT ALL 
CRITICAL STAGES
Is a defense attorney physically present at every critical stage of a 
criminal case (as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court) for all case 
types and in all courts? For example, are defense attorneys provided 
at arraignments, plea negotiations, and sentencing hearings?
5. REPRESENTATION THAT 
ENSURES MEANINGFUL
ADVERSARIAL TESTING OF 
THE STATE’S EVIDENCE
Are defense attorneys equipped to adequately represent defendants’ 
stated interests in an effective way? Recognizing that this does not 
mean one-to-one parity with prosecutors’ resources, are public de-
fenders overwhelmed because of a lack of resources, too many cases, 
or their own professional limitations? Specifically:
a. QUALIFIED COUNSEL Do defense attorneys’ skills, training, and experience match the 
complexity of appointed cases? For example, are young attorneys 
just out of law school handling serious felony cases?
b. DEFENSE RESOURCES Do defense attorneys have appropriate access to investigators, ex-
perts, and social workers?
c. REASONABLE 
CASELOADS
Do attorneys have the necessary time to consider whether certain ac-
tions (motions, crime scene investigations, witness interviews, etc.) 
are necessary and appropriate in specific cases?
6. FAIR COMPENSATION & 
PROPER INCENTIVES
Do attorneys receive a fair day’s wages for a fair day’s work? 
Specifically:
a. FAIR COMPENSATION, 
NOT PARITY
Are attorneys properly compensated, independent of the resources 
and salaries paid to prosecutors?
b. PROPER INCENTIVES Do attorney compensation arrangements produce financial incen-
tives or disincentives for the attorney to fulfill his ethical duty to the 
defendant to provide zealous representation?
7. CASE-SPECIFIC AND 
SYSTEMIC QUALITY 
CONTROL
Does the indigent defense system provide accountability through 
supervision and the monitoring of attorney performance against 
standards? Does the system collect data to ensure accountability?
Using the STUDY COMMITTEE Standards
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Are defendants 
denied access to 
counsel entirely?
PREJUDICE PRESUMED
Are defendants 
subjected to subtle or 
direct pressure to waive 
the right to counsel?
Are appointed attorneys 
absent at critical stages of 
the indigent defendants’ 
case?
Does the system allow 
the trial court to have 
excessive or inappropriate 
authority over the 
selection, compensation, 
or termination of 
appointed counsel?
Does the system allow any 
branch of state or local 
government to have 
excessive or inappropriate 
authority over the selection, 
compensation, or 
termination of appointed 
counsel?
Does the system allow the 
appointed attorney to 
handle a limitless number of 
cases at the same time OR 
proceed without sucient 
time to adequately prepare 
for and zealously advocate 
on behalf of every client?
Does the system allow the 
appointed attorney to represent a 
defendant, when the attorney or 
his law oce previously or 
currently represents an individual 
whose interests are adverse to the 
new defendant’s case, without 
both clients waiving that conict 
where allowed?
Did appointed counsel's 
performance fall below an 
objective standard of 
reasonableness?
Did appointed counsel's performance give 
rise to a reasonable probability that, if 
counsel had performed adequately, the 
result would have been dierent?
YES YES
NO NO
NO
NO
NO
APPLY CRONIC 
STANDARD
APPLY 
STRICKLAND
STANDARD
YES
YES
Does the system allow the 
method of compensation 
to place the appointed 
attorney’s personal nancial 
interests in conict with one 
or more of his clients’ case-
related interests?
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
SUCCESSFUL 
I.A.C. CLAIM
APPEAL 
REJECTED
NO
YES
YESNO
BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE STATE TO SHOW THAT ACTUAL OR 
CONTRUCTIVE DENIAL -- WHETHER BY FINANCIAL DISINCENTIVE, 
INADEQUATE TIME, GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE, ETC. -- DID 
NOT IMPACT DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO HAVE THE GOVERNMENT’S 
CASE SUBJECTED TO THE “CRUCIBLE OF ADVERSARIAL TESTING.”
The Cronic-Strickland Continuum
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requires (Study Committee Standard #5b). As the U.S. Supreme Court notes: “While a 
criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with 
a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators.”21
Cronic’s necessity of a fair fight requires the defense function to put the prosecution’s 
case to the “crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.”22 If a defense attorney is either 
incapable of challenging the state’s case or barred from doing so because of a structur-
al impediment, a constructive denial of counsel occurs. The Court clearly advises that 
governmental interference that infringes on a lawyer’s independence to act in the stat-
ed interests of defendants (Study Committee Standards #1 and #3) or places the lawyer 
in a conflict of interest (Study Committee Standard #2) is a cause of constructive denial 
of counsel.
In Cronic, the Court points to the deficient representation received by the so-called 
“Scottsboro Boys” and detailed in the U.S. Supreme Court case, Powell v. Alabama,23 as 
demonstrative of constructive denial of counsel. The trial judge overseeing the Scotts-
boro Boys’ case appointed a real estate lawyer from Chattanooga, who was not licensed 
in Alabama and was admittedly unfamiliar with the state’s rules of criminal proce-
dure.24 The Powell Court concluded that defendants require the “guiding hand”25 of 
counsel – i.e., attorneys must be qualified and trained to help the defendants advocate 
for their stated interests (Study Committee Standard #5a).
21 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 657 (quoting United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th 
Cir. 1975)). 
22 Id. at 656-57 (“The right to the effective assistance of counsel is thus the right of the accused to 
require the prosecution’s case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. When a true 
adversarial criminal trial has been conducted – even if defense counsel may have made demonstrable 
errors – the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment has occurred. But if the process loses its 
character as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated.”)
23 In 1931, nine young men of color stood accused in Alabama of the capital crime of rape. Their trial 
made national headlines, and quickly they became known as the “Scottsboro Boys.” The account of 
the Scottsboro Boys in this report is based on accounts provided in: the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); William Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American 
Courts 151-157 (1955); and, Douglas O. Linder, The Trials of “The Scottsboro Boys,” available at http://
law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/FTrials/scottsboro/SB_acct.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2015). 
24 A retired local attorney who had not practiced in years was also appointed to assist in the representa-
tion of all nine co-defendants.
25 Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69 (“The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not 
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and 
sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining 
for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left with-
out the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent 
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowl-
edge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he may have a perfect one. He requires the guiding 
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he 
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.”)
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Having been assigned unqualified counsel, the Scottsboro Boys’ trials proceeded im-
mediately that same day.26 Powell notes that the lack of “sufficient time” to consult with 
counsel and to prepare an adequate defense was one of the primary reasons for finding 
that the Scottsboro Boys were constructively denied counsel, commenting that imped-
ing counsel’s time “is not to proceed promptly in the calm spirit of regulated justice, 
but to go forward with the haste of the mob.”27 Insufficiency of time is, therefore, a hall-
mark of constructive denial of counsel, and the inadequate time may itself be caused by 
any number of things, including but not limited to excessive workload (Study Commit-
tee Standard #5c) or contractual arrangements that produce negative fiscal incentives 
to lawyers to dispose of cases quickly (Study Committee Standard #6b).
Perhaps the most noted critique of the Scottsboro Boys’ defense was that it lacked in-
dependence from governmental interference, specifically from the judge presiding over 
the case. As noted in Strickland, “independence of counsel” is “constitutionally pro-
tected,” and “[g]overnment violates the right to effective assistance when it interferes 
in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about how 
to conduct the defense.”28 In specific relation to judicial interference, the Powell Court 
stated:
[H]ow can a judge, whose functions are purely judicial, effectively discharge the 
obligations of counsel for the accused? He can and should see to it that, in the pro-
ceedings before the court, the accused shall be dealt with justly and fairly. He cannot 
investigate the facts, advise and direct the defense, or participate in those necessary 
conferences between counsel and accused which sometimes partake of the inviolable 
character of the confessional.29
In other words, it is never possible for a judge presiding over a case to properly assess 
the quality of a defense lawyer’s representation, because the judge can never, for exam-
ple, read the case file, question the defendant as to his stated interest, follow the attor-
ney to the crime scene, or sit in on witness interviews. That is not to say a judge can-
not provide sound feedback on an attorney’s in-court performance – the appropriate 
defender supervisors indeed should actively seek to learn a judge’s opinion on attorney 
performance. And, in some extreme circumstances, a judge can determine that counsel 
is ineffective, for example, if the lawyer is sleeping through the proceedings. It is just 
26 Over the course of the next three days, four separate all-white juries, trying the defendants in groups 
of two or three at a time, found all nine of the Scottsboro Boys guilty, and all but one was sentenced to 
death. The youngest – only 13 years old – was instead sentenced to life in prison.
27 287 U.S. at 56-59. A recent U.S. Department of Justice Statement of Interest, filed in a systemic indi-
gent defense challenge in New York, similarly notes that the lack of time to fulfill the lawyer’s “basic obli-
gations to their client” is a hallmark of constructive denial of counsel. Statement of Interest of the United 
States at 6, Hurrell-Harring v. New York, No. 8866-07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Sept. 25, 2014), available at 
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/09/25/hurrell_soi_9-25-14.pdf.
28 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
29 Powell, 287 U.S. at 61.
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that the judge’s in-court observations of a defense attorney cannot comprise the totality 
of supervision (Study Committee Standard #7).30
While Powell focuses on independence of counsel from judicial interference, other U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions extend the independence standard to political interference as 
well. In the 1979 case, Ferri v. Ackerman,31 the United States Supreme Court stated that 
“independence” of appointed counsel to act as an adversary is an “indispensible ele-
ment” of “effective representation.” Two years later, the Court observed in Polk County 
v. Dodson32 that states have a “constitutional obligation to respect the professional 
independence of the public defenders whom it engages.” Commenting that “a defense 
lawyer best serves the public not by acting on the State’s behalf or in concert with it, 
but rather by advancing the undivided interests of the client,” the Court notes in Polk 
County that a “public defender is not amenable to administrative direction in the same 
sense as other state employees.”
The most common way governments interfere with zealous defense is to, albeit inad-
vertently, create a series of conflicts of interest (Study Committee Standard #3). Con-
sider, for example, a public defense system funded and administered at the state level 
where a state chief defender is a direct gubernatorial appointee who can be terminated 
at the will of the governor. The chief defender will feel the pressure of undue political 
interference if, for example, the governor calls for all executive departments to take 
a ten percent budget cut. Since the bulk of an indigent defense system’s expenditures 
are in personnel, the cut must come at the expense of staff. Unlike other aspects of the 
criminal justice system, defense practitioners have no control over the number of new 
cases requiring their services.33 Therefore, a ten percent budget cut will cause excessive 
caseloads unless it is met by a ten percent cut in public defender workload. If the public 
defender objects, the governor could replace him with someone willing to do what the 
executive says.34 In short, any structure of services that places the attorney’s personal 
30 This report notes at page 50 that the same issues preventing a judge from overseeing the quality of 
defense services apply equally, if not more so, to having prosecutors oversee defender representation. 
31 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979).
32 454 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1981).
33 A defender cannot control the number of defendants requiring public defense services. Those deci-
sions are made elsewhere: the legislature could increase the number of statutory offenses in which jail 
time is a potential sentence; an increase in the number of police positions will correspondingly increase 
the number of arrests being made; and, prosecutors may choose to file charges rather than dismissing 
marginal cases. All of these choices are outside of the control of the indigent defense systems and the 
lawyers providing direct services, but all such choices will increase the number of clients the system must 
represent. 
34 Indeed, this scenario took place in New Mexico prior to the electorate amending their state consti-
tution to require independence of the defense function. In February 2011, the New Mexico Governor 
terminated the state’s chief public defender, in the middle of the legislative session, for suggesting that 
the state public defender department was underfunded. “‘I fear that I was not taking positions that the 
Governor liked in various obligations for the [Chief] Public Defender,’ Dangler says. ‘We have a very, 
very bad budget crisis, and I was testifying last week in front of the various committees. In fact it’s kind 
of interesting that my firing comes the week after my testimony. And I basically said, “We can’t make it 
with the budget we’ve been offered by either the [Legislative Finance Committee] or the Governor.” And 
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financial wellbeing in direct competition with the stated interest of a defendant is a 
constructive denial of counsel. 
Cronic determines that the presence of such a clear conflict of interest makes the de-
fense lawyer presumptively ineffective. The burden of overcoming such a presumption 
is inverted. The government may argue that, despite such conflicts, the defense lawyer 
in a specific case was not ineffective, but it is the government’s burden to establish this 
on appeal. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Wahlberg v. Israel, “if the 
state is not a passive spectator of an inept defense, but a cause of the inept defense, the 
burden of showing prejudice [under Strickland] is lifted. It is not right that the state 
should be able to say, ‘sure we impeded your defense – now prove it made a differ-
ence.’”35 
Strickland, therefore, should be reserved for retrospectively measuring the ineffective-
ness of specific attorneys who work within structurally sound indigent defense systems 
(as defined and prospectively determined by a Cronic and Powell analysis). 
The balance of this report follows Cronic, by first studying questions pertaining to 
actual denial of counsel focusing on the justice courts, before delving into issues of 
constructive denial of counsel with a focus on district court representation. (To give 
context to the Cronic discussion, consider a set of observations from a rural justice 
court. Side bar, next page.)
I think you’re supposed to say that, “Of course, we support the Governor’s option.”’” Wren Abbot, Chief 
Public Defender Dismissed: Testimony at State Legislature a Possible Trigger, Santa Fe Reporter, Feb. 
17, 2011, available at http://www.sfreporter.com/santafe/blog-2687-breaking-chief-public-defender-dis-
missed.html. 
Although the termination of then-Chief Public Defender Hugh Dangler occurred under a Re-
publican administration, undue political interference with the right to counsel in New Mexico is not 
a partisan issue. Governors from both the Republican and Democratic parties have seen fit to replace 
sitting public defenders. In fact, former New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, a Democrat, vetoed a bill 
passed on an overwhelmingly bi-partisan basis that would have created an independent statewide public 
defender commission. Bill Richardson, Governor Richardson Vetoes Legislation Creating New Public 
Defender Commission (Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://votesmart.org/public-statement/323912/gover-
nor-richardson-vetoes-legislation-creating-new-public-defender-commission#.VRApiVxHHds. 
35 766 F.2d 1071, No. 84-2435, ¶27 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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Applying Cronic
An example of actual and Constructive 
Denial of COunsel
For some, understanding the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s Cronic decision can be 
difficult without context. Both actual 
and constructive denial of counsel are 
best demonstrated by bringing the 
reader into the courtroom. The following 
court observation shows both prongs of 
Cronic.
Prior to the judge taking the bench in 
a rural justice court, a law enforcement 
officer walked into the courtroom and 
stated: “There are a lot of things you 
need to understand in this video. So pay 
attention.” The law enforcement officer 
then played a video on the defendants’ 
rights and court procedures, while peo-
ple walked in and out of the courtroom. 
At the conclusion of the video, the offi-
cer asked if anyone had any questions. “I 
have a question,” one woman said, but 
the officer did not hear her and left the 
courtroom to call for the judge to begin 
the calendar. No public defense attorney 
or prosecutor appeared in court that 
day.
The first defendant called forward was 
appearing for his arraignment on three 
separate charges – two class B misde-
meanors and one class C misdemeanor. 
As with all misdemeanors in Utah, these 
charges carry a potential jail term. Asked 
by the judge how he wanted to plea, 
the defendant stated that he wanted an 
attorney. The judge then instructed him 
to fill out an indigency determination 
form and moved on to the next case. 
The second defendant, facing a class B 
misdemeanor charge, also asked for a 
public defender, and he too was direct-
ed to fill out the form. By this time, the 
first defendant had finished filling out 
his application form, and so the judge 
called him back to the podium to be 
appointed a defender.  
“You will be given a piece of paper with 
the public defender’s contact informa-
tion,” the judge explained. “It is your 
responsibility to call him. However, 
don’t be surprised if you cannot reach 
him. He is very busy. You should not 
assume, just because he does not call 
you before your next court date, that he 
is not doing anything to help you. You 
can assume that he is going over the 
discovery, or talking to the city prosecu-
tor, or doing something on your behalf. 
Just make your next court date, and he 
will be there to tell you what has been 
decided.”
 
The second defendant likewise finished 
his paperwork and appeared before the 
judge to be appointed counsel. “I know 
you were filling out your paperwork,” 
said the judge, “but you heard what I 
just said to [the first defendant], right? 
You get a public defender, but he prob-
ably won’t return your call. Just so you 
know.”
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Another defendant appeared for his 
arraignment that day. He was charged 
with driving with a suspended license, a 
class C misdemeanor. The judge asked 
how he wished to plead, to which the 
defendant said he was “interested in 
making a deal.”
 
“What did you have in mind?” the judge 
asked.
 
The defendant began: “I know I did 
wrong, but at the same time I feel like I 
did right.”
 
“I am not sure what you mean,” said the 
judge. “Can you tell me what happened 
that night?”
“I was at a party and people needed a 
ride,” the defendant began. “I was the 
only sober one. I know I am not sup-
posed to drive, but at the same time I 
felt good that I wasn’t letting them drive, 
you know?”
 
 “I do see …” the judge began. But the 
defendant interrupted, continuing with 
his explanation.
 
“Judge, I am trying to get on the right 
track,” the defendant said. “I got out 
of prison last year, but I have a serious 
medical issue and I can’t see a doctor. 
Something is wrong inside of me. It’s 
a bad time for me. I have a medical 
condition where I can’t figure out my 
emotions. I have a battle going on in my 
head; just trying to get by every day … 
just trying … just trying to do what I am 
supposed to do. But my head is wrong 
and I can’t control my emotions. I felt 
good not letting people drive drunk, and 
then I am pulled over. I can’t do any-
thing right, but I want to. In jail I got my 
GED, but I don’t feel well enough medi-
cally or emotionally to work. I need help. 
I want help. I know something is eating 
at me and that makes my emotions 
more uncontrollable.”
 
“Your fine is likely to be $340,” the judge 
explained. “Perhaps we can give you 
credit if you get a psychiatric evaluation 
at [a local community health agency]. 
If we can arrange that, and you stay in 
treatment, I can work with you on your 
fine.”
 
The defendant proceeded to go on a 
long, outwardly apparent delusional 
tangent, about his inability to focus and 
his paranoid anxieties. “I feel bad,” he 
concluded. “I can’t deal with any of this. I 
don’t want to feel bad any more.”
 
“I am so proud of you for saying all of 
this in a room filled with people,” said 
the judge. “That means a lot. You need 
to call [the mental health counseling 
center]. What I will do for you is give 
you a 30-day suspended sentence and 
nine-months probation. No fine. If you 
are unable or incapable of setting up an 
evaluation, at your next hearing I will 
send you to jail where you will get the 
help you need. So how do you want to 
plead?”
 
“Guilty,” the defendant replied.
 
“You watched the video right? You know 
what rights you are giving up?”
 
“Yes,” he said.
Study Committee criterion #4 states that 
the accused is entitled to legal counsel 
at all “critical stages” of the proceeding. 
As explained above (page 8), the U.S. 
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Supreme Court has determined critical 
stages to include, among others, the ar-
raignment and sentencing hearings. This 
third defendant, if indigent, was entitled 
to counsel during the arraignment and 
sentencing because jail was a possibility 
(indeed, a likelihood, given the stated 
intentions of the judge). 
Under U.S. Supreme Court case law, a 
defendant may choose to waive his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. However, 
in doing so, the court must determine 
that the defendant made that choice 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.i 
Though informative, showing a group 
video at the start of court, particularly 
without knowing whether each defen-
dant was able to and actually did see 
and hear that video, does not replace 
the need for an individualized determi-
nation by the judge that each defendant 
wanting to waive counsel is doing so 
intelligently. In sentencing the third de-
fendant, the court clearly recognized the 
danger that the defendant might suffer 
from a mental impairment that would 
affect his judgment and understanding.  
Yet the court arraigned and sentenced 
this defendant without providing him 
an attorney and without making an 
individualized determination that this 
defendant understood the rights he 
was waiving. This is an actual denial of 
counsel.ii
The likelihood that the first and second 
defendants will receive a constructive de-
nial of counsel is high. For example, the 
municipality relies on the city prosecutor 
to select defense counsel, to enter into 
contracts with defense counsel, to set 
the compensation rate, and to decide 
whether to renew defense contracts 
each year. As will be discussed in Chap-
ter 3, it is a conflict of interest to have 
one courtroom adversary financially 
controlling the other. This is because the 
defense attorney must take into account 
what he needs to do to please the pros-
ecutor to secure future contracts, rather 
than advocating solely in the interests of 
the indigent accused. This violates the 
Study Committee’s criteria #1 and #2. 
For the court in question, the indigent 
defense contract pays the misdemean-
or attorney a flat $600 per month to 
handle the representation of everyone 
determined to be indigent. The contract-
ed private attorney for this courtroom 
estimated that he handles approximate-
ly 20 cases per month.iii This means he is 
compensated at approximately $30 per 
case, which produces financial incen-
tives for the attorney to dispose of the 
case as soon as possible (in violation of 
Study Committee #6b). And indeed, the 
defender meets with the city prosecu-
tor to begin plea negotiations before 
talking with the defendant, as the judge 
told the defendant will happen.
i Waivers of counsel are discussed in depth at page 27. 
ii Although on a case-by-case basis this could be considered an example of a judicial error, observations in this 
court show that it exemplifies a much broader indigent defense deficiency. This particular justice court only ap-
pointed an attorney in 24 percent of cases of people charged with a class B or class C misdemeanor (all carrying 
potential jail time if convicted) in 2013. 
iii The 6AC confirmed this estimate through the data obtained through the Administrative Office of Courts 
(AOC). In 2013, this attorney was appointed to 246 justice court cases. This is an average of 20.5 assignments per 
month.
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Because there is no independent super-
vision of this attorney (in violation of 
Study Committee #7), the misdemeanor 
lawyer in question is allowed to seek 
contracts from other jurisdictions too. In 
addition to his contracted justice court 
work described above, the attorney 
in question handles representation in 
the county district court and conflict 
representation in the county juvenile 
court. In total, this attorney handled 423 
cases on behalf of indigent defendants 
in 2013, including 101 felonies. As will 
be demonstrated in Chapter 5, this is an 
unreasonable caseload (in violation of 
Study Committee #5c).
Including all contracts, the attorney is 
paid $37,200 annually.iv That means, on 
average, he is compensated just $87.94 
for each and every case, regardless of 
the complexity of his felony and delin-
quency cases. To put it another way, if 
the attorney in question works 40 hours 
every single week of the year (or 2,080 
hours annually),v the attorney is paid 
$17.88 per hour.vi 
Though $18 per hour may sound like a 
lot of money to the average person try-
ing to scrape by in hard economic times 
in rural Utah, it is not a lot of money giv-
en the parameters of what is required of 
a practicing attorney. The maintenance 
costs to operate a law practice in Utah 
– commonly referred to as “overhead 
expenses” – are many. Overhead costs 
must be paid each month in order to 
stay open for business, and so the law-
yer’s take home pay is whatever amount 
remains after providing for office rent, 
telecommunications, utilities, account-
ing, bar dues, business travel, and pro-
fessional liability insurance. 
As a means of comparison, the Mississip-
pi Supreme Court determined, in a case 
challenging that state’s assigned coun-
sel compensation rate, that indigent de-
fense attorneys are entitled to a reason-
able hourly fee in addition to overhead 
expenses. Although that case is now 
nearly 25 years old, the Mississippi Court 
heard testimony from the Mississippi 
State Bar Association that the average 
overhead rate in that state was $34.86 
per hour at that time (or nearly twice the 
2014 hourly rate paid to this attorney in 
rural Utah without taking into account 
overhead costs).vii As will be discussed in 
Chapter 4, this is unfair compensation (in 
violation of Study Committee #6a).
iv  The attorney stated that, because of workload concerns, he does not carry any privately retained cases. 
v  This equates to working five eight-hour days without ever taking a sick day, vacation day, or a holiday.
vi  If the attorney spends more time on his indigent defense cases (i.e., if he works more than 40 hours per week, 
on average), then his hourly rate will further decrease.
vii  Wilson v. State, 574 So.2d 1338, 1340 (Miss. 1990) (determined that indigent defense attorneys are entitled to 
“reimbursement of actual expenses,” in addition to a reasonable sum, and defined “actual expenses” to include 
“all actual costs to the lawyer for the purpose of keeping his or her door open to handle this case.”). Though the 
appellant in Wilson urged the court to adopt a figure of $34.86 per hour for overhead, derived from a survey 
conducted by the Mississippi State Bar in 1988, the court chose rather to adopt a $25.00 per hour overhead rate. 
Id. at 1340-41. Obviously, this is still more than the rural Utah attorney earns per hour today.
Chapter 2
actual denial of counsel
More people accused of misdemeanors are processed through Utah’s justice courts 
without a lawyer than are represented by counsel – upwards of 62 percent of defen-
dants statewide, according to Administrative Office of Courts’ data.36 In fact, the data 
suggests that, in most justice courts, the number of misdemeanor defendants proceed-
ing without representation is closer to 75 percent.37
Courtroom observations confirm that a majority of misdemeanor defendants in Utah’s 
justice courts plead without a lawyer for two main reasons:38
A. A misapplication of Sixth Amendment case law related to: i) the early ap-
pointment of counsel; ii) the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases, especial-
ly those with suspended sentences; and, iii) waivers of counsel.
B. Prosecutors directly entering into plea agreements with uncounselled de-
fendants, or, in the absence of prosecutors at arraignment, judges advising 
defendants and negotiating pleas.
Utah’s appellate system is not set up to rectify actual denial of counsel in justice courts. 
This chapter details each of these issues.
36 In a letter dated June 18, 2015, Deputy Washington County Attorney Eric Clarke suggests that the 
list of reasons for actual denial of counsel in justice courts may be missing a third item: a greater percent-
age of those charged in justice courts may be deemed not indigent than those charged in district courts. 
Utah’s courts are not currently required to track the information necessary to conclusively determine 
whether or not this is true.
37 In a letter dated June 18, 2015, Deputy Washington County Attorney Eric Clarke suggests that the 
list of reasons for actual denial of counsel in justice courts may be missing a third item: a greater percent-
age of those charged in justice courts may be deemed not indigent than those charged in district courts. 
Utah’s courts are not currently required to track the information necessary to conclusively determine 
whether or not this is true.
38 In a letter dated June 18, 2015, Deputy Washington County Attorney Eric Clarke suggests that the 
list of reasons for actual denial of counsel in justice courts may be missing a third item: a greater percent-
age of those charged in justice courts may be deemed not indigent than those charged in district courts. 
Utah’s courts are not currently required to track the information necessary to conclusively determine 
whether or not this is true.
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I. 
MISAPPLICATION OF SIXTH AMENDMENT CASE LAW
A. Early appointment of counsel
In 2008, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed in Rothgery v. Gillespie County 
that the right to counsel attaches when “formal judicial proceedings have begun.”39 The 
Court carefully explained, however, that the question of whether the right to counsel 
has attached is distinct from the question of whether a particular proceeding is a “criti-
cal stage” at which counsel must be present as a participant.40
“Once attachment occurs, the accused at least is entitled to the presence of appointed 
counsel during any ‘critical stage’ of the postattachment proceedings . . .”.41 In other 
words, according to the Court, the Constitution does not necessarily require that de-
fense counsel be present at the moment that the right to counsel attaches, but from that 
moment forward, no critical stage in a criminal case can occur unless the defendant is 
represented by counsel or has made an informed and intelligent waiver of counsel. 
If the event that triggers attachment of counsel is not itself a critical stage, then that 
event can theoretically occur without counsel being appointed or being present; attach-
ment of the right to counsel triggers the need to appoint counsel to represent the de-
fendant at future critical stages. On the other hand, if the event that triggers attachment 
of counsel is itself a critical stage, then that event cannot occur unless the defendant is 
represented by counsel during the critical stage or has waived the right to counsel.42
39 Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 211 (2008); see also Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 
629 n.3 (1986); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 388-89 (1977).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 If it were always the case that the right to counsel attached before any critical stage occurred, then 
it would be a fairly simple and straight-forward matter for the magistrate before whom a defendant 
appears to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant and that counsel could then be prepared for and 
present at the first critical stage following. But things are not so clearly ordered in our criminal justice 
systems and there are wide variations among jurisdictions in the procedures they follow.
A defendant may be arrested before or after the formal institution of prosecution. A defendant may 
be in custody or may be at liberty at the time of the first appearance before a magistrate. Law enforce-
ment may arrest a defendant and wish to interrogate him, giving rise to the critical stage of custodial in-
terrogation, before he is brought before a magistrate for the first appearance. A prosecutor may desire to 
offer a plea bargain to a defendant who is under investigation prior to that defendant ever being arrested 
or brought before a magistrate for the first appearance. The events in a criminal case proceeding can and 
do occur in almost any order at all.
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The right to counsel attaches, according to the Supreme Court, at “a criminal defen-
dant’s initial appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge against 
him and his liberty is subject to restriction.”43 The event triggering the attachment of 
the right to counsel may be the custodial appearance of the defendant before a magis-
trate who informs him of the charges upon which he has been arrested and determines 
the conditions of his liberty, without regard to whether a prosecutor is aware of the 
arrest;44 or it may be the institution of prosecution, “whether by way of formal charge, 
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment,” without regard to 
whether the defendant is in jail or at liberty.45
Over the decades, the Supreme Court has inch-by-inch delineated many criminal case 
events as being critical stages, though it has never purported to have capped the list of 
events that might potentially fall into this category.46 Events that are definitely critical 
stages are: custodial interrogations both before and after institution of prosecution;47 
preliminary hearings prior to institution of prosecution where “potential substantial 
prejudice to defendant[s’] rights inheres in the . . . confrontation;”48 lineups and show-
ups at or after initiation of prosecution;49 during plea negotiations and at the entry of a 
guilty plea;50 arraignments;51 during the pre-trial period between arraignment until the 
beginning of trial;52 trials;53 during sentencing;54 direct appeals as of right;55 probation 
revocation proceedings to some extent;56 and parole revocation proceedings to some 
extent.57 
43 Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213.
44 Id. at 202.
45 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)); see 
also United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984) (plurality opinion).
46 The moments in which the defendant has to make choices are called the “critical stages” in a case. 
And by virtue of being “critical stages,” none of these proceedings can occur unless counsel is present or 
has been waived. Why? Because as the Supreme Court has noted, “the right to be represented by counsel 
is by far the most pervasive for it affects [an accused person’s] ability to assert any other rights he may 
have.” United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) (citing Shaefer, Federalism and State Criminal 
Procedure, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1956)).
47 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966); Mas-
siah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
48 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970).
49 Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 231 (1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972); United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-38 (1967).
50 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1386 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010); Mc-
Mann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 771 n.14 (1970).
51 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
52 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-399 (1977); Powell v. Alabama, 387 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
53 Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37, 40 (1972); In re 
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
54 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1386 (2012); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 538 (2003); Glover v. 
United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203-204 (2001); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). 
55 Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 621 (2005); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
56 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
57 Id.; cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (leaving open the question “whether the parolee 
is entitled to the assistance of retained counsel or to appointed counsel if he is indigent”).
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Most misdemeanor defendants in Utah’s 
justice courts do not have lawyers 
representing them. (See page 19.) The 
following courtroom observation is not 
an outlier, but is rather demonstrative of 
how the actual denial of counsel occurs 
with such routine.
A young woman appeared in a rural jus-
tice court for a status hearing. She had 
pled guilty to issuing a bad check (a class 
C misdemeanor) sometime prior and 
had been sentenced to attend Alcohol-
ics Anonymous (AA) classes and to pay 
$334 in fines and $1,079 in restitution.
As she stood before the court that day, 
the judge applauded the defendant for 
regularly attending the AA classes, but 
noted that she had yet to put any money 
toward her fines and restitution. “Are 
you prepared to pay anything today?” 
the judge asked.
“Judge, I am here to turn myself in,” 
the woman replied. “I am ready to have 
this whole thing over with.” Somewhat 
incredulously, the judge asked her point 
blank if she was seeking to go to jail. 
Acknowledging that she had no money 
and no job, she stated, “I see no prospect 
of paying, so I want to go to jail.”
 
“Ms. [Smith],” said the judge, “I am wor-
ried about your sense of hopelessness.”
 
“I am okay with it. I don’t want to keep 
coming here acting like I can pay it when 
I know I can’t. I am trying to take respon-
sibility for my actions.”
 
“I appreciate that,” the judge replied. 
“But I am a little concerned. You seem 
depressed.”
“I just want to have this behind me.”
 
“If I put you in jail, you understand that 
they are going to do a urine screen. 
What are they going to find?”
“Probably THC, pot, alcohol,” said the 
defendant.
 
“I appreciate your candor. Do you think 
your drug use is why you are de-
pressed?”
 
“I don’t know anything about that. I have 
never been tested for depression.”
 
“Hmm … Let me think.” The judge 
continued: “Here is what I can do for 
you. I will put you in jail. I will tell them 
that you will test dirty, but that will just 
give us a base line to gauge how well 
treatment works. I am going to have [the 
clinical representative from the local 
mental health agency] give you a screen. 
Maybe … you probably have something 
wrong mentally – well I don’t mean to 
assume that, but you appear to me to 
A closer Look
The UnCounseled Defendant
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be depressed. Perhaps he can find you a 
bed somewhere to get you the help you 
need.”
 
“Thank you, judge,” said the young 
woman. And then she was taken into 
custody.
In an interview upon conclusion of the 
docket, the judge admitted that at her 
original arraignment where a plea was 
taken, no counsel was assigned to the 
defendant because she was only getting 
fines and restitution. “Without jail on the 
table,” the judge stated, “there was no 
need for a lawyer.” Therefore, when the 
woman appeared in court that January 
day, according to Alabama v. Shelton she 
could not legally be sent to jail. 
When asked by what authority the judge 
put her in jail, the judge scratched his 
head and said it was a “tough question.” 
Questioned if he thought the defendant 
knowingly and intelligently decided to 
go to jail with no counsel to advise her, 
the judge responded, “absolutely … we 
like to see people take responsibility for 
their actions.” 
He believed this despite his assumption 
that she was depressed and her admis-
sion that she was on drugs.
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If the sentence available under statute involves potential incarceration for the accused, 
the arraignment proceeding cannot occur unless counsel is present or the right is intel-
ligently waived.58 However, in every justice court observed, with the exception of Salt 
Lake City and County justice courts, defendants were arraigned and subsequently sen-
tenced (another critical stage) to jail time or suspended sentences without any defense 
attorney present.59
B.  Suspended sentences
When a person pleads guilty to or is convicted of a misdemeanor, it is most often the 
case that they are placed on probation for some amount of time, during which they are 
required to make various payments and comply with other court-imposed conditions. 
Typically, the court suspends any jail or prison sentence during the time the person 
is on probation, and if the defendant successfully completes their probation they will 
never go to jail. If, however, there is an allegation that the defendant somehow violated 
the terms of probation, then the defendant may have to serve the full length of the jail 
sentence that had been suspended.
The U.S. Supreme Court noted in Alabama v. Shelton60 that a “suspended sentence is a 
prison term imposed for the offense of conviction. Once the prison term is triggered, 
58 Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37.
59 States and counties have long established ways to provide counsel at misdemeanor arraignments. 
Indeed, many are providing counsel at bail hearings when formal arraignments take place further out 
from arrest. For example, in each of Florida’s 20 judicial circuits (covering 67 counties), public defender 
offices staffed with full-time employees provide primary representation to indigent defendants. Each 
office is overseen by a popularly elected chief public defender to ensure independence from the judiciary 
and other government agencies. When a circuit public defender has a conflict – for example when there 
are multiple co-defendants or in instances of case overload – secondary representation is provided by 
five regional conflict defender offices covering each of the state’s five appellate jurisdictions. 
A defendant’s first appearance in Florida occurs within 24 hours of arrest, at which time the court 
reads the charges for which the defendant was arrested and decides issues of bail or release prior to 
arraignment. In Florida, an arraignment for in-custody defendants generally does not occur until 21 
days after the first appearance, with out-of-custody defendants generally being arraigned within 30 days. 
Because of this delay between initial appearance and arraignment, the defendant would suffer greatly if 
representation was delayed until the formal arraignment. Perhaps more importantly, because a defen-
dant might otherwise linger in jail for three weeks, it is critical that representation initiate with the first 
court appearance.
Florida’s 11th Judicial Circuit is a single-county district covering Miami-Dade County. There, the 
elected public defender created an early intervention unit which handles the case from initial appearance 
through arraignment, including any plea negotiations that may occur pre-arraignment (and particu-
larly negotiations related to reduction or dismissal of charges all together). The attorneys in the early 
intervention unit are solely dedicated to this function and therefore staff the courtrooms as part of their 
duties. For cases that are not resolved by this unit, the office will assign attorneys based on the severity 
of the charge so that the attorney is appropriately skilled to handle the complexity of the case. These 
attorneys will provide continuous representation from arraignment through disposition of the case. 
Office policies require both the early representation and the post-arraignment attorneys to interview and 
consult with clients before their court hearings.
60 505 U.S. 654 (2002).
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the defendant is incarcerated not for the probation violation, but for the underlying 
offense.”61 In other words, the lawyer representing a defendant in a probation revoca-
tion hearing cannot go back to the trial phase to challenge the government’s case on the 
original accusations – the accusations, after all, that most misdemeanor defendants in 
Utah’s justice courts had already faced without the assistance of counsel.  
Shelton made clear that the right to counsel attaches to any case involving the potential 
for jail time, no matter how remote the possibility and no matter that the sentence is 
suspended.62 Unless counsel is afforded to the defendant at the original trial or plea, 
then the judge is prohibited from ever imposing any amount of jail time. The Constitu-
tion further requires that defendants be advised of potential sanctions for each charge 
prior to being called upon to plead.63
Nevertheless, Utah’s justice courts frequently deny counsel to defendants solely be-
cause the immediate threat of jail was lifted and a suspended sentence was imposed as 
a condition of probation.64 In every justice court observed, defendants without counsel 
were given suspended sentences and probationary terms that, if revoked, would result 
in a loss of liberty,65 and defendants appeared for probation revocation hearings on 
charges for which they had not originally been represented by counsel.
61 Id. at 662.
62 The potential for time in jail includes misdemeanors with suspended sentences in which the defen-
dant remains at liberty unless the defendant fails the probationary terms.
63 The Constitution requires the judge to caution the defendant as to “the range of allowable punish-
ments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea” in order to ensure that the defendant’s plea, and with it 
his waiver of constitutional rights, is a “knowing, intelligent ac[t] done with sufficient awareness of the 
relevant circumstances.” Iowa v. Tovar, 541 US 77, 81 (2004) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 
742, 748 (1970)). Without knowing the seriousness of the charge, and especially the potential for time in 
jail as established by statute, defendants may feel representation is unnecessary.
64 Data is insufficient to determine the frequency with which this occurs across all justice courts, but 
interviews with judges suggest it occurs with regularity in many courts.
65 Importantly, the offenses carrying potential jail time that are heard in justice courts are not or-
dinances established by local governments. Utah’s cities and counties have no say over what types of 
conduct are punishable with incarceration. Rather, local governments are required to carry out criminal 
justice policies that are the choices of state government.
At the start of the site work, Utah law authorized a large portion of traffic offenses to be punished by 
jail sentences. As one district court judge noted, “We have vastly over-criminalized conduct in our state.  
Today, we’re all criminal offenders. I drive down the road five miles-per-hour more than I should, I get 
a ticket, and I’m a criminal.” The most serious traffic offenses carried the harshest punishments, as is the 
case in most states. But the state legislature attached potential jail sentences to a host of lesser traffic vio-
lations as well. While most traffic violations were and are classified as infractions (no imprisonment and 
fines up to $750), many minor traffic offenses, such as driving without a valid license, were considered 
class C misdemeanors and carried a maximum sentence of 90 days and fines up to $750. The most seri-
ous traffic offenses, such as drunk driving, qualified as class A misdemeanors and carried the possibility 
of up to one year in jail, and higher fines. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-301 (prior to 2015 amendment). 
On March 31, 2015, Utah Governor Gary Herbert signed into law HB 348 that decriminalized a 
significant number of non-violent acts and reclassified others to infractions carrying no jail time (e.g., 
traffic tickets carrying only a fine). The legislation came on the heels of a report that determined: “Six-
ty-two percent of offenders sent directly to prison from court in 2013 were sentenced for nonviolent 
crimes.” Utah Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, Justice Reinvestment Report 1 
(Nov. 2014).
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A closer Look
Suspended Sentences
One of the reasons for the actual denial 
of counsel across Utah’s justice courts 
is the misapplication of U.S. Supreme 
Court case law involving suspended 
sentences. (See page 24 for discussion 
of Alabama v. Shelton.) The following 
courtroom observation provides context 
for how such misapplication can occur.
In an urban justice court, a judge called 
one defendant to the podium in the cen-
ter of the courtroom. “Did you read the 
rights form?” the judge asked.i 
“Yes,” the defendant replied.  
“Do you have any questions?” the judge 
asked. The defendant did not. The judge 
then explained that the defendant was 
being charged with driving with a sus-
pended license,ii a class C misdemeanor, 
punishable under state statute by a $300 
fine and up to 90 days in jail. “Do you 
have any questions?” Again, the defen-
dant did not.
“You have the right to be represented by 
an attorney,” the judge stated. “Would 
you like to exercise that right and have 
an attorney assist you on this matter?” 
“Yes,” responded the defendant.
“Can you afford an attorney?” the judge 
inquired. The defendant stated: “No.”
“Okay. I’m not going to send you to jail 
for this,” the judge explained. “So, if 
you’re convicted, there is no possibility 
of jail time, and so I can’t give you an 
attorney at taxpayer expense. Does that 
change anything about what you want 
to do today?”
In an interview, the judge later clari-
fied his policy in relation to the right to 
counsel. “I’ll explain that if there there’s 
no possibility of jail time, regardless of 
what statute allows, I generally will not 
appoint counsel. In the past we were 
appointing counsel on cases when the 
city said it would not be seeking jail 
time. Ticky-tacky little cases – things like 
intoxication 1st offense – and even the 
public defenders were complaining.” 
Asked if months from now, should the 
defendant fail to adhere to the terms of 
the probation resulting from these types 
of “ticky-tacky” offenses, could he acti-
vate a suspended jail sentence at that 
time, the judge replied: “Yes, absolutely. 
I don’t like to, but it happens.”
But, as discussed on page 24, impos-
ing a suspended jail sentence later on, 
after refusing to appoint a lawyer to 
the defendant at the original charge, is 
precisely what the U.S. Supreme Court 
determined in Shelton is not allowed.
i  As with just about every court visited, upon arriving that day each defendant was provided a stan-
dardized Rights, Instructions, and Waiver Form, which among other things served to inform defen-
dants of their trial rights, including the right to appointed counsel. 
ii  Utah Code ann. §53-3-227.
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C.  Waiver of counsel
The U.S. Supreme Court is clear that an accused person has the constitutional right to 
represent himself, i.e. to proceed without the assistance of a lawyer.66 But first, courts 
are required to ensure that a defendant fully understands what he is doing before he 
waives the right to be represented by an attorney.67 For any such waiver to be valid, it 
must be knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.68
The constitutional “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent” standard69 exists, in large part, 
to protect the accused from the accused. Defendants may seek to waive counsel for any 
number of reasons. It is the court’s burden to ensure such waivers are effectively made. 
Thus, a judge must ensure that the defendant possesses the information necessary “to 
make an intelligent election” depending on “a range of case-specific factors, including 
the defendant’s education or sophistication, the complex or easily grasped nature of the 
charge, and the stage of the proceeding.”70
Yet, most justice courts visited use a video recording created and distributed by the 
Administrative Office of Courts to advise defendants of their constitutional rights and 
to give an overview of the criminal court process. The video touches upon the pre-
sumption of innocence, the right to a jury trial, a speedy trial, the right to remain silent, 
confront and examine witnesses, the right to appeal, and the right to the assistance of 
counsel. That a defendant has seen the video recording, or worse yet merely been 
66 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975). The Faretta Court held: “When an accused manages 
his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated 
with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must ‘knowingly and 
intelligently’ forgo those relinquished benefits. Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and 
experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be 
made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that 
‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’” Id. at 835 (internal citations omit-
ted).
67 Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942) (“The right to assistance of counsel 
and the correlative right to dispense with a lawyer’s help are not legal formalisms. They rest on consid-
erations that go to the substance of an accused’s position before the law. The public conscience must 
be satisfied that fairness dominates the administration of justice. An accused must have the means of 
presenting his best defense. He must have time and facilities for investigation and for the production of 
evidence. But evidence and truth are of no avail unless they can be adequately presented. Essential fair-
ness is lacking if an accused cannot put his case effectively in court. But the Constitution does not force 
a lawyer upon a defendant. He may waive his Constitutional right to assistance of counsel if he knows 
what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” (Internal citations omitted)).
68 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); see also United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) 
(“[T]he law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant 
fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances–
even though the defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it.”).
69 Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004).
70 Id.
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present in the room where that video was playing, however, does not mean she has 
understood the video.71
In fact, the reliance on the video in lieu of an individual colloquy by the judge is espe-
cially problematic. In one suburban justice courthouse, for example, defendants began 
arriving at 4:30pm for a calendar scheduled to start at 5:00pm. A law enforcement 
officer played the AOC’s rights video once a critical mass of defendants was seated in 
the courtroom. Meanwhile, however, more and more defendants continued to arrive. 
None of those who arrived late saw the whole video.72 A judge needs to make an indi-
vidualized determination to ensure a waiver is being made knowingly and intelligently, 
regardless of whether the defendant saw the video or not.
As another example, at an urban justice court, defendants clear through security and 
then check in at a clerk’s desk just beyond the metal detectors. From there, they are 
directed to go to a meeting room to one side (the courtroom is on the opposite side of 
the clerk’s desk). Ten or so rows of folding chairs face a television screen at the front of 
the meeting room, on which the AOC’s rights video is displayed in a continuous loop. 
Next to the television, a team of court interns sits at a desk where defendants check in 
and are handed a clipboard with forms to fill out and return.73 In theory, defendants are 
supposed to fill out the paperwork while also listening to the advice of rights video. In 
reality, most defendants arrive in the meeting room mid-way through the video, and 
few defendants sit through its entirety. A defendant’s failure to diligently watch the vid-
eo from middle-to-end and then beginning-to-middle – in order to ensure they caught 
the whole thing – does not constitute a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver.
The same holds true even if a defendant affixes his signature to a standardized court 
form explaining what a “knowing, voluntary and intelligent” waiver of the right to 
counsel is. (See side bar on advice of rights forms, page 32.) The court still needs an in-
dividualized, minimal examination into the defendant’s “education or sophistication” 
to ensure that the defendant can read and understand the language and vocabulary in 
which the form is written.74
Even presuming that defendants watch and understand the video, or read and under-
stand a standardized form, the dialogue between judge and defendant can often con-
fuse matters further. In fact, sometimes justice courts present the right to counsel in 
71 To be clear, the production of such videos is not in and of itself a bad thing. Indeed, information on 
rights should be widely disseminated by the AOC, including airing such videos before court. The point 
here is that a video cannot be the only thing a court does in regards to defendant’s rights. As explained in 
the next paragraphs, a formal colloquy by a judge must be made of each defendant.
72 Indeed, they were not tardy at all – court was not scheduled to commence until the top of the hour.
73 The clipboard contains the city’s Rights, Instructions, and Waiver Form, the justice court’s Contact 
and Current Information Form (defendants provide their contact information to the court clerks for 
future correspondence) and additional forms regarding any enhanceable offenses involved.
74 Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88.
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A closer Look
The defendant’s plea must be 
knowingly and intelligently made 
One of the reasons for the actual denial 
of counsel across Utah’s justice courts 
is the misapplication of U.S. Supreme 
Court case law involving the defendant’s 
waiver of constitutional rights. (See page 
27.) The following courtroom observa-
tion demonstrates how the improper 
waiver of the right to counsel, for exam-
ple, can result in a defendant entering a 
guilty plea without fully understanding 
the direct criminal consequences of his 
conviction.
A man in his mid-20s appeared at a rural 
justice court, where the judge informed 
him that he was being charged with fail-
ing to operate a vehicle within a single 
lane, a class C misdemeanor.i “You look 
like an educated young man,” the judge 
said to the defendant. “I’m assuming you 
can read and understand the English 
language?”
“Yes,” the defendant replied, and the 
judge handed him a piece of paper, 
explaining that the form was the advice 
of all of his rights. The defendant spent a 
minute or two reading the form, before 
signing it and returning it to the judge.
“You have the right to have an attorney 
to represent you at every proceeding 
in this court,” the judge began. “Do you 
wish to have an attorney to represent 
you today?”
“Um . . . no,” the defendant replied after 
a moment.
“Okay. I’m marking down ‘not today,’ 
because you can change your mind 
later,” the judge continued. “How do you 
plead?”
“I feel terrible about it,” the defendant 
began. He explained that he was driv-
ing down the two-lane state road and 
took a moment to look at his map – he 
was a bit lost, having recently moved to 
Utah – and, as he did, he drifted slightly 
over the yellow line. At that moment, a 
state trooper was driving in the oppo-
site direction. “I scared the officer half 
to death, and I feel horrible about that. 
I’m not contesting what happened – 
so yeah, I’m pleading guilty – but I’m 
just looking to see if I can get the fine 
reduced and to maybe get the points 
off my driving record, as this is my first 
offense ever.” The defendant explained 
that the officer had suggested that his 
$90 fine might be reduced and that he 
should talk to the judge about it. And 
that is why he opted to appear in court 
that day, rather than simply pay the 
ticket by mail.
“Okay,” said the judge, who had listed 
patiently and intently to the defendant’s 
explanation. “You’re looking at what is 
called a ‘plea in abeyance.’ You’ll need 
i  Utah Code ann. §41-6a-710(1)(a); 41-6a-202(2).
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to go next door and talk to the county 
attorney – he’s not in today, but you can 
schedule a time to talk with him the next 
time he’s in the office – and see if he’ll be 
willing to offer you a plea in abeyance.” 
The judge then explained the parame-
ters of a plea in abeyance,ii and said that 
he would set another hearing on the 
matter to give the defendant time to 
speak with the county attorney. 
“That seems like an awfully large waste 
of taxpayer resources,” said the defen-
dant. 
The judge replied that he couldn’t ad-
vise the defendant one way or another. 
“It’s your choice. Do you want to talk to 
the county attorney, or do you want to 
go ahead and plead guilty?”
“I’d rather not waste the taxpayers’ dol-
lars,” the defendant decided. 
The judge accepted the defendant’s 
guilty plea without ever advising the 
defendant of the range of penalties 
to which that plea would subject him. 
“Now, you have the right to be sen-
tenced within two to 45 days of entering 
your guilty plea. Or you can waive that 
right and be sentenced today. Do you 
wish to waive that right?” The defendant 
appeared confused and so the judge 
explained: “Do you want to hear what 
the fine is?” The defendant responded 
affirmatively. 
“Okay. Well, the cop got it wrong. The 
legislature recently changed the stat-
ute that sets the fines on these types 
of offenses,” said the judge. “The fine is 
now $120 [not $90]. I’m also sentencing 
you to five days of time in jail, and sus-
pending that for 36 months. What that 
means is, so long as you pay the fine and 
commit no similar offenses, then after 36 
months the jail time goes away.” 
“Whoa,” said the defendant. “That seems 
like a serious charge though.” The judge 
explained that indeed it was and re-
counted a recent car accident resulting 
in deaths.
“Yeah, but now you’re talking about 
jail time,” the defendant protested. “It 
seems almost like it’s a criminal charge.”  
“Well, in the state of Utah,” the judge 
replied, “it is a criminal charge.”
Later that day, while generally discuss-
ing the docket in his chambers, the 
judge explained that, even if the defen-
dant were to pay his $120 fine in full be-
fore leaving the courthouse that day, his 
probation would remain in effect for the 
full 36 months. And were he to commit 
any similar traffic violations, the suspen-
sion could be rescinded and his jail time 
could be imposed. Meanwhile, the judge 
continued, had the defendant merely 
paid the traffic ticket, rather than com-
ing to court that day, potential jail time 
would not have entered the equation.
ii  Utah law allows for a defendant to enter a guilty plea, but hold that plea in abeyance. Utah Code 
ann. §77-2a-1(1) (“’Plea in abeyance’ means an order by a court, upon motion of the prosecution and 
the defendant, accepting a plea of guilty or of no content from the defendant, but not, at that time, 
entering judgment of conviction against him nor imposing sentence upon him on condition that he 
comply with specific conditions as set forth in a plea in abeyance agreement.”). Importantly, Utah law 
expressly requires the assistance of counsel during plea in abeyance negotiations with the prosecu-
tion and that any waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing and intelligently made, in compli-
ance with U.S. Supreme Court case law. Utah Code ann. §77-2a-2(2). The failure to provide counsel 
both in the plea in abeyance negotiations and the entry of guilty pleas held in abeyance – common 
occurrences across the state – is, therefore, a violation of Utah statutes and the federal Constitution. 
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pre-Gideon terms.75 That is, defendants are advised they have a right to the assistance of 
a lawyer should they hire one, but the assistance of public counsel is mentioned only if 
defendants affirmatively ask for it. If defendants do not ask for counsel, the court does 
not offer counsel.
In criminal cases, the trial court cannot leave it to the defendant to seek counsel on 
his own. As the Supreme Court notes, “it is settled that, where the assistance of coun-
sel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be furnished counsel does not depend on 
a request.”76 Instead, the Court states that assistance of counsel must be affirmatively 
offered to the accused, and the offer must be made on the record: “Presuming waiver 
from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must be an alle-
gation and evidence which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently 
and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not waiver.”77
Despite U.S. Supreme Court case law determining that a defendant may waive the right 
to counsel only if the court determines that the decision is being made “knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently,” Utah justice courts regularly allow defendants to waive 
counsel without individualized inquiries into their decision to go without counsel.
75 Prior to Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Betts v. 
Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942), was the controlling law regarding the right to appointed counsel in state trial 
courts. In Betts, the diversity of right to counsel laws and statutes among state governments in that era 
was evidence to the Court “that, in the great majority of the States, it has been the considered judgment 
of the people, their representatives, and their courts that appointment of counsel is not a fundamental 
right, essential to a fair trial. . . . In the light of this evidence, we are unable to say that the concept of due 
process incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the States, whatever may be their own 
views, to furnish counsel in every such case.” The Fourteenth Amendment may have established certain 
federal rights as obligations upon state governments, but to the Betts Court the right to publicly appoint-
ed counsel was not such an obligation. Gideon overturned Betts in 1963.
76 Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962).
77 Id. at 516.
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Each municipality and county justice 
court crafts its own advice-of-rights form 
(sometimes called a waiver form). Often, 
the language included is inaccurate and 
inconsistent with the law. 
For example, some courts use a written 
form that incorrectly advises the ac-
cused persons that if they plead guilty, 
they give up the right to a lawyer. The 
form lists the rights available, includ-
ing to be represented by counsel, and 
states: “If you enter a plea of Guilty to 
the charge(s), you will give up the rights 
just mentioned . . . .” While this is the 
reality in that court, as no defender is 
present for most hearings, the law does 
not permit it. The defendant retains the 
right to representation in entering her 
guilty plea, and likewise she has the 
right to the assistance of counsel at her 
sentencing hearing. (See discussion of 
critical stages, page 20.)
Other courts use advice of rights and 
waiver forms that inform defendants: “if 
you cannot afford an attorney, request 
a court-appointed attorney by filing an 
affidavit at least 10 days before the pro-
ceeding. Failure to [hire a private lawyer 
or file an affidavit] will be treated as an 
implied waiver of your right to coun-
sel.”  This is also not consistent with the 
law. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated 
in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 
(1962): “Presuming waiver from a silent 
record is impermissible. The record must 
show, or there must be an allegation and 
evidence which show, that an accused 
was offered counsel but intelligently 
and understandingly rejected the offer. 
Anything less is not waiver.”
And, while many forms have a place to 
sign for a waiver of counsel, they have 
no place to sign to request counsel. For 
example, one form provides: 
I have read and I understand the foregoing 
rights and instructions. I understand the 
charge(s) and penalties. Any plea I enter 
is voluntary and of my own free will and 
choice. No force, threats, or unlawful influ-
ence have been made to get me to plead.
  (Date)    (Defendant)
I voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently 
waive my right to an attorney. I do not want 
an attorney; I want to represent myself.
  (Date)    (Defendant)
Although it is surely unintentional, the 
language of the form presents the right 
to counsel not as a choice between the 
two options of self-representation or 
having an attorney, but indeed as if the 
only option is to forego representation. 
The reliance on such forms with faulty 
language only compounds the issues 
discussed throughout this chapter.
A closer Look
The Written Advice-of-Rights Forms 
Sometimes get the law wrong
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II. 
Prosecutorial and Judicial interference 
in plea negotiations
The U.S. Supreme Court cautioned in Argersinger v. Hamlin: “Beyond the problem of 
trials and appeals is that of the guilty plea, a problem which looms large in misdemean-
or, as well as in felony, cases. Counsel is needed so that the accused may know precisely 
what he is doing, so that he is fully aware of the prospect of going to jail or prison, and 
so that he is treated fairly by the prosecution.”78 The U.S. Supreme Court estimates 
that 94 percent of all criminal convictions in state courts are the result of plea negotia-
tions,79 noting without judgment “the reality that criminal justice today is for the most 
part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”80
In the face of so many plea arrangements, states are free to serve as laboratories of 
democracy to try new ideas.81 However, “[w]hen a State opts to act in a field where its 
action has significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accord with the 
dictates of the Constitution.”82 And so, when Utah – like all of its sister states – seeks 
to resolve the overwhelming majority of its criminal cases through plea negotiations, it 
retains the original constitutional obligation to protect the rights of the accused.
Encouraging or otherwise directing unrepresented defendants to meet with prosecut-
ing attorneys to discuss plea deals, before making appointed counsel available to them, 
is a violation of the right to counsel. As discussed earlier, the plea negotiation is a crit-
ical stage of the case, meaning the negotiation cannot happen unless counsel is present 
or the defendant’s right to counsel has been knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
waived.83 Yet it is the practice of many justice courts to have prosecutors meet with un-
represented defendants to attempt to resolve the case prior to the defendant appearing 
before the judge. In others, the opportunity to meet with the prosecution is offered as 
though it is a chance to consult with an attorney who is looking out for the defendant’s 
interests. Neither is acceptable.84
78 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972).
79 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, No. 10-444, slip op. at 7 (2012). 
80 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012).
81 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis famously asserted that a “State may, if its citizens choose, 
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the coun-
try.” New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
82 Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401 (1985). 
83 Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004).
84 Prosecuting attorneys who speak directly with defendants, on their own volition or at the suggestion 
of the judge, risk violating their ethical duties. Rule 3.8 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct states in 
part: “The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: … (b) Make reasonable efforts to ensure that the accused 
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As the report of the National Right to Counsel Committee, Justice Denied, notes: “Not 
only are such practices of doubtful ethical propriety, but they also undermine de-
fendants’ right to counsel.”85 The National Right to Counsel Committee report notes 
further:86
Beyond the court’s role in making certain that a defendant’s waiver of counsel is 
valid, prosecutors have a professional responsibility duty “not [to] give legal advice 
to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel.”87 Similarly, 
the ABA has recommended that prosecutors should refrain from negotiating with 
an accused who is unrepresented without a prior valid waiver of counsel.88 Prosecu-
tors also are reproached by the ABA to ensure that the accused has been advised of 
the right to counsel, afforded an opportunity to obtain counsel, and not to seek to 
secure waivers of important pretrial rights from an accused who is unrepresented.89
Prosecutors are not always present in justice courts. In the majority of justice courts 
observed in which prosecutors are present, defendants are encouraged, if not instruct-
ed, to meet with the prosecutor in advance of the judge taking the bench. For example, 
in one municipal justice court, before the judge appeared, the prosecutor made a gener-
al announcement to the dozen or so individuals seated in the courtroom. Introducing 
himself, he said, “I’m the prosecuting attorney. I don’t represent you. You don’t have to 
talk to me if you don’t want to. The purpose today is to see if we can resolve the case, or 
if we will go to trial. So, do you want to try to resolve this today?” A prosecutor’s offer 
to “resolve” the case right away cannot be a substitute for the effective waiver of rights. 
In fact, the criminal process cannot presume defendants are aware of the rights they are 
waiving by entering into uncounseled negotiations directly with the prosecutor.90
has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable 
opportunity to obtain counsel; (c) Not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of import-
ant pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing.”
85 National Right to Counsel Committee, Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of 
our Constitutional Right to Counsel 8 (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.constitutionproject.
org/pdf/139.pdf.
86 Id., at 88. 
87 The National Right to Counsel Committee report, supra note 85, cites to ABA Model Rules, Rule 4.3. 
We note that Rule 4.3 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct is identical. 
88 ABA, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function 3-4.1(b), 3-3.10(a) (3d ed. 
1993).
89 Id. at 3-3.10(c).
90 Unlike any other state, prior to 2013 Colorado statutorily required misdemeanor defendants to meet 
with a prosecutor to discuss plea deals prior to applying for a public defender. Colo. Rev. Stat. §16-7-
301(4) (prior to 2013 amendment). Because that practice violated Rothgery’s clear edict that the right to 
counsel attaches at “a criminal defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns 
the charge against him and his liberty is subject to restriction,” Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 
191, No. 07-440, slip op. at 20 (2008), a federal lawsuit was filed in December 2010. Colorado Criminal 
Defense Bar v.  John Hickenlooper, No. 10-CV-02930-JLK-BNB (D. Colo.). The lawsuit was made moot 
when Governor Hickenlooper signed into law House Bill 13-1210 of the 2013 session, removing the 
requirement that misdemeanor defendants be made to confer with prosecutors without counsel.
The Office of the Colorado State Public Defender administers 21 regional defender offices across the 
state, each staffed with full time attorneys and substantive support staff. All administrative and support 
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In many justice courts, there are no prosecutors present and there are also no defense 
attorneys present. This leaves justice court judges responsible for all sides of the adju-
dicative process. Having judges judging, negotiating pleas, and advising defendants all 
at once creates a criminal process that is, in a word, non-adversarial.91
For example, in one suburban county’s justice court, a woman appeared for her ar-
raignment, accused of three separate animal control violations, each charge a class 
B misdemeanor.92 “You have the right to have a lawyer,” the judge began. “And, if 
you want, we can stop the proceeding until we can have a lawyer present. Would you 
like a lawyer or would you like to proceed today?” This presents the defendant with 
a “choice” that is in violation of the Supreme Court cases cited above on the right to 
counsel in plea negotiations and sentencing. The defendant responded that she would 
like to proceed, noting that it is “too stressful to come back.”
This specific justice court holds “open court,” which means defendants are required to 
appear in court within 14 days of the alleged incident, but the specific day they arrive 
in court is of their own selection. This policy choice is the justification for not having 
public counsel available at arraignment; the court has no way of knowing what defen-
dants will show up, nor how many. Meanwhile, this county justice court has but one 
part-time private attorney to call upon as defense counsel, who is paid a flat annual fee 
for his services.93
Such policy choices, however, inevitably create additional, unfair pressures for the 
accused. “Most people will waive the public defender if they can’t have representation 
immediately,” observed one urban justice court judge. This strongly suggests that, were 
the opposite to be true – that if public defenders were available to advise clients at the 
first critical stage, as constitutionally required – defendants would seek the assistance of 
a lawyer with greater frequency. In the face of such additional pressure to forego an at-
torney, created by cost concerns of the justice courts, the defendants’ failure to demand 
functions for these offices are handled by a central administrative office in Denver. An independent, 
five-member commission selects the system’s chief attorney, the state public defender, who is therefore 
responsible for implementing and enforcing the commission’s policies across the regional offices. In 
2014, the State Public Defender received an additional $8 million to begin providing representation at all 
misdemeanor initial appearances.
91 As one senior official of the Administrative Office of Courts noted: “Putting the judge in the position 
of prosecuting, judging, and advising is a structurally weak position with respect to judicial indepen-
dence.”
92 Utah Code Ann. §76-9-301.
93 From this lawyer’s perspective, is it fair if he is required to sit patiently in open court on a day in 
which no defendants choose to appear? He would get no extra pay for his time that day. Conversely, is 
it fair if he is required to represent each individual on a day in which 100 defendants choose to appear? 
Again, he receives the same flat fee no matter how many new clients he receives from the court on a 
given day. And so, open court serves to clear out a large number of his potential clients at their first 
appearance. 
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what should already have been provided to them does not constitute a valid waiver of 
that right.
Finally, many justice court judges expressed dislike for the reputation of the justice 
court system as being the “cash cow” of the local governments that established them.94 
But, by presenting the uncounselled defendant with the opportunity to reach a plea 
agreement with the prosecution or judge long before having the chance to consult with 
defense counsel, Utah’s justice courts appear to place concerns of costs and efficiency 
above the minimum requirements of the Constitution.
III. 
Appeals from Justice Courts
Utah’s appellate system is not set up to rectify any actual denial of counsel that occurs 
in justice courts. Although Utah’s justice courts are now required to make an audio 
recording of proceedings, the justice courts are not courts of record – there is no offi-
cial record from which cases can be appealed. Instead, defendants have a right to a “do 
over” in district court, known as a de novo review.95
But without counsel to advise them of this procedure, poor defendants simply do not 
know how to get a higher court to take a second look. In 2013, there were 79,730 total 
misdemeanors and misdemeanor DUI cases heard in all justice courts statewide. Only 
711 of such cases were reviewed de novo in all district courts combined (an appellate 
rate of 0.89%). Further still, while a “do over” might change the outcome in a particular 
case, it can never change the underlying systemic flaws that resulted in the denial of the 
right to counsel in the first place.96
94 This position has been documented before. See, e.g., Samuel P. Newton, et al, No Justice in Utah’s 
Justice Courts: Constitutional Issues, Systemic Problems, and the Failure to Protect Defendants in Utah’s 
Infamous Local Courts, Utah Law Review Online No. 1, 28 (2012), available at http://epubs.utah.edu/in-
dex.php/utahonlaw/article/viewArticle/762; Eric S. Peterson, Nickeled and Dimed: Utah’s Justice Courts 
Exact Their Pound of Flesh, Salt Lake City Weekly 18, (May 27, 2010), available at http://e.cityweekly.
net/cityweekly#2010/05/27/s1/?article=884757&z=49.
95 De novo translated from Latin means: “from the new.” When a district court hears a case de novo, it 
is not reviewing the justice court’s decision for legal or procedural errors, like a direct appeal. Instead, it 
is essentially a new trial, whereby the district court is examining the same evidence previously presented 
in justice court.
96 It is possible that other factors come into play as well. Consider the defendant who could have opted 
to pay his $90 traffic ticket, but who came to court to seek a better case outcome – only to leave with 
probation and a suspended jail sentence. (Side bar, page 29.) The lesson learned might be that the more 
he fights, the worse it will be for him. Defendants could be forgiven for thinking that a new hearing in 
district court – where even more serious crimes are adjudicated – would only make matters worse.
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A closer Look
Constructive Denial of Counsel 
in Justice Court 
Constructive denial of counsel can take 
many forms. One such form of structural 
interference is for appointed counsel to 
be provided in an assembly-line fashion, 
where one attorney handles one part 
of a case and then passes the client on 
to another attorney to handle the next 
court hearing, etc. Nationally referred to 
as “horizontal representation,” this as-
sembly-line method fosters long periods 
of time where defendants have repre-
sentation in name only.
For example, the city of Ogden contracts 
with one private attorney to provide 
public defender services in its justice 
court. One judge explained, however, 
that the contract defender only appears 
in court one day per week, usually Fri-
days. For the remaining days – Mondays 
through Thursdays – the lawyer subcon-
tracts with various other private attor-
neys to provide courtroom coverage. 
All specifics, including the subcontract-
ing attorneys’ rate of pay, expectations, 
and responsibilities, are negotiated 
directly between the primary contract 
defender and the other private attor-
neys, and without input from the city 
or the justice court judges. And, there 
is no regularity with the public defend-
er’s scheduling arrangements, meaning 
judges often do not know which public 
defender will show up on a given day.
As a matter of practice, if the public 
defender assigns himself to Friday’s 
court calendar for a given week, he calls 
around to other private attorneys to 
cover the remaining days that week. The 
coverage responsibilities, and even the 
attorneys selected, often change from 
one week to the next. 
So, a defendant might appear for ar-
raignment, enter a not-guilty plea, and 
be granted appointed counsel to assist 
her at her next court appearance – the 
pretrial conference. The judge explained 
that she used to have defendants talk 
to the public defender the morning of 
arraignment, but that it took too much 
time. Now the judge just enters a not-
guilty plea and sets the case for pretrial. 
The attorney who will represent the 
defendant during the pretrial confer-
ence is whomever happens to have that 
calendar day.
This means, during the intervening 
three- to four-week period between 
arraignment and pretrial conference, the 
defendant has no way of knowing who 
her appointed lawyer will be. And so, 
no work will be done on her behalf. For 
appointed counsel, the pretrial is their 
entry point on the case, and the attor-
ney who was present at arraignment 
has completed his work on behalf of the 
defendant.
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Should that defendant choose to sched-
ule her case for trial, rather than accept 
a plea offer at the pretrial stage, she will 
continue to have appointed counsel to 
assist her at that next hearing. But there 
is no guarantee that the same lawyer 
standing beside her at the pretrial will 
be standing beside her once more for 
her trial date. In fact, neither she nor any 
of the private lawyers have any idea who 
will be representing her on any future 
court date. 
And so, during the intervening three or 
four weeks between her pretrial and trial 
date, the defendant who exercises the 
right to counsel and the right to trial is 
left entirely without an attorney. At the 
time when trial preparation is the most 
essential element in her defense, she is 
left with no lawyer to consult, no one 
interviewing witnesses or investigating 
the facts, no one filing motions, etc. At 
the day of trial, even if she is fortunate 
enough to be assigned the same pri-
vate attorney to assist her for that court 
appearance, her lawyer is starting from 
scratch.
Chapter 3
Constructive denial of counsel
Part A: Accountability & Independence
Determining whether a jurisdiction’s indigent defense services satisfy the first prong 
of Cronic (“actual denial of counsel”) is relatively straightforward: either the indigent 
accused has an attorney or not. Determining whether the jurisdiction’s services satisfy 
Cronic’s second prong (“constructive denial of counsel”) is more complicated to assess 
and explain. This is because a public defense lawyer is indeed present in the courtroom, 
but systemic deficiencies prevent that lawyer from effectively advocating for the stated 
interests of each and every defendant assigned. Accordingly, the analysis of construc-
tive denial of counsel is divided into three chapters explaining: 
Chapter III: How a lack of structural accountability and independence encour-
ages constructive denials of counsel;
Chapter IV: How systemic financial conflicts of interest encourage constructive 
denials of counsel; and,
Chapter V: How systemic structures interfere with the sufficiency of time need-
ed to effectively defend indigent defense cases. 
This chapter explains governments’ obligation to provide effective representation 
before detailing how indigent defense services are structured for district court in each 
of the ten sample counties. The chapter concludes with an assessment of whether each 
county’s district court indigent defense services have the necessary independence and 
accountability to provide effective representation.
I. 
The Right to Effective Representation
In Gideon v. Wainwright, the U.S. Supreme Court declared it an “obvious truth” that 
anyone accused of a crime and who cannot afford the cost of a lawyer “cannot be 
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”97 But what is often less obvious 
to state, county, and municipal policymakers is that the attorney provided must also be 
97 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
40 The Right to Counsel in Utah: An Assessment of Trial-Level Indigent Defense SErvices
effective. Faced with competing financial priorities, government officials can incorrect-
ly assume that so long as every defendant is provided with an attorney then the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is satisfied. That is not true.98 Just as you would not go to 
a dermatologist for heart surgery, despite both doctors being licensed practitioners, a 
real estate or divorce lawyer cannot handle a complex felony case competently.99
In Utah, the practice of law is governed and regulated by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Failure to adhere to the state court’s Rules of Professional Conduct may result in disci-
plinary action against the attorney – even loss of license to practice law.100 Rule 1.1 of 
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct requires all lawyers to be “competent” in carry-
ing out their duties to clients.101 Importantly, there is no exception to this rule. Attor-
neys must know what legal tasks need to be considered in each and every case, and 
then how to do them. 
Although attorneys graduate from law school with a strong understanding of the prin-
ciples of law, legal theory, and generally how to think like a lawyer, no graduate enters 
the legal profession automatically knowing how to be an intellectual property lawyer, a 
consumer protection lawyer, or an attorney specializing in estates and trusts, mergers 
and acquisitions, or bankruptcy.102 Such specialties must be developed. 
98 As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984), a lawyer 
needs to offer the accused something more than a warm body: “That a person who happens to be a 
lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional com-
mand.” 
99 As Chief Justice Christine Durham said in her 2012 State of the Judiciary Address: “Most citizens 
are as knowledgeable about the laws and the rules as I am about the inner workings of my automobile. 
When my car breaks, I need an expert.”
100 While 49 of 50 states have adopted model rules for the legal profession, the state of Utah was early to 
do so in 1987. According to the Utah State Bar Office of Professional Conduct: “The practice of law in the 
State of Utah is regulated by the Utah Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has delegated to the Office of 
Professional Conduct (“OPC”) the responsibility of investigating allegations that an attorney has violated 
the Rules of Professional Conduct and of prosecuting those allegations in accordance with the Rules of 
Lawyer Discipline and Disability.” Utah State Bar Office of Professional Conduct, http://www.utahbar.org/
opc/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2015).
101 Utah Judicial Council, Rules of Judicial Administration, C. 13: Rules of Professional 
Conduct Rule 1.1. (Competence) (hereinafter “RPC”), available at http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/
rules/ucja/ch13/1_1.htm ( “A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary 
for the representation.”).
102 Christopher Sabis and Daniel Webert, Understanding the Knowledge Requirement of Attorney Com-
petence: A Roadmap for Novice Attorneys, 15 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 915, 915 (2001-2002) (“The Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) provide that an attorney 
must possess and demonstrate a certain requisite level of legal knowledge in order to be considered 
competent to handle a given matter. The standards are intended to protect the public as well as the image 
of the profession. Failure to adhere to them can result in sanctions and even disbarment. However, 
because legal education has long been criticized as being out of touch with the realities of legal practice 
and because novice attorneys often lack substantive experience, meeting the knowledge requirements of 
attorney competence may be particularly difficult for a lawyer who recently graduated from law school 
or who enters practice as a solo practitioner.”).
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The specialization of the legal profession, once thought of as cause for concern,103 has 
been embraced in recent decades.104 Now, in large part, it is accepted as a necessary 
fact.105 Criminal defense is an especially complex specialty area of law.106 As such, 
Utah’s Rules of Professional Conduct require that public defense lawyers be minimally 
qualified to handle any case to which they are assigned. The attorney’s ability to provide 
minimally effective representation is dependent upon his familiarity with the “substan-
tive criminal law and the law of criminal procedure and its application in the particular 
jurisdiction.”107
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.1 suggests that longevity alone is no substitute for 
ability.108 The most senior lawyer may be the least qualified to handle the most serious 
case. Attorneys may feel that they know how to interview the client, draft motions, 
and advocate at sentencing, and that they have all the tools they need from years gone 
by. But without constant honing, those tools lose their edge. For this reason, Rule 1.1 
requires attorneys to maintain their competence.109 Ongoing training, therefore, is an 
active part of the job of being a public defense provider. 
103 Gary A. Munneke, Why Specialize? ABA J., Jan. 2009 (“The term ‘specialization’ has a checkered 
past. Traditionally, upon being licensed to practice law, lawyers were presumed to be qualified to provide 
services to clients in any substantive legal field. Specialization was viewed as a form of attracting new 
clients, which was prohibited under ethical standards until 1977, when the U.S. Supreme Court held in 
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona that a blanket prohibition of lawyer advertising was unconstitutional. In 
1990, the Court, in Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Committee, held that the bar could not 
categorically prevent lawyers from making communications about their specialties.”), available at http://
apps.americanbar.org/lpm/lpt/articles/bkr01091.shtml.
104 John W. Reed, Specialization, Certification, and Exclusion in the Law Profession, 27 Okla. L. Rev. 
456, 460 (1974) (“[T]he bar has not been willing to recognize specialization. The fact is specialization 
exists in the bar. . . . Specialization has long existed at the bar, and the question is not whether it exists 
but whether we recognize it.”).
105 Munneke, supra note 103 (“The reality of practicing law in the United States today is that individu-
als and law firms cannot do everything; they must choose to handle some legal work and decline or refer 
other work. As society has become more diverse, the law has become more complex. As more lawyers 
have chosen to concentrate their practice areas, the threshold of competence has increased in many 
fields. As clients have grown more sophisticated, they have increasingly sought lawyers with greater 
expertise in the areas of the clients’ legal problems over lawyers with general legal knowledge of the law. 
Generalists simply cannot compete with specialists.”).
106 As the American Bar Association (ABA) explained more than 20 years ago, “[c]riminal law is a 
complex and difficult legal area, and the skills necessary for provision of a full range of services must be 
carefully developed. Moreover, the consequences of mistakes in defense representation may be substan-
tial, including wrongful conviction and death or the loss of liberty.” ABA, ABA Standards for Crimi-
nal Justice: Providing Defense Services Standard 5-1.5 and commentary (3d ed. 1992) (hereinafter 
“ABA Standards for Defense Services”).
107 National Legal Aid & Defender Association, Performance Guidelines for Criminal De-
fense Representation Guideline 1.2(a) (hereinafter “Guidelines”).
108 RPC, Rule 1.1, comment 2 (“A newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with 
long experience.”).
109 RPC, Rule 1.1, comment 6 (“To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep 
abreast of changes in the law and its practice, engage in continuing study and education and comply with 
all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.”).
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Rule 1.1 makes clear there is no absolute level of training or experience a lawyer must 
achieve as prerequisite to being qualified to handle a certain case. “A newly admitted 
lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience.”110 However, that a 
novice attorney can become competent to handle a certain case is not to suggest that all 
novices are competent to handle any type of case. As the Study Committee notes: “Pub-
lic defenders fresh from the bar exam should not be representing clients charged with 
rape of a child or aggravated murder.”111
But, requiring attorneys to attend training for training’s sake would also be count-
er-productive when it comes to achieving the constitutional demands of minimum ef-
fectiveness. As the Study Committee suggests, the maintenance of one’s competence is 
not attained through the pursuit of an arbitrary number of continuing legal education 
(CLE) hours. In fact, the lawyer must be required to attend training “commensurate to 
the complexity and seriousness of the case” to which he is assigned.112 In other words, 
attending CLE training in real estate law or insurance defense may satisfy the Utah 
State Bar’s annual requirements,113 but does nothing to achieve or maintain compe-
tence in the defense of the criminally accused. Training must be tailored instead to the 
types and levels of cases for which the attorney seeks public appointments. If the lawyer 
has not received training on the latest forensic sciences and case law related to drugs, 
then the government should ensure that lawyer is assigned no drug-related cases. 
For these reasons, all national standards, including those of the National Advisory 
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals,114 require that the indigent 
defense system provide attorneys with access to a “systematic and comprehensive” 
training program,115 at which attorney attendance is compulsory, in order to maintain 
competency from year to year.
110 RPC, Rule 1.1, comment 2.
111 Study Committee Standards, supra note 14.
112 Id.
113 Utah State Bar, MCLE Requirements: Active Status Lawyers Complying 2013 and 2014 Re-
quirements (“A minimum of 24 hours of accredited CLE which shall include a minimum of 3 hours of 
accredited ethics or professional responsibility. One of the three hours of ethics or professional responsi-
bility shall be in the area of professionalism and civility. …”), available at http://www.utahbar.org/mcle/
mcle-requirements/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2015).
114 Building upon the work and findings of the 1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement 
and Administration of Justice, the Administrator of the U.S. Department of Justice Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration appointed the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards 
and Goals (hereinafter “NAC”) in 1971, with DOJ/LEAA grant funding to develop standards for crime 
reduction and prevention at the state and local levels. The NAC crafted standards for all criminal justice 
functions, including law enforcement, corrections, the courts, and the prosecution. Chapter 13 of the 
NAC’s report sets the standards for the defense function. National Advisory Commission on Crimi-
nal Justice Standards and Goals, Report of the Task Force on the Courts, c.13 (The Defense) 
(1973) (hereinafter “NAC Standards”), available at http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Stan-
dards/Standards_For_The_Defense. 
115 Id. at Standard 13.16 (“The training of public defenders and assigned counsel panel members should 
be systematic and comprehensive.”). 
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If a public defense provider does not have the “knowledge and experience to offer qual-
ity representation to a defendant in a particular matter,” then the attorney is obligat-
ed to move to withdraw from the case or, better yet, to refuse the appointment at the 
outset.116 
But if no one monitors the qualifications, training, and performance of attorneys, then 
no one knows who is or is not meeting their professional ethics, and a government’s 
obligation to ensure effective representation is unfilled. This call for systemic quality 
control is reflected in the Study Committee’s standards requiring each public defense 
system to “safeguard against both case-specific and systemic violations of the right to 
counsel.”117 The words “safeguard against” are proactive in nature, rather than reac-
tive.118 
Government, therefore, has an affirmative duty to:
1. Establish minimum standards related to:
a. Public defense attorney qualifications;
b. Requisite training to remain qualified; and,
c. Performance expectations.
2. Provide access to training.
3. Monitor compliance with established standards. 
116 Id., see also Guidelines, supra note 107, at 1.2 (b) ( “Prior to handling a criminal matter, counsel 
should have sufficient experience or training to provide quality representation,” and at 1.3(a) ( “Before 
agreeing to act as counsel or accepting appointment by a court, counsel has an obligation to make sure 
that counsel has available sufficient time, resources, knowledge and experience to offer quality repre-
sentation to a defendant in a particular matter. If it later appears that counsel is unable to offer quality 
representation in the case, counsel should move to withdraw.”). 
The requirement of public defense lawyers to withdraw from cases, rather than provide incompetent 
representation, is reflected in the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.16.
117 Study Committee Standards, supra note 14, Standard 7.
118 The Oxford Dictionary defines the word “safeguard” as: “to prevent something undesirable” or to 
“protect from harm or damage with an appropriate measure.” Oxford University Press, “Safeguard” 
Definition, Oxford Dictionaries, available at http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/amer-
ican_english/safeguard (last visited Sept. 11, 2015).
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II. 
The Structure of Indigent Defense Services in Utah
As discussed previously, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution re-
quires effective representation119 be provided to the indigent accused at all critical stag-
es120 of a criminal case for which the defendant may potentially be incarcerated.121 In 
Gideon v. Wainwright, the U. S. Supreme Court made the provision of indigent defense 
services a state obligation through the Fourteenth Amendment.122
However, right to counsel services in Utah are administered under the adage that the 
government closest to the people governs best.123 Numerous local agencies and officials 
spread across the state’s 29 counties and 236 municipalities therefore share the respon-
sibility for ensuring the sufficiency of public defense services provided in Utah’s 36 
district courts and 133 justice courts.124
Utah Code 77-32-302 provides for three indigent defense delivery models:
Defender office: Full or part-time public defenders paid an annual salary. 
Unlike other states, no public defenders in Utah are gov-
ernment employees. Rather, defender offices are non-profit 
entities under contract to the county.
119 The constitutional imperative for effective representation is discussed at page 39.
120 The critical stages of a criminal case are enumerated at page 21.
121 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Gideon Court determined that the indigent accused 
has the right to public counsel in felony proceedings. The Supreme Court has since clarified that the 
Sixth Amendment requires the appointment of counsel in any case in which a defendant may potentially 
face a loss of liberty. The Gideon mandate now extends to: direct appeals, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 
353 (1963); juvenile delinquency proceedings, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); misdemeanors carrying jail 
time as a potential penalty, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); misdemeanors with suspended 
sentences, Alabama v. Shelton, 505 U.S. 654 (2002); and, appeals challenging an unagreed-to sentence as 
a result of a guilty plea, Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005).
122 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343-45.
123 This is true of many government functions in Utah, where citizens have access to local policymakers 
and public employees to resolve issues, rather than having to deal with large statewide bureaucracies 
centered in Salt Lake City.
124 For example, although county commissioners are responsible for funding indigent defense services 
in district court, the elected commissioners generally do not provide direct oversight of those services. 
To varying degrees throughout the state, decisions about contracting for public defense services, attor-
ney qualifications, and ultimately the competency of services rendered may involve judges and county 
attorneys. Funding for public defense in municipal justice courts commonly is a decision of a city mayor 
made in conjunction with city councils or commissioners, but oversight of the Sixth Amendment in the 
lower courts is generally thought to be the domain of either a city prosecutor or a justice court judge. In 
most county justice courts, however, the responsibility for public defense services generally follows from 
whatever oversight structure has been decided upon for district court representation. 
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Contracts: Individual attorneys, consortia of attorneys, or law firm 
paid a set rate to provide primary or conflict services, or 
paid to represent specific case types.
Assigned counsel: Where no contract system or defender office exists, the 
court appoints a private attorney paid at an hourly rate es-
tablished by the court. However, Utah Code 77-32-304.5(2)
(f) establishes caps on total compensation: $3,500 for a 
non-capital felony case; $1,000 for a misdemeanor; and, 
$2,500 for the direct appeal. (Compensation caps may be 
waived with prior court approval following a hearing.)
How these three basic models are employed across Utah’s various district and jus-
tice courts requires further clarification. First, none of the three models are mutually 
exclusive. A county may employ a defender office for primary services, but use contract 
attorneys to represent those defendants with whom the defender office has a conflict 
of interest.125 Additionally, service models may vary between district and justice courts 
within a county. That is, a county may employ a defender office for district court and 
contract with private attorneys for county justice courts. And, variation can occur 
between how a county delivers services in county courts and how a municipality within 
the county’s borders chooses to organize services in its justice court.126
Moreover, within each delivery service model there can be significant variations in im-
plementation. For example, the state’s two most populous counties (Salt Lake County 
and Utah County) both employ a defender office. However, the defender office in Utah 
County is also the agency that selects attorneys for conflict representation,127 whereas 
the defender office in Salt Lake County plays a different role. In Salt Lake County, the 
defender office is the funding agency for conflict representation, but the actual selec-
tion of private attorneys for conflict representation is a function of the district court 
judges. 
The contract model has variations too. For district court representation, Washington 
and Weber counties contract with an individual attorney to administer contracts with 
private defense attorneys. Davis County similarly has a defense coordinator, but the 
position is an employee of county government rather than another private contractor. 
Contrastingly, there are no contract defense lawyer administrators in Cache, San Juan, 
Sanpete, Tooele, and Uintah counties, though all use a contract system to provide de-
fense services.
125 It is unethical for the same attorney or law firm to represent co-defendants charged with the same 
crime whose interests are at odds with one another. The “primary” system takes co-defendant #1 and 
the “conflict” system takes co-defendant #2. For example, Salt Lake County contracts with a private 
non-profit law firm – the Salt Lake Defender Association – to provide primary public defense services 
but conflict services are provided by private attorneys under contract.
126 For example, a non-profit defender office provides primary services in the Salt Lake County and Salt 
Lake City justice courts, but the rest of the municipal justice courts in Salt Lake County operate their 
own contract systems.
127 The defender office in Utah County contracts with seven private attorneys for conflicts.
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Utah is one of just two states requiring local governments to fund and administer all 
indigent defense services.128 Though it is not believed to be unconstitutional for a state 
to delegate its constitutional responsibilities to its counties and cities, in doing so the 
state must guarantee that local governments are not only capable of providing adequate 
representation, but that they are in fact doing so.129 The State of Utah, however, has 
no institutional statewide presence, and a limited statewide capacity, to ensure that its 
constitutional obligations under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments are being met 
at the local level. 
For example, at the outset of this project, no statewide government entity could detail 
how public defense services are provided in each and every district and justice court or 
give the names of all of the lawyers who represent the accused. Indeed, unbeknownst to 
policymakers, outside of the two largest counties (Salt Lake County and Utah County), 
the bulk of the indigent defense workload throughout the state is handled by a small 
number of private attorneys. (See side bar, next page.) This is important because Utah 
cannot determine for itself the effectiveness of its right to counsel services if it does not 
first know who handles public defense cases from one county to the next.
Moreover, though Section 301 of the Indigent Defense Act speaks of “minimum stan-
dards for defense of an indigent,”130 the standards mentioned there do not address the 
full parameters of effective representation.131 Other than the current work of the Study 
128 The other state is Pennsylvania.
129 In other words, the state has an obligation to ensure that the counties are capable of meeting the 
obligations and that counties actually do so. Cf. Robertson v. Jackson, 972 F.2d 529, 533 (4th Cir. 1992) 
(although administration of a food stamp program was turned over to local authorities, “’ultimate re-
sponsibility’ . . . remains at the state level.”); Osmunson v. State, 17 P.3d 236, 241 (Idaho 2000) (where a 
duty has been delegated to a local agency, the state maintains “ultimate responsibility” and must step in 
if the local agency cannot provide the necessary services); Claremont School Dist. v. Governor, 794 A.2d 
744 (N.H. 2002) (“While the State may delegate [to local school districts] its duty to provide a constitu-
tionally adequate education, the State may not abdicate its duty in the process.”); Letter and white paper 
from American Civil Liberties Union Foundation et al to the Nevada Supreme Court, The Obligation of 
States in Providing Constitutionally-Mandated Right to Counsel Services (Sept. 2, 2008) (“While a state 
may delegate obligations imposed by the constitution, ‘it must do so in a manner that does not abdicate 
the constitutional duty it owes to the people.’”) available at http://www.nlada.net/sites/default/files/
nv_delegationwhitepaper09022008.pdf.
130 Section 301 of the Indigent Defense Act states: “(1) Each county, city, and town shall provide for the 
legal defense of an indigent in criminal cases in the courts and various administrative bodies of the state 
in accordance with legal defense standards as defined in Subsection 77-32-201(8).” Utah Code Ann. § 
77-32-301. “Legal defense” as defined in the Utah Code “means to: (a) provide defense counsel for each 
indigent who faces the potential deprivation of the indigent’s liberty; (b) afford timely representation by 
defense counsel; (c) provide the defense resources necessary for a complete defense; (d) assure undivided 
loyalty of defense counsel to the client; (e) provide a first appeal of right; and (f) prosecute other rem-
edies before or after a conviction, considered by defense counsel to be in the interest of justice except 
for other and subsequent discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings.” Utah Code Ann. § 
77-32-201(8).
131 For an understanding of how performance standards can establish the full parameters of effective 
representation, readers need look no further than the State of Nevada. In January 2008, the Nevada 
Supreme Court issued Administrative Order ADKT-411, instituting performance standards for indigent 
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Given the various possible permuta-
tions in service delivery approaches (see 
discussion of Utah’s indigent defense 
structures, page 44), identifying the 
lawyers who provide indigent defense 
representation in each of Utah’s district 
and justice courts required extensive 
data analysis. 
Utah has a unified court data collection 
system that houses a significant amount 
of information on indigent defense ser-
vices. It is one of only a few states with 
a decentralized approach to right to 
counsel services that also collects robust 
indigent defense data. Significantly, the 
data appears to be reported uniformly 
by local court clerks across all jurisdic-
tions and levels of court.
At the outset of this evaluation, the 
Study Committee requested infor-
mation from the Utah Administrative 
Office of the Courts (AOC) on all crim-
inal cases heard in all Utah justice and 
district courts (not merely those of the 
ten sample counties) for calendar years 
2011-2013.i The AOC dataii reveals that, 
outside of the two largest counties, a 
relatively small number of private attor-
neys handle the majority of Utah’s right 
to counsel workload throughout the 
state. Prior to this study, however, this 
simple fact was unknown. 
To explain, the data showed that there 
are a total of 217 attorneys providing 
indigent defense services throughout 
Utah.iii  The two institutional public de-
fenders in Salt Lake and Utah Counties 
i   The AOC produced two databases (one for district courts; one for justice courts) listing every attorney who 
handled even a single criminal case over the three-year requested time period. Mary Westby, Court of Appeals 
staff attorney, is recognized for serving as a resource on questions of law throughout the project and for acting 
as conduit to the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) regarding court data. George Braden, Management 
Analyst of the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC), is thanked for responding to numerous requests for 
large amounts of data in a timely and professional manner. The authors of this report received the AOC district 
court data on June 6, 2014 and the justice court data on July 17, 2014.
ii   The 2013 AOC data was sorted by court and by attorney, and the total number of cases was then arranged in 
descending order (from greatest to fewest). The district court data was sorted by “felony” cases and justice court 
data was sorted by “misdemeanor” cases.
iii   A blind data review was conducted to test hypotheses regarding who provides indigent defense services in 
each of the ten sample counties. That is, researchers who did not participate in a particular site visit identified 
likely indigent defense providers based solely on the available data. Site team members who visited that county 
then provided site notes confirming the identity of the indigent defense providers. 
     For example, in 2013, the Tooele District Court processed 503 felony cases, and the attorney handling the case 
was identified in 474 of those cases. (29 did not have an attorney of record listed, an “unmarked” rate of 5.77%). 
Though 67 individual lawyers were named, 58 of them handled only two or fewer felony cases that year. Of the 
remaining nine lawyers, three handled 75% of all felony cases in which an attorney was identified. Additionally, 
the three attorneys had near identical felony caseloads (123 felony cases, 122 cases and 115 cases, respectively). 
A closer Look
Determining who provides 
public defense services in Utah
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employ 77 county-funded attorneys. 
The remaining 139 individual private 
attorneys provide services under con-
tract. Of those 139 contract lawyers, the 
majority (93) each have a single contract 
to provide indigent defense services in 
only one criminal court. The remaining 
46 contract attorneys, however, serve as 
an indigent defense provider in multiple 
courts.
On average, each of these 46 attorneys 
holds more than three indigent defense 
contracts.iv  As a result, outside of the 
two largest counties (Salt Lake County 
and Utah County), the bulk of the indi-
gent defense workload is handled by a 
surprisingly small number of contract 
defenders.v
Based on this data, a researcher unfamiliar with Tooele County services identified these three attorneys as likely 
being indigent defense providers for that jurisdiction, and also discerned that the Tooele District Court likely 
assigned cases to the contract lawyers on a rotational basis. Afterwards, site team members who visited Tooele 
County confirmed that the three identified attorneys were indeed the indigent defense providers for Tooele 
District Court and that the court tries to assign cases on a pure rotational basis when possible.
     This method was successful at correctly identifying the defense providers (both primary and conflict) in each 
of the ten sample counties visited.
     Extrapolating from the state-wide data and applying this same method, public defense providers were identi-
fied across Utah for the vast majority of courts (some courts have so few cases that a primary public defense pro-
vider could not be identified). The AOC data identifying individual attorneys’ cases by court does not distinguish 
retained clients’ cases from court-appointed cases (i.e., indigent defense cases). The data analysis methodology 
takes this into consideration. In most jurisdictions nationwide, the indigent defense caseload is the significant 
majority of the total caseload for all lawyers representing criminal defendants in a given court. Therefore, the 
working hypothesis is that the lawyer(s) handling the significant majority of cases for each Utah courthouse is 
probably doing so under contract with the local government.
iv   Of the 46 private attorneys who provide indigent defense services in more than one court, each holds, on 
average, 3.11 indigent defense contracts. These contracts involve either multiple district courts, multiple justice 
courts, or, most often, a combination of both justice and district courts. One attorney, for example, is handling 
indigent cases for seven different courts (one district and six justice courts over two different counties).
v   The 46 contract defenders together represented defendants in 13,304 of the 24,373 felony and misdemeanor 
cases handled by all non-institutional indigent defense providers. This means that approximately 55% of the 
private non-institutional indigent defense workload in Utah is handled by a third of the contract lawyers.
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Committee, there is no statewide entity, organization, or official at the state level with 
the express authority and mandate to examine the state’s compliance with its constitu-
tional obligations on an ongoing basis.132
The absence of state oversight is perhaps most apparent in the realm of managing 
public defense workload.133 Although local governments may believe the number of 
cases assigned to a particular lawyer in a particular courtroom in their county is not 
excessive on its own, there is currently no mechanism for government to know if the 
additional work that attorney is doing elsewhere (in a neighboring county, or in a juve-
nile court, or a justice court, or on behalf of their retained clients) pushes the attorney’s 
workload to the point that the lawyer begins triaging the duty owed to each and every 
person appointed to them to defend.134
Like the state, Utah’s local governments have limited capacity to ensure systemic 
effectiveness of right to counsel services. Without state guidance, counties are left to 
determine for themselves how best to monitor indigent defense services. With no 
defense attorneys in trial-level adult criminal, juvenile delinquency, and appellate representation. (This 
is the same order that, among other things: removed the judiciary from the oversight and administration 
of indigent defense; ordered case-weighting studies; promulgated a uniform indigency standard; and, 
required each county to submit local plans for the delivery of indigent defense services to the Supreme 
Court.)
Opponents of the performance standards claimed that Strickland specifically prohibits any com-
prehensive checklist of measures that bind a defender to performing specific tasks in every single case. 
Indeed, Strickland does prohibit the use of checklists in that exact manner. Performance standards, the 
Strickland Court acknowledges, are “guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides.” 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). However, opponents of the performance standards 
take this statement to mean, therefore, that performance standards are inherently meaningless. 
But that is not what Strickland says. The Strickland Court is clear that a mandatory checklist does 
not pass constitutional muster – not because performance standards are meaningless – but because 
mandatory checklists “interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel.” Id. at 689. 
Imposing universal performance standards that must be followed always and forever would, in the words 
of the Strickland Court, “restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions.” Id. 
That is, there may be perfectly legitimate reasons for a defense attorney in a particular case to decide 
against, for example, filing a specific motion or conducting a specific investigation. To the Strickland 
Court, the freedom to make those independent strategic decisions, in consultation with the defendant, is 
preeminent and a core principle of due process.
In other words, just because there may be a perfectly good strategic reason for not conducting a 
thorough investigation in one, or even many cases, it does not logically follow that a lawyer never has to 
ever investigate any case. Indeed, a lawyer needs time to determine which particular cases warrant which 
particular actions. And that is the true value of performance standards – they serve as guides for what a 
lawyer should consider doing in each case. The system’s obligation then is to ensure that each attorney 
has sufficient time to do so on behalf of each client and in every case.
132 Despite the absence of a statewide entity charged with the oversight of local indigent defense ser-
vices, the authors of this report find that the State of Utah has a limited capacity, as opposed to no capac-
ity, to provide accountability. This conclusion is made because of the robust court data that is currently 
available.
133 An in-depth discussion of public defense workload is detailed at page 77.
134 The presence of institutional defender offices in Salt Lake and Utah counties precludes the issue of 
attorneys there working in more than one county or court, but the State of Utah still has no mechanism 
to monitor the competency of services rendered by those offices.
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uniformity amongst counties in how services are delivered and monitored, the state has 
no local assurances that its constitutional obligations under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments are being uniformly met. This void on the state’s part has allowed sys-
temic deficiencies to take root that infringe on a defender’s independence and cause 
constructive denials of counsel.
IIi. 
The role of county attorneys in the 
provision of indigent defense services
In the more rural parts of the state, county attorneys are involved to varying degrees 
in the selection of defense counsel, the negotiation of defense attorney compensation, 
and the oversight of defense counsel performance. Such involvement is an undue 
infringement on the constitutional obligation to ensure independence of the defense 
function.135
Having county attorneys involved in right to counsel decisions means that the defend-
er’s courtroom adversary is the one ultimately responsible for whether the defender 
gets the next appointment or contract. But, as the U.S. Supreme Court states, “a de-
fense lawyer best serves the public not by acting on the State’s behalf or in concert with 
it, but rather by advancing ‘the undivided interests of the client.’”136 Perhaps for that 
reason, such involvement of prosecutors is rarely seen anywhere in the country.
It is understandable why county attorneys frequently play this role in rural Utah. 
County policymakers often are not lawyers or constitutional scholars trained in the nu-
ances of perpetually changing Sixth Amendment case law, and they rely on the county 
attorneys to advise commissioners on all other matters of law. And, given that county 
attorneys are sworn to uphold the laws of the state, including the right to counsel, it 
may not appear to be a conflict of interest to county administration to have those coun-
ty attorneys select public defense attorneys, supervise their work, and approve trial-re-
lated expenses (e.g., experts, investigators, etc.). 
Therefore, the involvement of county attorneys in indigent defense services is not 
malicious. Indeed, one rural county attorney very succinctly stated why he believes he 
can be fair in his involvement with right to counsel services: “I am elected by all voting 
members of my community. I must be fair to both victims and the families of victims 
135 This position does not mean that prosecutors never have valuable insights to a public defense 
services. A system that provides independent oversight should always seek input and feedback from the 
prosecution.
136 Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981).
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as I am to defendants and the families of defendants. If I am anything less than fair, I 
could be voted out of office.”137
 
But here is the problem with that position. A county attorney does not have to have 
malicious intent for there to be an infringement on the defender’s independence to act 
in the stated interest of the accused; a county attorney does not have to state overtly 
that a public defense provider must not file too many pre-trial motions or request too 
many experts or investigators. Defense attorneys, either consciously or unconsciously, 
take into account what they think they must do to please a prosecutor when balancing 
their own financial self-interest with what is required of zealous advocacy.138 For this 
reason, some states that, like Utah, lack a centralized indigent defense system, nonethe-
less explicitly ban the involvement of prosecutors in indigent defense services.139
In 2008, the elected county attorneys from across the state met to discuss the issue of 
defender independence and whether the prosecution should ever be in the business of 
administering public defense. In the end, it was decided that policymakers from each 
county should decide themselves what to do about the issue.140 Perhaps not unexpect-
edly, some chose to leave county attorneys in charge of indigent defense, some chose to 
remove county attorneys from this role, and still others tried to create ethical screens 
within county attorney offices by assigning oversight of defender services to a civil dep-
uty county attorney. 
Therefore, the degree to which prosecutors are involved with indigent defense services 
exists on a spectrum in Utah’s counties. Counties with fewer residents tend to have 
more involvement of county attorneys, while counties of greater population tend to 
have more fully developed indigent defense systems that have safeguards to insulate 
public defenders from prosecutorial interference, as discussed below.
San Juan and Tooele Counties: County attorneys in San Juan and Tooele counties exert 
significant influence over the right to counsel. The San Juan county attorney advises the 
commissioners on matters of indigent defense, and right to counsel services are a line 
item in the prosecutor’s budget. The county contracts with a single attorney to handle 
all indigent defense appointments. That defender is required to pay for all necessary 
137 Though this sentiment is very respectful and balanced, it belies the fact that electorates can and do 
make decisions from time to time that run contrary to the needs of effective defense advocacy – especial-
ly if the electorate votes passionately in response to a particularly egregious crime. The right to counsel 
must provide the same level of advocacy, regardless of the decisions of the electorate.
138 A district court judge who is a former county attorney in a rural county explained the dilemma. 
“I’m the prosecutor and I’m choosing my opponent? Ironically, I was in the best position to know who 
the best lawyers were. But I would like to somehow take it out of the county attorneys’ control.” Another 
district court judge in a rural county noted: “It always bothered me that the county attorneys were calling 
the shots on who would be a public defender and who wasn’t. It doesn’t seem right to have the prosecu-
tor involved. It leaves open the potential for abuse.”
139 For example, Washington State has a law prohibiting prosecutors from selecting defenders. See 
Wash. Rev. Code §10.101.040 (“City attorneys, county prosecutors, and law enforcement officers shall 
not select the attorneys who will provide indigent defense services.”).
140 Interview with a county attorney who was present at and participated in the meeting.
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expenses out of the flat fee, including “research, paralegal assistance, and legal clerks, 
copies, court fees,” etc., but the lawyer can apply for funding to cover any “extraordi-
nary unforeseen expenses.” The contract, however, does not define such extraordinary 
expenses. And so the lawyer covers the cost of investigation out of her monthly pay.
Similarly, Tooele County contracts with three private attorneys who are appointed on 
a rotational basis. Requests for trial-related expenses by public defenders are made to 
the county attorney.141 Though Tooele County has limited access to indigent defense 
training, there is no such allowance in San Juan County.
Uintah County: In Uintah County, the county attorney tried to create an ethical screen 
by having a civil deputy attorney perform oversight of the indigent defense function, 
including the drafting of contract language and making recommendations to the 
county administration on defense contractor hiring. Three private lawyers share the 
felony caseload in district court. A fourth handles the county justice court. The contract 
lawyers share conflicts amongst themselves (e.g., cases involving multiple co-defen-
dants).142 
Uintah County periodically solicits bids from private attorneys for public defense 
services. Individual applications are vetted through a review committee, which includes 
the civil deputy, the county’s human resources director, the clerk auditor, a county 
commissioner, and a retired judge.143 Despite this structural accountability, the hiring 
committee does not provide ongoing oversight. Nominally, the private lawyers’ con-
tracts include a requirement to submit quarterly reports to the county commission, yet 
it seems this requirement is frequently left unmet.144 And so, without objective data, 
the ongoing oversight of public defense services by the civil deputy relies heavily on the 
prosecution’s day-to-day observations. Ultimately, the conflict is not resolved because 
the civil and criminal deputies all report to the same elected county attorney.145 Still, 
141 In a correspondence dated August 5, 2015, former Tooele County attorney and current Third 
District Judge L. Douglas Hogan states that Tooele County “Public Defenders have a separate budget 
(although contained as a subset with the County Attorney’s budget) and appear before the County Com-
missioners during the budgeting process to advocate budgetary issues directly with the Commissioners.  
Requests for additional funds (investigators or experts) are processed through the County Attorney’s 
Office because that is where the funding is located but are not controlled by the County Attorney. There 
has never been a request for additional money that has been declined.”
142 A fifth attorney handles the contract for juvenile court. If a case arises with more than five co-defen-
dants, the county hires outside counsel on an as-needed basis.
143 Sitting judges are prohibited from serving on the selection committee in Uintah County. “If you’re 
a sitting judge, you’re going to have a conflict,” the civil deputy county attorney explained. The county 
attorney’s leadership team stressed that the county commission takes its constitutional obligations seri-
ously, and the selection of lawyers to do the work is no different. “Everybody works under the assump-
tion that if you get a bar license, then you can go practice law,” said the county attorney’s felony unit 
chief. “But criminal defense has a different level of competence required.”
144 In fact, one lawyer suggested the oversight burden rests with the county government: “We’re sup-
posed to be periodically reviewed – maybe annually – but I haven’t done one yet.”
145 For this reason, criminal justice stakeholders in other counties find such ethical screens insufficient 
to remedy the systemic conflicts involved. Also, the least populated counties generally have small county 
53Constructive Denial of Counsel, Part A: Accountability & Independence
Contract Defender
SAN JUAN COUNTY
County Attorney (elected)
Contract Defender
(primary)
Contract Defender
(conict one)
Contract Defender
(conict two)
SANPETE COUNTY
County Commissioners (elected)
Contract Defender
Contract Defender
Contract Defender
UINTAH COUNTY
County Attorney (elected)County Commissioners (elected)
Civil Deputy County Attorney
County Human Resources Director
HIRING PANEL
Civil Deputy County Attorney
Clerk Auditor
County Commissioner
Retired Judge
Contract Defender
Contract Defender
Contract Defender
WASHINGTON COUNTY
County Attorney (elected)
Civil Deputy County Attorney
County Commissioners (elected)
County Executive (appointed)
County Executive
HIRING PANEL
Civil Deputy County Attorney
Lead Contract Defender
Contract Defender
Contract Defender
Contract Defender
CACHE COUNTY
County Commissioners (elected)
County Executive (appointed) County Attorney (elected)
Contract Defender
(district court)
Contract Defender
(juvenile court)
Contract Defender
(county justice court)
TOOELE COUNTY
County Commissioners (elected) County Attorney (elected)
Lead Contract 
Defender
The state of Utah delegates to each 
county the responsibility for provid-
ing right to counsel services in the 
district courts, and each county does 
so by a method of its own choosing. 
The degree to which prosecutors are 
involved with the indigent defense services 
exists on a spectrum in Utah’s counties. 
Counties with fewer residents 
tend to have more involve-
ment of county attorneys, 
while counties of greater 
population tend to have 
more fully developed indi-
gent defense systems that 
have safeguards to insulate 
public defenders from prose-
cutorial interference.
A closer Look
Indigent Defense structures 
in Utah’s Smaller counties
54 The Right to Counsel in Utah: An Assessment of Trial-Level Indigent Defense SErvices
Uintah is acknowledged for creating a more independent process for nominating attor-
neys to take public defender cases. 
Cache County: In Cache County, three private attorneys split the district court caseload 
evenly. Cache County policymakers do not otherwise believe the active supervision of 
its contract defenders is an appropriate role for the administration to play. To them, 
the attorneys hired are independent contractors and government interference should 
be avoided. The problem of self-oversight is that it is difficult for people with no other 
outside experience to judge their own services against prevailing national standards.146 
Nevertheless, in the absence of any other oversight, the county executive relies on the 
prosecution for feedback on attorney performance.
IV. 
Accountability issues in counties where 
county attorneys are not involved in the 
oversight of indigent defense services
In the counties that do not allow county attorneys to be involved in the administration 
of indigent defense services, there are a wide variety of practices related to defense at-
torney selection, training, and performance accountability. At one end of the spectrum 
is an absence of any system at all of ongoing training and supervision. At the other 
end are the more populated counties that have created independent indigent defense 
systems with ongoing training and supervision. However, even these more developed 
indigent defense systems have conflict defender services that are not held to the same 
standards as the primary indigent defense services.
attorney staffs. For example, in San Juan County, the elected county attorney is a part-time position and 
he has no lawyers assisting him. There is no separation of civil and criminal duties – the county attorney 
handles both – and so the creation of ethical screens, by passing oversight of public defense services to a 
civil deputy, is not an option in such counties even if it did resolve the conflict.
146 See Tigran Eldred, Prescriptions for Ethical Blindness: Improving Advocacy for Indigent Defendants 
in Criminal Cases, 65 Rutgers L. Rev. 333 (2013). The core conclusion of Professor Eldred’s research is 
that indigent defense lawyers, like everyone, are influenced by a number of psychological factors (called 
“cognitive biases and heuristics”) that, under certain conditions, make it hard for them to appreciate 
their own limitations. The result is that many lawyers do not realize when they are providing subpar 
performance to their clients. First, people experience what is known as “confirmation bias.” This is the 
tendency to seek out, interpret, and remember information in a manner that supports a pre-existing 
belief. The second and related concept is “motivated reasoning.” Not only do people seek to confirm 
pre-existing beliefs, but they also reach conclusions that they prefer. Third, because of the general desire 
to think well of oneself, people tend to experience an “overconfidence bias,” including the tendency to 
overestimate one’s abilities to act competently and ethically when confronted with difficult dilemmas.
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Sanpete County: The Sanpete County elected county attorney took the step of remov-
ing his office entirely from the administration of indigent defense services, and instead 
passed the administration of the right to counsel back to the county commission itself. 
Sanpete County has a standing contract with one private criminal defense lawyer to 
serve as public defender, and two additional private lawyers are under contract for con-
flict cases, in all district court, juvenile court, and county justice court matters. 
Most criminal justice system stakeholders interviewed in Sanpete County believe the 
removal of the county attorney’s office from the oversight of the public defense system 
was sound policy. And, indeed, the county attorney deserves recognition for main-
taining independence from his courtroom adversaries. However, the decision leaves 
Sanpete County with a gap in oversight – one the county commission acknowledges.147 
Given the choice between non-qualified supervision from the commissioners and 
conflicted supervision from the county attorney, the county is left opting for no super-
vision at all over the public defense function. 
Washington County: Washington County contracts with a private attorney to serve 
as the lead defense attorney. The lead attorney handles a percentage of public defense 
cases and is paid an additional sum to coordinate indigent defense services for the 
county. That attorney then recommends other attorneys to the county to contract with 
for public defense services, effectively removing the county attorney from the process 
of defense attorney qualification. 
This structural design toward independence too is to be commended. Unfortunately, 
when Washington County’s lead contract defender was asked whether his status as 
lead attorney included any supervisory responsibilities over the other contract lawyers, 
he indicated that it does not. Therefore, Washington County has no real independent 
system of accountability.
Weber County: Prior to 2010, Weber County contracted for public defense services 
with a non-profit corporation called the Public Defender Association (WCPDA). The 
corporation had an independent board, a central office, a training budget for attorneys, 
and two secretaries. However, none of the trial lawyers were full-time employees of the 
corporation. Rather, private attorneys were simply selected by the corporation’s direc-
tors as sub-contractors to handle the direct representation of clients. 
In 2010, Weber County opted against renewing its contract with WCPDA, causing 
the non-profit corporation to dissolve. In its place, the county created a new system of 
individual contracts with a consortium of private attorneys. The greatest difference be-
tween the old and new system is that, rather than being subcontractors of a non-profit 
association, the individual lawyers now are selected by, and contract directly with, the 
147 Commissioners feel they lack the expertise necessary to actively supervise contract defenders. To fill 
that gap, the commission chair explained: “We get feedback from our prosecuting attorney.”
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county administration.148 And, in the place of the non-profit public defender associ-
ation, a single private attorney – the public defender coordinator – serves as the ad-
ministrative liaison to the county attorney’s civil deputy on contractual and budgetary 
issues. With neither the county administration nor the coordinating attorney holding 
supervisory responsibility over the contract panel, Weber County therefore has limited 
accountability to ensure effective representation.
Davis County: Davis County went in a different direction, taking its coordinating 
defense attorney position in-house, thereby making the public defender a department 
of Davis County government.149 The public defender department is small – it con-
sists of an executive attorney and a paralegal – and is administratively placed within 
the county’s human resources division. As such, the public defender director reports 
directly to the county’s personnel director.150 Unlike the other counties discussed, the 
public defender director in Davis County is expected to provide a level of oversight of 
contracted panel attorneys.151 And indeed, with one managing attorney responsible for 
coordinating a loosely affiliated panel of private contract defenders, Davis County’s 
contract system comes closest of the less populated sample counties to rendering basic 
accountability over services.152
However, it remains a system of limited oversight, with no ongoing, preemptive, and 
objective review over its attorneys. The defender director only occasionally conducts 
court observations. To be fair, court observation is an important method of supervi-
sion, but so too is the active auditing of case files and analysis of objective data. The 
defender director acknowledges as much. “We have no reporting requirements of our 
148 The change also achieved a cost savings for the county of approximately $100,000 in central office 
support staff, rent, and training costs. For example, under the old model, each contract attorney received 
from the public defender association a stipend of $1,000 per year that they could put toward the cost of 
CLE training and events. The stipend was eliminated from the new model. Instead contract defenders 
must now cover the cost of any training they desire from their take home pay.
149 To Davis County policymakers, it is important that the county attorney’s office has no role in the 
budgeting process for public defense services, selection of individual contract lawyers, and the drafting of 
contract language. “We should be out of everything,” said the county attorney. “If we’re going to have an 
adversarial system, then you can’t have the prosecution overseeing defenders.” The ethical screens estab-
lished elsewhere are insufficient. “There is nothing good with that arrangement. Placing it under the civil 
division chief would not satisfy the conflict of interests.” In a correspondence dated August 18, 2015, 
Davis County Legal Defender Director Todd Utzinger notes that “[m]embers of the Davis County Board 
of Commissioners shared the concerns expressed by the county attorney and responded by creating a 
fulltime legal defender coordinator position independent of the county attorney’s office.”
150 It would be a mistake to consider this agency a traditional public defender office. Instead of a team 
of full-time staff attorneys, a panel of private contract attorneys provides direct client services.
151 Each public defense contract in Davis County is for a three-year term, and the county can terminate 
the agreement without cause after providing the contract defender with 60 days of notice.
152 For example, both the defender director and the county’s personnel director noted they are in close, 
almost constant communication. This allows the county leadership to focus on big-picture issues, with-
out concern they are abdicating their management responsibilities. “We sign the contracts and approve 
the budget,” said the county commission chair, “but otherwise we rely on the defender director and the 
personnel director to manage the day-to-day.” 
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legal defenders. They used to have to give a quarterly report of what cases they have. 
But we don’t require that anymore.” Additionally, Davis County’s legal defender pro-
gram has no ongoing training program for new attorneys.153
Utah County: The Utah County Public Defender Association (PDA) was created as a 
public-private partnership effort in 1993.154 Being a non-profit organization, the direc-
tor is selected by and reports to the PDA board of directors. Although Utah County 
had a role in PDA’s creation, neither the county commission nor the county attorney’s 
office has a role in selecting the members of its board of directors. PDA’s leadership is 
thus independent of county government and, beyond the annual contract with PDA, 
Utah County government is uninvolved with the administration of right to counsel ser-
vices. Instead, the director receives the annual approval of his board to create full-time 
and part-time attorney and non-attorney positions using the contract funds, and then 
has full discretion over internal personnel matters.155 The system is independent.
However, accountability is still limited, because the PDA board has no real oversight 
role.156 The board sets no standards for attorney performance and there is no ongoing 
performance review. That being said, PDA has some level of quality review built into 
the system. For example, though there is no formal training, new attorneys are not 
assigned to cases for the first six months. Instead, new attorneys sit second-chair on 
cases of more experienced attorneys.157 PDA also provides ongoing monthly training 
through its in-house CLE program. 
However, this same level of quality assurance does not extend to conflict cases. Cur-
rently, Utah County has seven lawyers who are selected by the PDA director to provide 
153 “Training is another area that I’ve thought about building up,” said the county’s defender director. 
“Everybody is required to keep up with CLE. [The Utah Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers] does 
lots of training sessions that are really good. But I don’t have any periodic meetings with lawyers. Infor-
mally, I see them a lot. But there are no set staff trainings.”
154 For many years, a well-regarded private law firm handled all public defense services under a flat 
annual contract arrangement with the county. In 1993, however, they lost the contract when another 
firm underbid them. Shortly thereafter, Utah County felt they had made a significant mistake in their 
choice of contractor, and rather than merely cancelling the contract and renewing ties with its former 
contracting law firm, the county instead elected to change the method of providing services entirely. The 
non-profit agency started small; in 1999, there were only four attorneys. Another two attorney positions 
were added in 2003. But then, as demand for right to counsel services ballooned that decade, the Public 
Defender Association grew at a rapid pace. By 2012, the office had 12 trial attorney positions and one 
additional lawyer handling appeals.
155 Currently, PDA employs 18 attorneys (including the director) and a team of paralegals and adminis-
trative staff. Beyond the director, the assistant director and chief counsel positions are based on seniority 
(i.e., there is no extra merit or selection criteria considered in filling such positions; they automatically go 
to the longest-tenured PDA lawyers). 
156 “It’s not terribly active,” the director explained. “It’s necessary to have a board to have a non-profit 
corporation, but in all honesty [the Association is] run right here from my chair.”
157 PDA’s 14 trial attorneys are assigned in teams of five to individual judges’ courtrooms. Each lawyer 
is assigned to the courtrooms of two judges and, with each judge having two calendar days per week, 
each lawyer provides representation for four days of court per week. 
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conflict services. These conflict lawyers operate under contracts, let by the PDA out of 
the PDA budget, that pay a single flat rate for an unlimited number of cases. While the 
primary system has its own internal training approach, there is no training required of 
the private conflict lawyers.158
There is also a clear conflict in having the primary defender system responsible for the 
administration and funding of conflict services. The reasons why a judge or county 
attorney can never provide supervision are the same reasons prohibiting the primary 
defender system from properly supervising conflict services. That is, because of con-
fidentiality and conflict of interest rules, the primary system cannot review case files, 
discuss motions practice, or exercise anything resembling supervision over the services 
provided by the conflict lawyers. In these ways, the conflict system in Utah County 
shares the same structural flaws as other less populated counties’ primary systems. 
Salt Lake County: Like Utah County, Salt Lake County has a more developed indigent 
defense system with many internal safeguards to ensure effective representation in the 
primary system, but lacks the systemic safeguards to ensure the same level of services 
for conflict representation. 
The non-profit Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association (LDA) was originally established 
as one of many pilot programs nationwide using federal grant dollars to provide felony 
representation immediately following the Gideon decision. After showing the early 
success of the non-profit model, the county took over the funding obligation from the 
federal government. Today, LDA operates under an annual contract with the county 
for district court and county justice court services. A separate LDA contract with Salt 
Lake City provides for misdemeanor representation in the municipal justice court. 
LDA’s combined contracts allow for a total staff of 117 employees, including 62 coun-
ty-funded and 9 city-funded attorney positions. Eight of those 71 attorneys are super-
visors who, in addition to their regular caseload duties, seek to ensure quality control 
within the trial and appellate divisions. LDA also has a team of investigators, social 
workers, paralegals, law clerks, and secretaries.
LDA is strong when it comes to ongoing training and supervision of its staff, result-
ing in high-quality felony representation. Unlike public defender agencies of its size 
across the country, LDA does not have a formal training division or full-time training 
director. Nevertheless, the misdemeanor division director provides an orientation and 
training program for new attorneys assigned to the misdemeanor department. The mis-
demeanor department is the “training ground,” with lawyers spending usually three or 
158 For example, one conflict lawyer passed the bar in October and by January was on the conflict panel 
handling felony cases before the district court. Again, there is no constitutional right to a lawyer who 
has received a certain number of hours of training. Perhaps this conflict lawyer was qualified to handle 
a felony caseload three months after passing the bar exam. As discussed above, that a novice attorney 
can become competent to handle a certain case is not to suggest that all novices are competent to handle 
every type of case. In Utah County, however, the government cannot be certain either way.
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four years trying misdemeanors before handling felonies. The appellate director then 
provides an advanced training program on the appellate process for lawyers moved 
up to the felony division. Further still, LDA offers a monthly in-house CLE program 
to all lawyers run by LDA supervisors.159 LDA ensures lawyers have access to external 
seminars as well, including some national training opportunities. Everyone gets $700 in 
seminar money per year that they can use at any time, and all misdemeanor attorneys 
go to nationally sponsored trainings.160
LDA ensures staff attorneys are appointed to cases for which they are sufficiently qual-
ified. For example, lawyers spend another two or three years in the felony unit before 
the LDA director assigns them any homicide cases. Additionally, staff lawyers cover 
certain judges’ courtrooms and are assigned to teams based on the days on which each 
assigned judge holds calendars. For example, the “Thursday” team is a team of 19 law-
yers covering five judges’ courtrooms. When making assignments to those 19 lawyers, 
the LDA director looks at the complexity of the cases, the number of open cases each 
attorney has, and subsequently assigns cases accordingly.
However, while LDA is able to provide excellent representation to many clients in 
the Salt Lake District Court, it is not able to guarantee the same level of quality to all 
defendants. LDA is contracted to pay for conflict representation.161 Instead of the LDA 
director choosing conflict counsel, a panel of the district court’s leadership – the pre-
siding judge, the associate presiding judge, and the district court administrator – selects 
private attorneys for conflict services.162 Conflict lawyers are not required to attend any 
specialized training, beyond the annual CLE requirements of the Utah State Bar. Nor 
does the selection process for the conflict panel envision active supervision or quality 
control.163
159 Those trainings touch upon immigration, the state’s Adult Probation & Parole division, prob-
lem-solving courts, jury issues, updates in case law, and ethics & civility.
160 Specifically, the non-profit National Criminal Defense College in Macon, Georgia conducts sem-
inars and training sessions for criminal defense lawyers. See http://www.ncdc.net. Also, the non-profit 
National Defender Training Project has been hosted regularly as a summer program of the University of 
Dayton School of Law for more than five years. 
161 LDA receives separate budgets from Salt Lake County for primary and conflict services. All funding 
for conflict representation is separate, and the money is not taken out of the LDA primary budget when 
expenses for experts or investigators for the conflict attorneys are approved. Should that conflict budget 
be depleted, the LDA director requests additional funds on behalf of the conflict attorneys. 
162 “We approve attorneys on a yearly basis,” said the presiding judge. “We make the decisions [on who 
will get a contract], and LDA carries out our decisions.” 
163 The LDA budget includes funds for experts and investigative resources for the conflict system. Like 
Utah County’s indigent defense system, therefore, the conflict lawyers must apply to the primary system 
for access to such funds. Just as the primary system cannot review the performance of the conflict law-
yers, the primary system cannot review for quality the efficacy of the conflict system’s financial expen-
ditures. The LDA director indicated that he has never turned down a request, because he thinks it is a 
conflict. With each conflict lawyer’s request for expert services approved as blanket policy, the purpose 
of requiring the lawyers to submit a request in the first place is rather limited. As the LDA director ex-
plained: “It’s just a way of keeping track of the dollars.”
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Though Utah County and Salt Lake County are to be commended for their approach-
es to ensure operational independence164 and to train and supervise attorneys in their 
primary systems, neither county has a mechanism for ensuring minimum constitution-
al demands are met in conflict cases.165 The Constitution does not differentiate between 
the first person accused of wrongdoing and a co-defendant. Government has an obli-
gation to ensure that every person accused of a crime has access to the same minimum 
level of effective representation to which all are constitutionally entitled. 
Perhaps most importantly, without additional structural protections, the operational 
independence the non-profit model provides remains at risk of government control. 
As the Weber County example demonstrates, there is nothing to guarantee that future 
county government officials will not simply do away with the non-profit legal defender 
model altogether by failing to renew the contract.166 And so, where the right to 
164 Operationally independent systems have solved the personal interest conflict that would otherwise 
prevent a lawyer from zealously advocating for an individual defendant in an individual case. In other 
words, the individual lawyers employed by those systems are not concerned from year to year with the 
renewal of their employment. As one district attorney noted: “A healthy model has defense lawyers filing 
motions – we may feel they’re frivolous – but at least [the defense lawyer] is not thinking ‘geez, if I file 
this motion, am I going to lose this contract?’”
Structurally independent systems are stronger still. They are operationally independent, such that 
the lawyers employed are free to zealously defend the clients to whom they are assigned. But the sys-
tem itself is only structurally independent if the system does not risk retaliation (such as reduction of 
services, or loss of a non-profit’s contract) for advocating for the rights of those defendants who should 
receive right to counsel services but are not, as one example.
165 As noted before, the absence of oversight structures does not mean that the right to counsel services 
provided are constitutionally inadequate. Many stakeholders interviewed expressed their belief that the 
lawyers currently providing conflict defender services in Salt Lake County are of uniformly high quality. 
Nevertheless, the county’s indigent defense structures do not provide an independent mechanism to 
actively monitor the conflict program for continued quality, nor to address areas of concern.
166 This concern is not a mere abstract for Salt Lake County’s non-profit model. In fact, according to a 
July 6, 2015, report of the Salt Lake Tribune, the county government is actively “rethinking how best to 
provide legal counsel for indigent offenders — a $17 million bill each year.” See Mike Gorrell, Jury’s Out 
on Salt Lake County’s Defense of the Indigent, Salt Lake Trib., July 6, 2015, available at http://www.
sltrib.com/home/2686546-155/jurys-out-on-salt-lake-countys. Ostensibly, the purpose is to increase 
parity between prosecutor and defender salaries, which is intended to achieve a higher level of quality 
representation for the indigent accused. Nevertheless, one option on the table for debate “would be to 
scrap the contract with the Legal Defender Association and to put the job out for bid.” Further still, there 
is nothing to prevent a future Salt Lake County administration from considering the same structural 
changes for reasons less constructive to the indigent accused. 
The non-profit defender model has been overhauled elsewhere in recent years as well. Prior to recent 
changes, King County (Seattle), Washington provided right to counsel services through four non-prof-
it legal defender offices that shared conflicts. In Dolan v. King County, 258 P.3d 20 (Wash. 2011), the 
Washington Supreme Court affirmed a lower court determination that employees of the public defender 
agencies should be considered county employees for purposes of participating in the public employee 
retirement fund because they serve a basic government function. Following that decision, King County 
refused to renew the contracts with the non-profits and, instead, created a new county government agen-
cy to provide right to counsel services.
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counsel is subject to such structural influence, the non-profit is liable to weigh oper-
ational decisions (even where such decisions may be to the detriment of the indigent 
accused) against the potential loss of its annual contract.167
167 For example, when an entire category of defendants receives a reduced level of services (or no 
services at all), the non-profit is left with a choice. The non-profit could (and should) push for the funds 
necessary to provide effective services to all defendants, as each defendant’s individual constitutional 
right. But if the government is already on record considering less-costly options, see supra note 166, the 
non-profit has a clear incentive to rationalize the reduced services it provides rather than risk its very 
existence. In many ways, this is not far removed from the 10% cut scenario discussed on page 13.
Chapter 4
Constructive denial of counsel
PArt B: Financial Conflicts of Interest
Each and every defendant has a right to effective representation that is free from con-
flicts of interest. This is because trust is central to the proper functioning of our Amer-
ican system of justice and is a principal tenet upon which the entire legal profession is 
founded.168
In September 2013, an ethics panel of the Utah State Bar was asked to revisit the ques-
tion of the lawyer’s “duty of loyalty” to the client. Maintaining undivided loyalty to the 
client’s interests, the ethics committee noted, is a fundamental duty of all lawyers. But 
it is especially “heightened for the criminal lawyer by the duty of loyalty under the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.”169 In other words, all lawyers have an 
ethical obligation to preserve the client’s confidence and trust. But for the appointed 
lawyer representing the criminally accused, loyalty is not a question of aspiration or 
ethics alone; it is a constitutional imperative foundational to the fairness of the entire 
criminal process.170
168 This tenet is accepted as a bedrock principle of the practice of law in Utah, just as it is nationally. For 
example, among Utah lawyers, even in the midst of the nationwide debate during the turn of the 21st 
century regarding the advent of multi-disciplinary practices (whether the very existence of MDPs threat-
ened the future of the legal profession), the attorney’s “loyalty to the client” was the universal measure 
used by proponents and opponents alike in weighing such deep existential questions. See, e.g., 
Stephen W. Owens, Keeping Our Core Values (and Sanity) in the Internet Age, 23 Utah B.J. 8 (2d ser. 
2010) (“These and other changes offered by the Internet Era bring speed and efficiency. However, we 
need to be careful that we do not lose our core values as a profession: Trusting relationships, under-
standing client needs and goals, civility, confidentiality, and competence.”); Mark C. Quinn, The MDP 
Question: Should We Board the Train to the Future or Lie Down in Front of It, 14 Utah B.J. 27 (2d ser.  
2001) (“The debate over whether to allow Multi-Disciplinary Practices (MDPs) to exist as legitimate 
entities under our rules of professional conduct centers around the question of whether our profession 
can maintain its core values (e.g. independent judgment, confidentiality, attorney-client privilege, loyalty 
to clients and competence) while permitting the convenience and competitive advantages created by per-
mitting lawyers to practice alongside, and share fees with, non-lawyers.”); Charles R. Brown, That Vision 
Thing - A.K.A. The Future of Our Profession, 12 Utah B.J. 6 (2d ser. 1999) (an accounting firm had “...
failed in its adherence to the values of client loyalty, confidentiality, and avoidance of conflicts.”).
169 Utah State Bar, Ethics Advisory Opinion 13-04 (issued September 30, 2013).
170 See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981) (“Where a constitutional right to counsel exists, 
our Sixth Amendment cases hold that there is a correlative right to representation that is free from con-
flicts of interest.”); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 US 335, 346 (1980) (“Defense counsel have an ethical obliga-
tion to avoid conflicting representations and to advise the court promptly when a conflict of interest aris-
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The Utah courts and legislature alike have reaffirmed the core values of the legal pro-
fession, which include the lawyer’s duty to maintain undivided loyalty to the client and 
to avoid conflicts of interest with the client. The Rules of Professional Conduct expressly 
prohibit all lawyers from representing a client whenever a conflict of interest exists, 
commenting further that “[l]oyalty and independent judgment are essential elements 
in the lawyer’s relationship to a client.”171 It is, therefore, imperative that the attorney 
avoids and eliminates any conflict of interest between himself and his client – whether 
real or merely perceived – or else the attorney must withdraw from representing the 
client with whom the conflict exists.
While the Rules of Professional Conduct govern all areas of the legal practice, in 2012 
the Utah State Legislature reaffirmed the need for public defense services specifically to 
be provided free from conflicts of interest, establishing the “undivided loyalty of de-
fense counsel to the client” as a “minimum standard” for the defense function.172
The statutory and ethical standards discussed above reflect the dictates of U.S. Supreme 
Court case law. The Court stated in Glasser v. United States: “‘[A]ssistance of counsel’ 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates that such assistance be untram-
meled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously 
represent conflicting interests.”173 Government, therefore, has a constitutional obliga-
tion to ensure the systems established for providing Sixth Amendment services are free 
from conflicts that interfere with counsel’s ability to render effective representation to 
each defendant.
So, what is a conflict of interest? According to the Utah Court’s Rules of Professional 
Conduct, conflicts come in three basic categories:174
Another Client: an attorney cannot represent two or more clients whose inter-
ests might be at odds with each other; separate representation must be provided 
for all co-defendants in a particular criminal case.
es during the course of trial.”); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942) (“‘[A]ssistance of counsel’ 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired 
by a court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests.”).
171 RPC, commentary to Rule 1.7.
172 Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301, citing Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-201(8), which defines “legal de-
fense” as: “‘Legal defense’ means to: (a) provide defense counsel for each indigent who faces the potential 
deprivation of the indigent’s liberty; (b) afford timely representation by defense counsel; (c) provide the 
defense resources necessary for a complete defense; (d) assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the 
client . . . .”
173 Glasser, 315 U.S. at 70.
174 RPC, Rule 1.7(a)-(a)(2) (“[A] lawyer shall not represent a client if . . . [t]here is a significant risk that 
the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to 
another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.”).
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Third Person: an attorney cannot represent a defendant if, for example, the 
attorney already represents a client in a different case who happens to be the 
state’s main witness to the alleged offense of the new defendant.
Personal Interest: an attorney cannot represent a defendant if the attorney’s per-
sonal interests are in direct conflict with the client’s case-related interests.
Just as an individual attorney in these scenarios has to withdraw from representing the 
person with whom there is a conflict, so too does the entire law firm in which that at-
torney practices.175 Because of this, conflicts of interest involve systemic considerations 
as much as they do a single lawyer and his client. Indeed, as the Study Committee’s 
standards warn: “Systemic conflicts of interest can arise in the contract terms of en-
gagement, the manner of selection, funding, and payment of defense counsel.”176
Further still, U.S. Supreme Court case law is clear that all defendants have a right to 
representation without government interference.177 Because of this right, the govern-
ment’s method for providing public defense services “should not create incentives that 
undermine the effective assistance of counsel.”178
I. 
Financial conflicts created through 
flat fee contracting
Outside of the primary defender offices in Utah and Salt Lake Counties, indigent 
defense services in Utah use flat fee contracts that give attorneys, to varying degrees, fi-
nancial incentives to dispose of cases quickly, rather than effectively, causing a personal 
interest conflict.
As noted in Chapter 2 above, San Juan County contracts with a single attorney who 
is paid a monthly fee of $6,250 ($75,000 per year) for a limitless number of cases. The 
defender is required to pay for all necessary expenses out of the flat fee, including 
“research, paralegal assistance, and legal clerks, copies, court fees,” etc., but the lawyer 
can apply for funding to cover any “extraordinary unforeseen expenses.” The contract, 
however, does not define such extraordinary expenses. And so the lawyer covers the 
175 RPC, Rule 1.10.
176 Study Committee Standards, supra note 14, at Standard 2.
177 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (“Government violates the right to effective 
assistance when it interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions 
about how to conduct the defense.”); see also Study Committee Standards, supra note 14, at Standard 3 
(“In deciding whether an attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel, courts presume prejudice if 
the state interferes with the assistance of counsel. State interference can take many forms.”).
178 Study Committee Standards, supra note 14, at Standard 6.
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cost of investigation out of her monthly pay. The more investigations required for ef-
fective defense, the less take-home pay for the lawyer.
Similarly, Cache County’s contracts for public defense services divide the work pro-
vided into two categories: base legal services, and special legal services. All representa-
tion in juvenile and civil commitment matters is “special legal services,” for which the 
defenders are paid $50 per hour. Everything else before the district court – i.e., all adult 
criminal representation – is considered “base legal services,” for which they are paid 
a flat rate. The rate of pay for base legal services has remained at $4,305.56 per month 
($51,666.72 per year) since the current contracts expired in 2012. The base legal ser-
vices contract provides lawyers the same amount of pay no matter how much or how 
little work is involved.
The contract makes clear the base rate of pay is to cover everything, including attorney 
pay and all case-related expenses, unless otherwise approved in advance on a case-
by-case basis. The public defenders are “responsible to provide and pay for clerical, 
secretarial, or other staff employees; investigative services not approved by the court in 
advance; and their own office space, supplies, utilities, and materials necessary…”
With all flat fee contracts, where the defendant has a winnable case, the incentive nev-
ertheless is to resolve it by plea. The attorney is not rewarded with additional pay for 
the additional work involved in zealous advocacy. Rather, the attorney is hurt financial-
ly the more he does for his clients.179 Put another way, the government’s compensation 
structure creates a conflict between the lawyer’s financial interests and the case-related 
interests of each of his court-appointed clients. As a result of that conflict, the lawyer 
may triage the time and energy he puts into his cases.180
A federal court in 2013 called the use of such flat fee contracts an “[i]ntentional 
choice[]” of government that purposefully “left the defenders compensated at such a 
paltry level that even a brief meeting [with clients] at the outset of the representation 
would likely make the venture unprofitable.”181 Using this same reasoning, the Study 
Committee points to the use of flat fee annual contracts as a concrete example of gov-
ernment interference through the creation of structural conflicts.182
But conflicts still arise even in those counties that have more contractual safeguards. 
For example, Washington County contracts with private lawyers, each expected to han-
dle one-sixth of the district court caseload regardless of the number of cases and paid a 
179 As one defense lawyer commented: “If you do a trial, you’re hurt because you have to prepare. So I 
do a lot of motions practice.”
180 And the attorney has no incentive to dedicate time toward developing his client’s trust. “Things 
happen quickly,” said one contract lawyer. “I can’t say I’m able to meet with every client in the jail. But 
they can always call me for free.”
181 Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, No. C11-1100RSL, Memorandum of Decision at 15 (W.D. Wash. 
Dec. 4, 2013), available at http://sixthamendment.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Wilbur-Decision.
pdf. 
182 Study Committee Standards, supra note 14, Standard 6.
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flat $4,363 per month ($52,356 per year). In addition, the county agrees to cover certain 
costs, including witness fees, costs for transcripts and printing briefs as necessary for 
appeals, investigation, and other extraordinary expenses. 
Though the county is commended for paying separately for these case-related expens-
es, the county does not cover any of the cost of attorney overhead. For example, one 
attorney takes a third of the district court’s public defender caseload (for $8,726 per 
month), and the work is split between himself and his associate. Overhead alone for 
both lawyers – rent, utilities, insurance, phones, internet, fax, copiers, basic supplies, 
and a part-time legal assistant – is approximately $4,500 per month. Next, the lead 
attorney pays his associate $3,700 per month. That leaves the lawyer with around $526 
per month for himself. The attorney indicated that he makes up the difference with 
private clients. Therein lies the problem. His own financial conflict creates a concurrent 
conflict between his public clients and his private clients, as he has an incentive to ded-
icate time to the latter and to the detriment of the former in order to cover overhead 
costs and a reasonable fee.183
Such conflicts have led a number of state supreme courts to require that governments 
pay lawyers a “reasonable fee” in addition to “overhead expenses.”184
183 “I don’t know if, realistically, I can continue this much longer,” said the contract attorney. “When 
you consider that we’ve got to cover our overhead, I’m almost doing this for free.”
184  See, e.g., Wright v. Childree, 972 So. 2d 771, 780-81 (Ala. 2006) (determining assigned counsel are 
entitled to a reasonable fee in addition to overhead expenses, in case where state’s Attorney General 
had issued an opinion against paying the overhead rate and the state comptroller subsequently stopped 
paying); May v. State, 672 So. 2d 1307, 1308 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (determining indigent defense 
attorneys were entitled to overhead expenses in addition to a reasonable fee); DeLisio v. Alaska Supe-
rior Court, 740 P.2d 437, 443 (Alaska 1987) (determining that appointed cases did not simply merit a 
reasonable fee and overhead, but rather the fair market rate of an average private case. “[R]equiring an 
attorney to represent an indigent criminal defendant for only nominal compensation unfairly burdens 
the attorney by disproportionately placing the cost of a program intended to benefit the public upon 
the attorney rather than upon the citizenry as a whole.” Alaska’s constitution “does not permit the state 
to deny reasonable compensation to an attorney who is appointed to assist the state in discharging its 
constitutional burden,” because doing so would be taking “private property for a public purpose without 
just compensation.”); Kansas ex rel Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 242 Kan. 336, 383 (Kan. 1987) (the 
state “has an obligation to pay appointed counsel such sums as will fairly compensate the attorney, not 
at the top rate an attorney might charge, but at a rate which is not confiscatory, considering overhead 
and expenses.” Testimony was taken in the case that the average overhead rate of attorneys in Kansas in 
1987 was $30 per hour); Wilson v. State, 574 So.2d 1338, 1340 (Miss. 1990) (determining that indigent 
defense attorneys are entitled to “reimbursement of actual expenses” in addition to a reason-able sum, 
defining “actual expenses” to include “all actual costs to the lawyer for the purpose of keeping his or 
her door open to handle this case,” and allowing defense attorneys to receive a “pro rata share of actual 
overhead”); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Okla. 1990) (finding that state government “has an ob-
ligation to pay appointed lawyers sums which will fairly compensate the lawyer, not at the top rate which 
a lawyer might charge, but at a rate which is not confiscatory, after considering overhead and expenses;” 
and determining a reasonable appointed counsel fee to be between $14.63 and $29.26 (based on expe-
rience) and “[a]s a matter of course, when the district attorneys’ ... salaries are raised by the Legislature 
so, too, would the hourly rate of compensation for defense counsel.” Additionally, in order “to place the 
counsel for the defense on an equal footing with counsel for the prosecution,” “provision must be made 
for compensation of defense counsel’s reasonable overhead and out of pocket expenses”); Jewell v. May-
nard, 383 S.E.2d 536, 540 (W. Va. 1989) (raising the hourly rate paid to court appointed attorneys on a 
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II. 
Conflicts in accessing trial-related expenses 
In the less populated counties, it is common practice for district courts to require that 
contract defenders ask the county attorney for trial-related expenses or apply in open 
court for non-attorney support resources. Neither practice is common nationwide. 
In fact, Utah is one of only a handful of states where appointed counsel is required to 
make a showing for important case-related resources in open court. 
In other states, public counsel seeking investigative resources or expert assistance for 
an indigent client may apply to the judge for those funds in an ex parte proceeding 
– the prosecution typically receives notice that such a proceeding will occur, but the 
prosecutor is not present and does not participate in the hearing where the defense 
provider will put on evidence about what is needed and why it is needed. As such, there 
is no opportunity for the prosecution to learn about the defense strategy or to object to 
case-related needs of the defense.185 “The reason ex parte application is allowed is that, 
just as a defendant able to foot the costs need not explain to anyone his reasons for 
summoning a given witness, so an impecunious defendant should be able to summon 
his witnesses without explanation that will reach the adversary.”186
The fear of revealing to the prosecution the legal strategy involved in a case might cause 
any defense lawyer anywhere in the country to hesitate before requesting in open court, 
for example, funds for an investigator to reexamine the detective’s analysis of the crime 
scene. But that fear is only compounded in Utah when the county attorney’s office has 
a role in approving contracts for public defense services, or directly approves trial-re-
finding that they were forced to “involuntarily subsidize the State with out-of-pocket cash,” because the 
then-current rates did not cover attorney overhead shown to be $35 per hour in West Virginia in 1989. 
“Perhaps the most serious defect of the present system,” the West Virginia Court determined, “is that 
the low hourly fee may prompt an appointed lawyer to advise a client to plead guilty, although the same 
lawyer would advise a paying client in a similar case to demand a jury trial.”).
185 The prosecution certainly can challenge the testimony and evidence proffered by the defense during 
the trial. Likewise, there is law on how the trial courts should determine whether an expert’s testimo-
ny is admissible under the state’s rules of evidence. But there is no opportunity in those states for the 
prosecution to challenge the defense’s application for funds to hire an expert or an investigator or issue 
a subpoena in the first instance. See, e.g., N.Y. County Law §722-c (“Upon a finding in an ex parte 
proceeding that investigative, expert or other services are necessary and that the defendant . . . is finan-
cially unable to obtain them, the court shall authorize counsel . . . to obtain the services on behalf of the 
defendant or such other person.”).
186 Blazo v. Superior Court, 315 N.E.2d 857, 860 n.8 (Mass. 1974) This holding was codified as Rule 
17(b) of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure (“At any time upon the written ex parte 
application of a defendant which shows that the presence of a named witness is necessary to an adequate 
defense and that the defendant is unable to pay the fees of that witness, the court shall order the issuance 
of an indigent’s summons.”).
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lated expenses, or where prosecutors openly challenge requests.187 To put it another 
way, there is a systemic conflict between the zealous advocacy interests of the indigent 
accused and the personal interests of the appointed attorneys in retaining their con-
tracts from year to year. In the end, such systemic conflicts likely contribute to the 
limited use of investigators throughout the state.
III. 
Conflicts and the limited use of investigators1 88
The U.S. Supreme Court determined that, because governments “quite properly spend 
vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants,”189 a poor person charged 
with crime cannot get a fair trial unless a lawyer is provided at state expense. And, in 
the face of such “machinery,” due process requires the defense to subject the prosecu-
tion’s case to “the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.”190
The “fair fight”191 envisioned by our adversarial system of justice requires the defense 
function to test the prosecution’s case and, in order for that “adversarial testing” to 
be “meaningful,”192 the defense function must have adequate support resources, such 
as investigators, social workers, paralegals, substantive experts, and forensic testing. 
Therefore, as the Study Committee notes, “access to defense resources” is a factor that 
may “materially impact the adversarial nature of proceedings.”193
187 In a letter dated June 18, 2015, Deputy Washington County Attorney Eric Clarke notes that this 
process is not uniformly carried out throughout Utah: “I recently had a hearing where the judge and I 
both agreed that the statute only allowed the judge to order the funds if the county did not provide them. 
In our county’ we budget for the requests and have always covered any request approved by our lead 
public defender. Thus, we have resolved the concerns you raise.” To be clear, not every county in Utah 
has the structural conflict of making the public defenders seek funds after disclosing to the county attor-
ney’s office what the funds will be used for, but the practice is prevalent.
188 The underutilization of investigators in Utah is demonstrative of the general lack of other non-at-
torney trial-level resources, such as mitigation specialists and other social work professionals. For ease of 
readership, the discussion of investigators is used as a placeholder for all such services.
189 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
190 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984).
191 Study Committee Standards, supra note 14, at Standard 5.
192 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656.
193 Study Committee Standards, supra note 14, at Standard 5b (“By statute, counties and cities are 
required to provide defense resources at public expense. These include ‘a competent investigator, expert 
witnesses, scientific or medical testing, or other appropriate means necessary, for an effective defense.’ 
(Utah Code § 77-32-201(3).)”). This standard is reflected in U.S. Supreme Court case law. The Court 
has held, for example, that an indigent accused is entitled to the assistance of a psychiatrist at public 
expense to assert an insanity defense. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
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The Utah Supreme Court has determined that the failure to conduct adequate investi-
gation may be grounds for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. For example, 
the Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Lenkhart:
A review of the record reveals that Mr. Lenkart’s trial counsel failed to fulfill his duty 
to conduct an adequate investigation of the facts and evidence in this case, and thus, 
his performance was deficient under the first prong of the Strickland standard. We 
have repeatedly held that one of criminal defense counsel’s most fundamental ob-
ligations is to investigate the underlying facts of a case. This duty is not optional; it 
is indispensable. As we stated in Taylor, “failing to investigate because counsel does 
not think it will help does not constitute a strategic decision, ‘but rather an abdica-
tion of advocacy.’”194
And in Gregg v. State, the Court similarly ruled:
Trial counsel’s failure to conduct a reasonable investigation into the underlying facts 
of a case constitutes deficient performance under the first Strickland prong. In State 
v. Templin, we vacated a conviction of rape and remanded for new trial where the 
defendant’s trial counsel failed to investigate facts that would have contradicted the 
victim’s testimony. We noted that when “counsel does not adequately investigate 
the underlying facts of a case, . . . counsel’s performance cannot fall within the ‘wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance’” because “a decision not to investigate 
cannot be considered a tactical decision.”195
In less populated counties, indigent defense providers appear to see no need for inves-
tigation and often make do without it. “I’ve not had to ask for an investigator,” said a 
contract defender in one rural county. “I haven’t asked for an investigator in the entire 
time of the contract,” said another private lawyer who has handled indigent defense 
cases in a different rural county for multiple years. “I’ve done my own investigating,” 
the lawyer stated, indicating that if she needed a witness to an interview she brings 
along her secretary. 
Washington County has an annual budget that includes a line item for “Investigation 
& Special Defense.”196 One Washington County contract defender estimated he made 
only one or perhaps two requests for investigation in felony cases over the past year. 
Some Washington County public defenders say they actually hold back from using 
investigative resources because using the resources today could deplete resources for a 
194 State v. Lenkhart, 2011 UT 27, ¶ 38,  262 P.3d 1 (Utah 2011) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Kimmel-
man v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385 (1986) (“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or 
to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”).
195 Gregg v. State, 2012 UT 32, ¶ 24, 279 P.3d 396 (Utah 2012) (citing and quoting State v. Templin, 805 
P.2d 182, 188-89 (Utah 1990)).
196 In the most recent fiscal year, the county budgeted $40,000 and actually spent $42,000. In fiscal year 
2011, as another example, the county budgeted $48,000 and actually incurred $69,666 in expenses. That a 
county regularly exceeds its budgeted amount, however, does not necessarily mean the county budgeted 
an adequate amount of money to begin with, nor that all expenditures that should have been made were 
in fact made. 
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different case tomorrow that may demand a greater need for an investigator. This posi-
tion is not universally true for all Washington County attorneys.197
Weber County contracts with a private investigator at a flat annual rate, just as it does 
with the individual defense lawyers. This causes difficulty when it comes to conflict 
representation.198 Of equal importance, the flat fee contract places the investigator in 
the same financial conflict of interest as the lawyers. The contract defenders send cases 
to the investigator as the need arises.199 The investigator estimates he receives between 
five and 15 new requests each month and has 50 to 60 open cases at any given time. 
According to the investigator, however, his caseload really demands a team of three 
investigators. 
Like Weber County, Davis County also has a standing agreement with a local private 
investigator for primary investigative services. Using defender agency funds, the coun-
ty’s defender director pays the investigator at a rate of $60 per hour for his services. Out 
of that hourly rate, the investigator hires another private investigator to assist part-time 
for a flat annual rate. Rather than splitting the investigative caseload – approximately 
200 cases per year, according to the investigator – he and his part-time assistant work 
on all cases as a team. Davis County has a third investigator who is independent of its 
primary investigators and attorneys may use other investigators on a case-by-case basis 
with prior approval of the legal defender coordinator. The use of investigative resources 
in Davis County, though, occurs primarily in felony cases. The comparatively limited 
use of investigative resources in misdemeanor cases is concerning because even misde-
meanor cases carry potential penalties of up to a year in jail.
197 One Washington County contract defender frequently seeks investigation resources, noting for 
example that technological advancements have increased the amount of discovery materials lawyer must 
review in each case, and that investigators are important for getting through all of it. 
198 Investigators have the same ethical duties as the lawyers who hire them. As with the attorney, the 
defender investigator must maintain confidentiality and provide conflict-free investigative services. For 
this reason, just as there must be separate counsel provided to two or more co-defendants in a given case, 
so too must there be separate investigative services provided for each defendant.
199 The lawyer sends the defendant’s name, the case number, the date of the incident, and the lawyer’s 
objectives. Frequently, the investigator is asked to review the police report, review witness statements, or 
interview witnesses directly. “The lawyer includes some sort of instruction, like: ‘Client indicates there 
was a witness in the vehicle with him, who was pressured to give a statement to the police,’” said the 
investigator. “‘Go find her and interview her.’”
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IV. 
Conflicts in the determination of 
eligibility for public counsel services
Utah provides a uniform standard for determining who qualifies for public defense 
services.200 That standard, however, is not applied uniformly across the state, often 
creating a conflict of interest between the indigent accused and the attorneys provid-
ing indigent defense representation. This is especially true where flat fee contracts are 
employed.
Utah Code 77-32-202 establishes that a defendant is to be found “indigent” if the 
accused does “not have sufficient income, assets, credit, or other means to provide for 
the payment of legal counsel and all other necessary expenses of representation without 
depriving that person or the family of that person of food, shelter, clothing, and other 
necessities.”201 Courts are instructed to take into account such things as number of de-
pendents and current debt level when making such determinations.202 All people earn-
ing below 150% of the federal poverty guidelines are to be presumptively determined to 
be indigent.203 Despite this, the determination of indigency varies greatly from district 
court to district court. Court observations revealed examples of judges stating that the 
presumptive indigency standard is 125% of the federal guidelines and some judges that 
appointed lawyers to anyone asking for counsel.
The lack of consistency in the determination of eligibility for public counsel services 
produces further conflicts. For example, during a court observation in a district court, 
a woman appeared for her arraignment on a single misdemeanor count of criminal 
trespassing within a dwelling.204 After she requested public counsel, the judge asked 
the defendant many questions to determine her financial eligibility for representation 
at public expense, one of which was: “Do you own any land?” The woman explained 
she was the owner of a 144-acre plot of a much larger 780-acre parcel of tribal lands in 
Montana. In response to the judge’s inquiry of whether or not she could sell the land, 
she replied that she tried unsuccessfully in the past. 
The contract public defender staffing the courtroom interjected, suggesting that the 
judge set the case for review, as the defender did not want to have to handle the case if 
200 Utah Code Ann. §77-32-202.
201 Utah Code Ann. §77-32-202(3)(a)(i).
202 Utah Code Ann. §77-32-202(3)(b).
203 Utah Code Ann. §77-32-202(3)(a)(b).
204 A class A misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206(3).
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he did not have to. That is, the defender has a personal interest in trying to reduce the 
number of clients he represents. The less cases, the less potential work and trial-related 
expenses, the greater his take-home pay and the opportunity to take on more private 
paying cases.205 Financial conflicts exist even where the contract defenders play no 
role in determining a defendant’s financial eligibility. Several lawyers said they often 
get frustrated when appointed to represent clients who they believe should not qualify 
financially. 
In some counties, the defendant’s financial eligibility depends on his custodial status 
pending trial. For example, in-custody initial appearances in another district court 
are held by videoconference, with a contract public defender appearing from the jail 
alongside the defendants, and the rest of the criminal justice system appearing in the 
courtroom. “Does he qualify for a public defender?” the judge asked the public defend-
er of one defendant. This defendant was accused of a 3rd degree felony count of posses-
sion of a controlled substance and another count of class B misdemeanor theft. “If he 
gets out, he won’t,” the public defender replied. “I will appoint the public defender to 
represent you,” said the judge to the defendant. “And I will impose bail in the amount 
of $6,000.” 
An indigent defendant should not have to choose between being at liberty pre-trial and 
getting counsel.206 As such, eligibility for public counsel should not depend on a defen-
dant’s ability to post bail:  
Indigence must be conceived as a relative concept. An impoverished accused is not 
necessarily one totally devoid of means. . . . Indigence must be defined with refer-
ence to the particular right asserted. Thus, the fact that a defendant may be able to 
muster enough resources, of his own or of a friend or relative, to obtain bail does 
not in itself establish his nonindigence for the purpose of purchasing a complete 
trial transcript or retaining a lawyer.207
205 “Sometimes the defenders are appointed to people who are not indigent,” said the Uintah County 
Attorney, explaining that the judges try to ensure people have access to legal representation, but the de-
fenders would prefer if the judge would slow down the appointment process and instead take more time 
to verify the defendant’s financial eligibility. “They feel like it’s inflating their workload,” said the county 
attorney. The financial conflict between the appointed lawyer and his clients gets compounded over time, 
where the rate of pay causes the lawyer to feel trapped in the job.
206 National standards reflect Utah statutes requiring jurisdictions to determine whether hiring counsel 
would be a “substantial hardship” to the defendant. See ABA STANDARDS FOR DEFENSE SERVICES, 
supra note 107, at Standard 5- 7.1 (regarding eligibility and ability to pay partial costs: “Counsel should 
be provided to persons who are financially unable to obtain adequate representation without substantial 
hardship. Counsel should not be denied because of a person’s ability to pay part of the cost of represen-
tation, because friends or relatives have resources to retain counsel or because bond has been or can be 
posted.”).
207 Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 289 n.7 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quotation marks 
and citations omitted). Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Stewart joined in Justice Gold-
berg’s concurring opinion. The Court’s holding in Hardy was limited to whether defense appellate coun-
sel was entitled a free transcript of the trial, and thus, while instructive here, the discussion of indigence 
for the purpose of receiving the public’s assistance of counsel was merely intended as support for the 
Justice’s concurring opinion. See also National Study Commission on Defense Services, Guide-
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The notion that indigent is not synonymous with destitute – or “totally devoid of 
means,” as U.S. Supreme Court Justice Goldberg put it208 – is a notion with which 
jurisdictions across Utah struggle. Certain defendants, for example, fall into a sort of 
administrative gray area, wherein they do not meet the presumptive threshold of earn-
ing less than 150 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines, and the court cannot say 
with certainty that it would cause them a “substantial hardship” to pay for all the costs 
of their own defense. After all, a judge cannot, at the outset of a case, predict with 100 
percent certainty exactly what resources will be needed by the defense as the case pro-
ceeds nor how quickly the case will proceed. For example, some defendants may not 
have the full amount of needed cash on hand at the time their case begins, but could set 
aside some money from each future paycheck and so might be able to pay for their own 
defense if the case proceeds slowly enough and lasts long enough for them to do so.  
Across the nation, these defendants are often referred to as being “partially indigent” or 
“near indigent.”  
Many Utah local governments have attempted to solve for the partial indigency prob-
lem by requiring such defendants to reimburse the county for some or all of the cost of 
representation. The reimbursement goes back to the government, not to the individual 
attorneys. As a result, the financial conflict between attorney and client is compounded 
with each new partially indigent defendant being found eligible for their services. The 
work goes up but the pay stays the same.
An even more vexing situation occurs, though, where a defendant is found by a judge 
to be fully indigent, i.e., cannot afford to pay for his own defense attorney and defense 
lines for Legal Defense Systems in the United States, c. 13, Guideline 1.5: 
Effective representation should be provided to anyone who is unable, without substantial financial hardship to 
himself or to his dependents, to obtain such representation. This determination should be made by ascertaining 
the liquid assets of the person which exceed the amount needed for the support of the person or his dependents 
and for the payment of current obligations. If the person’s liquid assets are not sufficient to cover the antici-
pated costs of representation as indicated by the prevailing fees charged by competent counsel in the area, the 
person should be considered eligible for publicly provided representation. The accused’s assessment of his own 
financial ability to obtain competent representation should be given substantial weight.
(a) Liquid assets include cash in hand, stocks and bonds, bank accounts and any other property which 
can be readily converted to cash. The person’s home, car, household furnishings, clothing and any property 
declared exempt from attachment or execution by law, should not be considered in deter mining eligibility. Nor 
should the fact of whether or not the person has been released on bond or the resources of a spouse, parent or 
other person be considered.
(b) The cost of representation includes investigation, expert testi mony, and any other costs which may be 
related to providing effective representation.
See e.g., Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, Eligible for 
Justice: Guidelines for Appointing Counsel (2008), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Eligibility.Report.pdf; The Spangenberg Group, Determina-
tion of Eligibility for Public Defense (2002), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/determinationofeligibility.auth-
checkdam.pdf.
208 See 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 11.2(e) (1984) (“The appel-
late courts agree that indigency is not a synonym for ‘destitute.’ A defendant may have income and assets 
yet still be unable to bear the cost of an adequate defense.”).
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resources without substantial hardship. But then, a private attorney enrolls to represent 
that defendant. Perhaps the private attorney is a family friend or a criminal justice ac-
tivist who agrees to represent the defendant for free. Perhaps a family member ponies 
up the attorney fee to hire that private lawyer.209 In whatever manner the private attor-
ney came to represent the defendant, that defendant is still indigent and someone must 
pay for any necessary defense-related expenses such as an investigator or experts. 
On January 27, 2015, the Utah Supreme Court issued decisions in five cases, all ad-
dressing exactly this situation.210 The court determined that, under amendments to 
Utah statutes that took effect May 8, 2012,211 an indigent defendant who somehow is 
represented by private counsel is not entitled to public assistance for necessary case-re-
lated expenses: “Under the 2012 amendments to the IDA, a defendant who opts out of 
public representation has also opted out of public defense resources.”212 In other words, 
once the trial court decides the defendant is indigent, the defendant must choose: he 
can get both his attorney and his resources provided at public expense, or he must pay 
for both his attorney and all of his defense resources himself. What he cannot do is 
obtain an attorney at no expense to the public and then receive public funding for only 
his case-related expenses.213
But how is a person to know this when they come before the judge for the first time 
and are asked whether they can afford to hire their own attorney? In the absence of 
being given this information by the trial court, it is highly unlikely that a non-lawyer 
defendant could foresee and understand that they must have enough money to both 
hire the attorney and pay all expenses of their case, much less accurately estimate what 
209 See e.g., State v. Parduhn, 2011 UT 55, ¶5, 283 P.3d 488 (Utah 2011) (indigent defendant “received a 
one-time monetary gift from his grandparents that he used to retain private counsel”).
210 State v. Earl, 2015 UT 12, 345 P.3d 1153 (Utah 2015); State v. Perez, 2015 UT 13, 345 P.3d 1150 
(Utah 2015); State v. Folsom, 2015 UT 14, 345 P.3d 1161 (Utah 2015); State v. Steinly, 2015 UT 15, 345 
P.3d 1182 (Utah 2015); State v. Rodriguez-Ramirez, 2015 UT 16, 345 P.3d 1165 (Utah 2015). In each 
of the five cases, the defendant was found by the trial judge to be indigent. Earl, at ¶4; Perez, at ¶¶3,5; 
Folsom, at ¶¶4, 15; Steinly, at ¶4; Rodriguez-Ramirez, at ¶5. At the time of seeking public funding for 
necessary defense resources, each defendant was represented by private counsel, though the cases are 
silent about how the defendants acquired their private attorneys. Earl, at ¶4; Perez, at ¶3; Folsom, at ¶4; 
Steinly, at ¶4; Rodriguez-Ramirez, at ¶3.
211 Utah Code Ann. §77-32-303.
212 Steinly, 2015 UT 15, at ¶22; see also Earl, 2015 UT 12, at ¶24. By way of contrast, prior to May 8, 
2012, “local governments [were] statutorily required to provide an indigent defendant with funding 
for necessary defense resources, even when the defendant is represented by private counsel,” State v. 
Parduhn, 2011 UT 55, ¶22, 283 P.3d 488 (Utah 2011). Under the statutes then in effect, “the right to 
necessary defense resources [in the Indigent Defense Act] was a separate and distinct right from the right 
to counsel.” Parduhn, at ¶¶22, 24. After the Parduhn decision, the Utah legislature amended the Indigent 
Defense Act and “chose[]to couple the availability of defense resources with the retention of govern-
ment-funded counsel.” Steinly, at ¶20. The 2012 amendments to the IDA cannot, though, be applied 
retroactively. Perez, 2015 UT 13, at ¶15; Folsom, 2015 UT 14, at ¶15.
213 As the Utah high court observed in explaining the county’s argument: “The County agreed that 
Rodriguez-Ramirez was indigent, but asserted that the 2012 amendments to the IDA applied to this case 
and foreclosed the request for resources unless Rodriguez-Ramirez agreed to be represented by a public 
defender.” Rodriguez-Ramirez, 2015 UT 16, at ¶5.
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those expenses might total. If judges do begin to advise defendants about this situation 
at their first appearance in court, an even larger percentage of people facing criminal 
charges are apt to request appointed counsel – foregoing even a free private attorney, in 
order to secure defense resources necessary for their case. Again the number of clients 
that a contracted attorney must represent will grow, with yet again no increase in the 
lawyer’s pay, and the financial conflict between the appointed lawyer and all of his 
indigent clients is exacerbated. The appointed lawyer has every incentive to remain si-
lent any time an indigent client hints at securing a private attorney, even if that lawyer 
knows this may well result in the client losing needed defense resources. In the wake of 
the 2012 amendments to the Indigent Defense Act and the Utah Supreme Court cases 
construing them, the defendant’s access to necessary resources hinges upon a non-uni-
form indigency determination process that includes many forms of built-in conflicts, as 
discussed above. It is vital that the state get this right.
 
 
Chapter 5
Constructive denial of counsel
PArt C: Insufficient Time
No matter how complex or basic a case may seem at the outset, there are certain fun-
damental tasks each attorney must be capable of doing on behalf of the client. Even 
in the average misdemeanor case, the attorney must be able to, in part: meet with and 
interview with the client; attempt to secure pretrial release if the client remains in state 
custody (but, before doing so, learn from the client what conditions of release are most 
favorable to the client); keep the client informed throughout the duration of proceed-
ings; prepare for and appear at the arraignment, wherein he must preserve his client’s 
rights; request formal and informal discovery; launch an investigation, scouring all 
sources of potential investigative information in the process and as soon as possible; 
develop and continually reassess the theory of the case; file and argue on behalf of 
pretrial motions; read and respond to the prosecution’s motions; negotiate plea options 
with the prosecution, including sentencing outcomes; and all the while prepare for the 
event that the case will be going to trial.214
All national standards on appropriate workload for public defense providers are con-
sistent that establishing and applying a single caseload standard uniformly across a 
state and to all attorneys of varying experience levels is not the best way to ensure that 
attorneys can provide the same level of adequacy to each and every one of the people 
the lawyer is appointed to represent. As explained by the U.S. Department of Justice in 
August 2013, “caseload limits are no replacement of a careful analysis of a public de-
fender’s workload, a concept that takes into account all of the factors affecting a public 
defender’s ability to adequately represent clients, such as the complexity of cases on a 
defender’s docket, the defender’s skill and experience, the support services available to 
the defender, and the defender’s other duties.”215
Simply put, a public defender in an urban jurisdiction in which the public defender 
office, court, and jail are all in close proximity may be able to handle a greater number 
of cases, for example, than a defense provider in a rural jurisdiction where courtroom 
214 See generally Guidelines, supra note 107.
215 Statement of Interest of the United States, Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, No. C11-1100RSL 
(W.D. Wash) (filed Aug. 14, 2013) available at http://sixthamendment.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2013/08/wa_dojsoi_08142013.pdf. Wilbur was a federal lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of 
indigent defense services in municipalities in Washington State.
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coverage alone may require significant travel time. An attorney’s experience is also a 
factor, in that a young attorney fresh out of law school cannot handle as many or as 
complex cases as a seasoned competent attorney.
However, in Utah there are no jurisdiction-specific standards by which to measure 
public defender workloads. In the most sophisticated indigent defense systems in the 
country, all indigent defense providers are required to track their time against case-spe-
cific tasks216 and non-case-specific tasks217 alike. Specific case-tasks, and the time need-
ed to accomplish them, are also tracked by case-type. By analyzing the data, an indigent 
defense system can determine, for example, the average time its attorneys are spending 
from appointment through disposition and sentencing for the average felony case. 
Predicated on those attorneys providing effective representation, dividing that number 
into the average hours worked by attorneys in a year will result in an average number 
of cases, of a specific case-type, an attorney can handle in a year. And, these averages, 
or caseload standards, can be made specific to a jurisdiction to incorporate the varia-
tions in practice. 
Utah has no infrastructure to require that public defense attorneys record their time or 
to promulgate standards resulting from a time analysis. 
I. 
Workload of contract attorneys
Although the Study Committee standards state that national caseload standards218 may 
be “instructive,” even if they are not “outcome determinative for Utah,”219 one does 
216 For example, client contact, investigation, motions practice, in-court advocacy, etc.
217 For example, training, staff meetings, etc.
218 National defender caseload standards were first created under the NAC Standards, supra note 113, 
as a U.S. Department of Justice-funded initiative. NAC Standard 13.12 prescribes numerical caseload 
limits of: 150 felonies per attorney per year; 400 misdemeanors per attorney per year; 200 juvenile delin-
quencies per attorney per year; 200 mental health per attorney per year; or, 25 appeals per attorney per 
year. This means a lawyer handling felony cases should handle no more than 150 felonies in a given year, 
assuming the lawyer has no additional duties. That is, she does not have any supervisory responsibilities, 
nor handles misdemeanors (or other case types), nor engages in any private practice on the side. The 
NAC standards can be prorated to assess mixed caseloads. That is, an attorney would still meet the NAC 
standard by carrying 75 felonies and 200 misdemeanors per year. These standards are referenced in the 
American Bar Association Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System. Principle 5 states that “in 
no event” should these NAC standards be exceeded.
219 Study Committee Standards, supra note 14, at Standard 5c (“The Sixth Amendment does not entitle 
the accused to a public defender with a particular number of cases annually. But the ‘fair fight’ is clearly 
impacted by the amount of time a public defender can devote to each case. National caseload standards 
may be instructive, but not outcome determinative for Utah. As Professor Backus observed: ‘Although 
national caseload standards are available, states should consider their own circumstances in defining a 
reasonable defender workload. Factors such as availability of investigators, level of support staff, com-
plexity of cases, and level of attorney experience all might affect a workable definition. Data collection 
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not have to refer to those standards to understand defender caseloads in most regions 
of Utah are excessive. By any measure, 35 percent of Utah’s defense contract attorneys 
have excessive caseloads. 
Consider, for example, the Seventh Judicial District, which encompasses Carbon, 
Emery, Grand, and San Juan counties. A single attorney holds the indigent defense 
contract in two of the district courts: Carbon County District Court, and Emery Coun-
ty District Court. He also provides defender services in three justice courts: Carbon 
County Justice Court, Castle Dale Justice Court, and Green River Justice Court. Col-
lectively, this attorney handled 297 felonies and 144 misdemeanors in 2013. This same 
attorney also provided representation in 33 delinquency cases that year.220
In Tooele County, one of the three attorneys who provides felony representation in 
the district court had a criminal caseload of 115 felonies and 14 misdemeanors (and he 
does not hold another criminal indigent defense contract anywhere else in the state). 
This appears reasonable,221 however, this attorney also provides juvenile court repre-
sentation. In 2013, he additionally handled 122 delinquency cases and appeared at 149 
dependency hearings.222
One of three contract defenders in Cache County District Court also provides public 
defense services in the Hyrum Justice Court and the North Logan/Hyde Park Justice 
Court. On first pass, the lawyer’s combined felony caseload (134) and misdemeanor 
caseload (84) do not appear too egregious.223 However, he also handled 270 delinquen-
cy cases and appeared at 432 dependency cases in 2013.224
Another lawyer serves Davis County District Court at its Farmington courthouse and 
two justice courts (Centerville and Woods Cross). This defender also contracts with 
Bountiful City to provide representation for misdemeanor cases prosecuted by the city 
at the district court located in Bountiful. This provider handled 186 felonies and 249 
misdemeanors – a large caseload even before factoring in the travel and logistics of reg-
ularly covering four separate courts.225 (See chart, next page, for visual representation.)
Sometimes, it is not just an individual lawyer providing indigent defense services, but 
rather a consortium of lawyers or a law firm. A single law firm provides primary indi-
and a consistent method of weighing cases are essential to determining current caseloads and setting 
reasonable workload standards.’” (quoting Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in 
Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 Hastings L. J. 1031, 1125 (2006))).
220 This means this one attorney is carrying a caseload that would require 2.34 attorneys under the 
NAC standards. See supra note 218.
221 In analyzing his criminal caseload against the NAC standards, his criminal workload is about 80% 
of what is allowable under a mixed felony/misdemeanor NAC standard analysis.
222 This additional work indicates that he is doing the work of 1.81 attorneys under the NAC standards.
223 By NAC standards, he is at 90% of a felony FTE and 20% of a full time misdemeanor attorney. Tak-
en together, this is approximately 110% of the combined NAC standard.
224 This means that he is actually doing the work of 3.81 lawyers under NAC standards.
225 This is the equivalent of 1.86 attorneys under the NAC standards.
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gent defense services in the Layton District Court and in six justice courts.226 The law 
firm’s website indicates that there are five attorneys in the firm.  The AOC database 
showed the attorneys in the law firm enrolled as counsel – without regard to whether 
the cases were private or public – in over 3,000 misdemeanor cases across 31 different 
justice courts and nine different district courts in 2013. If cases are split evenly amongst 
the attorneys, each attorney is handling 600 cases annually – or resolving approximate-
ly two cases per day every day including weekends.227
On the basis of similar analysis, 35 percent of Utah’s defense contract attorneys have 
unreasonable caseloads. In the absence of Utah-specific workload standards that take 
into account local criminal practices and procedures, geography, court locations, and 
other variances, it is difficult to determine whether the remaining 65 percent of the 
identified contract defense attorneys’ workloads are, in fact, reasonable.228
226 The six courts are Bluffdale, Harriman, Midvale, Murray City, Saratoga, and West Valley justice 
courts.
227 In other words, the five attorneys are doing the work of 8.77 attorneys under NAC (even before 
factoring in the logistics and travel time necessary to cover 40 different courts).
228 While the NAC caseload limits, supra note 218, were established as absolute maximums, policymak-
ers in many states have since recognized the need to set local workload standards at the state and county 
level. Local standards can take into account factors that affect attorney performance (such as time trav-
eling between the court and the local jail to meet with clients, or the prosecution’s charging practices), 
as well as additional obligations placed upon defense attorneys (such as through evolving U.S. Supreme 
Court case law, improvements in forensic sciences, and advancing criminal justice technologies) – all of 
which increase the time needed to render effective representation beyond what was established in 1973. 
For exactly this reason, many critics argue that the caseload standards permitted by NAC are far too 
high, and that the actual maximum, for felony cases in particular, should be adjusted to well below 150 
cases per attorney per year. This, of course, is just one more reason the State of Utah should work toward 
establishing its own workload standards for public defense services.
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In most district courts, the county attor-
ney’s office is responsible for prosecut-
ing class A misdemeanor cases – such 
as domestic violence-related assault, 
possession of marijuana in a drug free 
zone, or sexual battery – alongside their 
regular felony caseloads. 
Under state law, however, a city may opt 
to have its own city attorney prosecute 
class A misdemeanors in district court. If 
the local government chooses to pros-
ecute its own cases in this way, then it 
must also carry the burden of providing 
defense services. Most cities that exer-
cise this option provide defense lawyers 
using the same method that they use for 
their local justice court cases.
A Closer Look
Workload concerns in
the Misdemeanor courts
AMERICAN FORK DISTRICT
Total cases (misd. & trac): 777
Distance from oce: 0 miles
Driving time: 0 minutes
LEHI JUSTICE COURT
Total cases (misd. & trac): 198
Distance from oce: 3 miles
Driving time: 9 minutes
ALPINE JUSTICE COURT
Total cases (misd. & trac): 12
Distance from oce: 5 miles
Driving time: 10 minutes
HIGHLAND JUSTICE COURT
Total cases (misd. & trac): 25
Distance from oce: 4 miles
Driving time: 7 minutes
UTAH COUNTY JUSTICE COURT
Total cases (misd. & trac): 12
Distance from oce: 14 miles
Driving time: 20 minutes
SPANISH FORK DISTRICT
Total cases (misd. & trac): 348
Distance from oce: 23 miles
Driving time: 26 minutes
SANTAQUIN / GOSHEN / GENOLA 
JUSTICE COURTS
Total cases (misd. & trac): 25
Distance from oce: 34 miles
Driving time: 32 minutes
APPOINTED COUNSEL WORKLOADS
The example of one private lawyer
82 The Right to Counsel in Utah: An Assessment of Trial-Level Indigent Defense SErvices
i  In FY2011, the lawyer handled 675 cases in American Fork (591 misdemeanors, 46 misdemean-
or DUIs, 8 infractions, and 30 contested traffic charges). In FY2012, the total was 698 cases, and in 
FY2013 it was 777. On average, that comes to 717 cases per year. We rounded down to 700 for a 
more conservative annual estimate.
ii  40 hours per week, for 52 weeks per year, is a total working year of 2,080 hours. Dividing that by his 
total caseload yields 2.97 hours per case (2,080 / 700 = 2.97). If the lawyer takes any time for vaca-
tions, holidays, sick leave – or time for mandatory CLE or other training – he has even fewer hours 
available for each case.
In Utah County, for example, the city of 
American Fork does not have its own 
justice court, so the district court in 
American Fork hears all of their misde-
meanor cases. The city has a standing 
contract with one private attorney to 
serve as its prosecutor on these misde-
meanors, and a second contract with 
another private attorney to serve as its 
public defender. The contract defender 
handles approximately 700 misdemean-
ors each yeari before the district court in 
American Fork.  
If all the defense attorney does is rep-
resent clients before the American Fork 
District Court, he can devote only 2.9 
hours per case, and that assumes the 
lawyer takes no sick days, vacations, or 
holidays.ii But this lawyer handles anoth-
er 348 misdemeanor cases in the Span-
ish Fork District Court, located nearly 30 
minutes away, which only decreases the 
amount of time he has available to each 
of his clients. In fact, this lawyer sup-
plements his district court work with a 
number of justice court contracts across 
the county, including Spanish Fork, Sa-
lem, Santaquin, Genola, and Goshen. In 
total, each year the lawyer handles more 
than 1,200 misdemeanor and traffic cas-
es before nine district and justice courts 
scattered across Utah County. The law-
yer has only 1.7 hours available per case, 
without yet accounting for the driving 
time necessary to appear for his clients’ 
hearings at each courthouse location. 
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II. 
Workload of institutional indigent defense providers
The use of a defender office, rather than contract attorneys, does not appear to improve 
this workload concern in Utah. In fact, both of the state’s institutional public defender 
offices, in Salt Lake County and Utah County, have too many cases. The workloads of 
the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association (LDA) lawyers, however, are particularly 
troublesome.
To be clear, LDA has a well-deserved reputation within the state of Utah. Its attor-
neys provide excellent representation for large categories of defendants, particularly 
in felony cases. That level of quality is jeopardized in justice court misdemeanor cases, 
however, where LDA is handling more than double the workload its lawyers reasonably 
could be expected to handle effectively. All told, LDA needs a staffing increase of ap-
proximately 38%, if not more, to effectively handle its current total trial-level workload. 
(See side bar, next page.)
The Public Defender Association (PDA) in Utah County has comparatively less signif-
icant workload issues than LDA, but caseloads there are still troubling. PDA has 12.5 
full-time equivalent lawyers on staff. In 2013, the public defender office handled 2,349 
felony cases and just 68 district court misdemeanor cases. Under national standards, 
the office needs a staff of 15.83 lawyers.
However, as with the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association, this staffing estimate for 
PDA does not yet incorporate adequate supervision. In fact, the office’s chief public de-
fender maintains a full caseload, as do both chief deputies, meaning none of the three 
most senior attorneys have sufficient time available for supervisory duties.229 Account-
ing for adequate supervision, PDA needs another 1.6 lawyers (17.4 attorneys total). To 
put that into perspective, the office needs an increase of approximately 40% in attorney 
staff, just to meet current workload demand using the NAC standards.230
229 Any amount of time the most senior attorneys spend on supervision takes away from their caseload 
responsibility, and their caseload responsibility makes providing adequate supervision extremely diffi-
cult. If all three are in court at the same time that an attorney or support staff person needs advice, there 
is no meaningful supervision available.
230 For consistency across all counties, regardless of the model used or the size of the county, the au-
thors of this report relied on the AOC’s data for workload analysis. The Utah County Public Defender 
Association disputed the accuracy of the AOC’s district court data for Utah County. According to PDA, 
staff attorneys handle more than 200 felonies on average each year, whereas the AOC data shows the 
PDA caseloads being 187.9 felony cases per attorney. Taking as we did the more conservative numbers 
provided by AOC, the Utah County public defenders are operating at 125% of capacity under NAC. If 
PDA’s internal data is correct, however, PDA lawyers are in fact operating at 133% of capacity under 
NAC.
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The Salt Lake Legal Defenders Associ-
ation is commended for maintaining a 
robust case-tracking system. Without 
data, policymakers are left to rely on gut 
feel, chance, or even bias when making 
important criminal justice policy and 
budgetary decisions. LDA regularly 
assesses its attorneys’ caseloads in light 
of national caseload standards, and it 
incorporates internal data and caseload 
figures into its budget requests to Salt 
Lake County. Indeed, as a measure of the 
effectiveness and value of tangible da-
ta-points, LDA recently received funding 
for additional felony attorney positions 
to maintain compliance with its internal 
workload goals.
For example, according to court records, 
LDA provided representation in 7,440 
felonies and 1,843 misdemeanors in dis-
trict court in 2013.i To handle that many 
cases effectively, national standards sug-
gest LDA needs a felony staff of 54.21 
attorneysii – slightly more than the 54 
attorneys LDA had assigned to district 
court that year.iii The attorney positions 
added since aim to ensure LDA stays 
within national caseload maximums.
However, the staffing situation for LDA’s 
district court workload is more concern-
ing than those numbers suggest. First, 
national standards indicate that there 
should be one attorney supervisor for 
every ten attorneys.iv Where that su-
pervisor also carries a caseload, as do 
LDA’s supervising attorneys, the same 
standards call instead for one part-time 
supervisor for every five attorneys, i.e. 
A Closer Look
Defender Caseloads in 
Salt Lake County
i  In correspondence dated May 22, 2015, LDA Executive Director Patrick Anderson reported that the AOC data 
does not match the organization’s own case-tracking data. LDA recorded 7,896 felonies and 1,625 state mis-
demeanor cases, for a total of 9,521 total district court cases in 2013. The AOC reported a combined 9,260 such 
cases. This relatively small difference of 261 cases can be explained by variations in counting methodology. For 
example, if LDA counts “cases assigned” and the AOC counts “cases disposed,” there will always be a differ-
ence. Some cases assigned in 2012 will be disposed in 2013 or later, and some cases assigned in 2013 will not 
be disposed until future years. Additionally, if LDA records the charge at assignment (e.g. felony) and the AOC 
records charge at disposition (e.g. a felony reduced to a misdemeanor), the numbers for type of case will differ. 
Though, for the record, using LDA’s numbers means their caseloads in district court are greater than this analysis 
suggests.
ii  The NAC workload standards are referenced to explain the workload issues because no jurisdiction-specific 
standards exist in Utah or locally in Salt Lake County. That is, we are not suggesting adoption of these NAC 
standards, but rather are using them as a reference for comparison. NAC standards call for workloads of no more 
than 150 felonies per attorney per year, or 400 misdemeanors per attorney per year
iii  In correspondence dated May 22, 2015, LDA Executive Director Patrick Anderson noted the number of attor-
neys handling district court cases has since increased.
iv  national StUdy CommiSSion on defenSe ServiCeS. GUidelineS for leGal defenSe ServiCeS in the United StateS, Standard 4.1 
(1976). Developed under a grant from the U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administra-
tion.
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one out of every six attorneys should be 
a supervisor who carries only a part-time 
caseload.v Thus, LDA requires five more 
lawyers than it currently has available 
(for a total of 59.14 attorneys) to provide 
adequate supervision over the total dis-
trict court workload.vi
Meanwhile, LDA also has a team of 12 
lawyers providing representation in 
the county and city justice courts. The 
office’s internal data suggests the work-
load of its misdemeanor lawyers falls 
well below national standards.vii LDA’s 
misdemeanor workload projections, 
however, only account for those cas-
es that go beyond arraignment. Court 
data, though, correctly accounts for all 
new cases in which the right to counsel 
attaches and a public defense lawyer 
appears, whether the defendants plead 
guilty at the arraignment or not.viii 
Indeed, AOC data shows LDA lawyers 
handled a combined total of 13,367 
misdemeanors, contested traffic, and 
other cases in 2013 – far above the 3,702 
misdemeanors counted internally by 
LDA. When using AOC’s data, national 
standards suggest LDA needs a misde-
meanor staff of 29.26 lawyers to handle 
its current justice court workload (more 
than twice as many as its current staff 
of 12 lawyers). Put another way, if LDA 
accounts for all cases it actually handles, 
including those disposed of at arraign-
ment, its misdemeanor lawyers in fact 
are each carrying more than double the 
workload they could reasonably be ex-
pected to handle effectively. And that is 
before accounting for adequate supervi-
sion levels for LDA’s justice court teams.ix 
v Id. Only the LDA executive director carries no caseload.
vi Accounting for adequate supervision in district court cases alone, LDA’s 7,440 felony cases require 54.11 
lawyers, and its 1,843 misdemeanors require another 5.03 attorneys. Per national standards, a team of six felony 
lawyers with one acting as part-time supervisor can handle 825 felony cases per year: five attorneys handle 150 
cases each, and the sixth handling the reduced 75 cases to allow for her part-time supervisory duties.
vii  In correspondence dated June 18, 2015, LDA Executive Director Patrick Anderson reported misdemeanor 
attorneys handling cases in Salt Lake City Justice Court receive an average of 355 new cases per year (88.75% 
of the NAC standards). “The average caseload per attorney handling Salt Lake City cases is 355 new cases per 
attorney per year. This number is below the targeted national recommendation and far less than many of the 
caseloads referred to in justice courts around the State. LDA misdemeanor attorneys are trained and supervised 
very closely by the Chief Misdemeanor attorney and their performances are evaluated on an ongoing basis. Each 
attorney in justice courts tries between 6 and 15 cases per year and files numerous written motions and appeals 
subsequent to judicial rulings and jury trials. We only try bench trials in justice court if the case has been amend-
ed to an infraction, and it is our policy to try all other cases to juries.” These are all valid and important markers 
of quality advocacy. However, the high-quality advocacy provided to those clients whose cases survive arraign-
ment is dependent on an even larger number of clients pleading guilty at their first appearance in justice court.
viii  As previously discussed, supra note i, LDA contests the accuracy of the AOC’s caseload data for LDA lawyers. 
The largest difference between LDA’s data and the AOC’s is in justice court misdemeanors: LDA counted 3,702 
to AOC’s 10,873 cases handled in 2013. Email correspondence in July 2015 clarified that LDA only counts those 
cases that go beyond arraignment, while the AOC counts all cases – those that go beyond arraignment and 
those in which the defendant pled guilty at arraignment. Indeed, if the cases LDA disposes of at arraignment 
are added to its reported case count, then LDA’s numbers and the AOC numbers are off by only a few hundred 
cases, and the difference is likely the result of counting cases at time of assignment versus time of disposition. 
According to the LDA director, the defendants represented by LDA who plead guilty at arraignment are mostly 
involving crimes of homelessness and vagrancy (e.g. public intoxication) where the defendant is given time 
served in exchange for a guilty plea.
ix  Accounting for one part-time supervisor for every five trial lawyers, standards suggest LDA requires 31.92 
attorneys in total to provide adequate supervision over and effectively handle the justice court workload.  See 
supra notes iv and v.
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All told, LDA needs an increase of ap-
proximately 38% in its trial divisions to 
handle its current workload, if not more.x 
For example, to the extent that any of 
the 7,440 felony cases in Utah in 2013 
were death-eligible, the number of 
attorneys needed in Salt Lake County in-
creases further still. Under the U.S. Con-
stitution, states can elect to impose the 
death penalty upon conviction of certain 
crimes. However, states that choose to 
have a death penalty have extra require-
ments imposed on them to ensure due 
process in these cases. The U.S. Supreme 
Court has consistently determined that, 
for death penalty representation to be 
deemed effective, defense counsel has 
an obligation to conduct a thorough 
investigation, including looking into a 
defendant’s background for informa-
tion that may be used as aggravating or 
mitigating factors in the penalty phase 
of the case.xi Moreover, the Court stat-
ed that prevailing national standards, 
including the American Bar Associa-
tion Guidelines on the Appointment and 
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death 
Penalty Cases are guideposts that “no 
one can misunderstand”xii in deciding if 
defense counsel’s performance is un-
reasonable, and thus deficient. The ABA 
Death Penalty Guidelines require no few-
er than two attorneys per case and spe-
cifically suggest that an attorney handle 
no more than two-to-three death-eligi-
ble cases per year (and nothing else).xiii
The NAC standards were developed 
during that period in our nation’s history 
where the death penalty was not in op-
eration, and thus are mute on the allow-
able number of death-eligible cases one 
attorney can competently handle a year. 
For this reason, in analyzing LDA work-
load above in light of NAC standards, the 
number of attorneys needed  presumes 
none of the felonies handled in 2013 
were capital cases. We note, however, 
that 14 LDA attorneys are identified as 
“capital” attorneys.
As a final consideration in evaluating 
workload, while site work was being 
conducted for this study, Salt Lake 
County had in place an early case reso-
lution (hereafter “ECR”) program.xiv LDA 
designated specific attorneys to cover 
the ECR cases that the prosecutor had 
identified for a quick resolution – within 
30 days and with very limited crimi-
nal justice process. In 2013, eight LDA 
attorneys assigned to ECR resolved a 
combined 3,255 felony cases. Divided 
evenly, that is an average of more than 
400 felonies per lawyer, and under 
national standards, LDA should have 
had 21.7 lawyers to effectively handle 
just this caseload. The NAC caseload 
standards were designed, though, with 
the assumption that the maximum 150 
felony cases handled by an attorney 
x  The total of 91.06 attorney staff required to handle LDA’s combined district court and justice court workload 
(accounting for proper supervision ratios) is 25.06 attorneys greater than the office’s current 66 attorney posi-
tions, or an increase of 37.96%.
xi  See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003; Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 
(2000).
xii  Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387.
xiii   ABA, GUidelineS for the appointment and performanCe of CoUnSel in death penalty CaSeS, Guidelines 4.1, 6.1, 10.3, and 
Commentary (2003).
xiv  See infra Appendix B, page 105, for the authors’ view on the former early case resolution program.
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would include a full-range of felonies, 
with a greater number of less-complicat-
ed faster-resolving cases balancing out a 
fewer number of complex lengthy cases. 
So arguably, an attorney might be able 
to handle more ECR cases because by 
definition they were supposed to have 
been clear-cut cases that required virtu-
ally no investigation, no research, and no 
need to have hearings before a judge. 
Now that the ECR program is terminat-
ed, these 3,255 felony cases will come 
back into the normal district court case 
calendar, complete with the full pano-
ply of criminal justice process, and, in 
theory, be distributed among all of the 
LDA district court attorneys on top of 
their existing caseloads. Thus, the overall 
workload of LDA trial attorneys likely will 
increase further, and LDA will likely need 
an even greater number of attorneys 
than projected above in order to provide 
effective representation to every client.
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“The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend 
the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small 
and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, 
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is 
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel, he may be put on 
trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence 
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge 
adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires 
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, 
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know 
how to establish his innocence.”
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)
Chapter 6
CONCLUSION & Recommendations
Government has an obligation to ensure that in every criminal case the prosecution’s 
evidence is subjected to rigorous adversarial testing. Such adversarial testing, the U.S. 
Supreme Court reminds us, can only be realized where the defendant is provided with 
unfettered access to Sixth Amendment right to counsel services.231 Therefore, any 
actual or constructive denial of counsel is a violation of the defendant’s constitutional 
guarantee of a fair day in court.232
Utah’s trial courts do not uniformly provide counsel to indigent defendants at all 
critical stages of criminal cases as required by the U.S. Supreme Court, with many 
defendants – particularly those facing misdemeanor charges in justice courts – never 
speaking to an attorney. Those defendants that do receive representation too often re-
ceive an attorney who operates under multiple conflicts of interest arising from unfair 
contractual arrangements that produce incentives to curtail zealous representation. The 
challenge of providing effective representation for each client can be exacerbated by an 
excessive caseload that reduces the time a lawyer can spend on an individual case. And, 
these attorneys generally lack the appropriate independence from undue state and local 
government interference in securing the necessary resources to put the state’s case to 
the test. The primary cause for the institutionalization of these practices is the lack of 
accountability inherent in the system.
Accordingly, the following recommendations are made to rectify the actual and con-
structive denial of counsel prevalent in Utah’s trial courts.
231 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) (“[T]he right to be represented by counsel is by 
far the most pervasive, for it affects [an accused person’s] ability to assert any other rights he may have.” 
(citing Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 8 (1956))).
232 Id. at 656-57 (“The right to the effective assistance of counsel is thus the right of the accused to 
require the prosecution’s case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. When a true 
adversarial criminal trial has been conducted – even if defense counsel may have made demonstrable 
errors – the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment has occurred. But if the process loses its 
character as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated.”).
90 The Right to Counsel in Utah: An Assessment of Trial-Level Indigent Defense SErvices
Recommendation 1
Insulate the provision of right to counsel services from political, judicial, 
and prosecutorial interference through the establishment of a statewide 
independent oversight commission, authorized to enact right to counsel 
standards and to actively monitor and enforce ongoing compliance with 
those standards for, at a minimum: workload, attorney performance, 
attorney qualifications, training, supervision, contracting, and ensuring 
independence of the defense function.
Most states eliminate the potential for direct government interference by establishing 
an independent commission to oversee the defense function.233 Following the recom-
mendations of nationally recognized standards of justice, such states achieve constitu-
tionally mandated independence by insulating right to counsel services under a board 
made up of members selected by diverse appointing authorities, such that no single 
branch of government has the ability to usurp power over the system. Other states pub-
licly elect chief defenders234 to ensure that they are accountable to the voters and not to 
judges or other elected officials.
A statewide indigent defense commission does not require services to be administered 
and funded at the state level. Rather, commissions set standards and monitor compli-
ance against those standards.
Though there is no uniform cookie-cutter indigent defense services model that can or 
should be applied to each and every state, there are national standards that serve as 
guidelines for policymakers. The prevailing standards are the American Bar Associa-
tion, Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System. Adopted by the ABA House 
of Delegates in 2002, the ABA Ten Principles are self-described as constituting “the 
fundamental criteria necessary to design a system that provides effective, efficient, high 
quality, ethical, conflict-free legal representation for criminal defendants who are un-
able to afford an attorney.” 
The first of the ABA Principles requires that the public defense function, including the 
selection, funding, and payment of defense counsel, be “independent.” Commentary 
on Principle 1 states that the defense function must be insulated from outside political 
or judicial interference by a board or commission appointed from diverse authorities, 
so that no one branch of government can exert more control over the system than 
any others. Footnotes then refer to National Study Commission on Defense Services’ 
Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems in the United States (1976). The Guidelines were 
233 See supra note 13.
234 Those states are Florida and Tennessee.
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created in consultation with the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) under a 
DOJ Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) grant. NSC Guideline 2.10 
(The Defender Commission) states in part:
A special Defender Commission should be established for every defender system, 
whether public or private. The Commission should consist of from nine to thirteen 
members, depending upon the size of the community, the number of identifiable 
factions or components of the client population, and judgments as to which non-cli-
ent groups should be represented. Commission members should be selected under 
the following criteria: The primary consideration in establishing the composition of 
the Commission should be ensuring the independence of the Defender Director. (a) 
The members of the Commission should represent a diversity of factions in order to 
ensure insulation from partisan politics. (b) No single branch of government should 
have a majority of votes on the Commission. (c) Organizations concerned with the 
problems of the client community should be represented on the Commission. (d) A 
majority of the Commission should consist of practicing attorneys.
In practice, states with statewide indigent defense commissions generally give equal 
appointments to the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. To 
fill out the remainder of appointments, states often give one or two appointments to 
the state bar association. States have also found that giving appointments to the deans 
of accredited law schools creates professional alliances that help the indigent defense 
commission (for example, law schools can help with standards-drafting, training facili-
ties, etc.). Additionally, many states have tried to include a voice from the communities 
most predominantly affected by the criminal justice system (for example, the African 
American Bar in Louisiana, or Native American interests in Montana).
Examples of indigent defense commission appointments from other states include:235 
• Louisiana: The Louisiana Public Defender Board (LPDB) is a 15-member 
commission. LPDB members are appointed by: Governor (6 appointments, 
4 of whom are affiliated with certain designated law schools); Chief Justice (2 
– one juvenile justice expert; one retired judge); Senate President (1); Speaker 
of the House (1); president of the Louisiana State Bar Association (2); pres-
ident of the Louis A. Martinet Society (African-American Bar - 1); chair of 
the Louisiana State Law Institute’s Children Code Committee (1); and, the 
executive director of the Louisiana Interchurch Conference (1).236
235 For ease of discussion, the authors of the report point the Study Committee to specific jurisdictions 
that are more akin to Utah from our perspective (i.e., more conservative or Western states as opposed to 
more liberal or Northeastern states). However, Task Force members may browse how every state funds 
and administers right to counsel services on the 6AC website at: http://sixthamendment.org/the-right-
to-counsel/state-indigent-defense-systems/.
236 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §15:146(3).
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• Michigan: The Michigan Indigent Defense Commission (MIDC) is a 
15-member commission. The governor appoints all members of MIDC based 
on recommendations submitted by: the Senate Majority Leader (2 appoin-
tees); Speaker of the House of Representatives (2); Chief Justice (1); Criminal 
Defense Attorney Association of Michigan (3); Michigan Judges Association 
(1); Michigan District Judges Association (1); State Bar of Michigan (1); a bar 
association advocating for minority interests (1); former prosecutor recom-
mended by Prosecuting Attorney’s Association of Michigan (1); local units 
of government (1); and, one member of the general public. The Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court serves as an ex officio member of the MIDC without 
vote.237
• Montana: The Montana Public Defender Commission (MPDC) is an 
11-member public defender commission. Appointments are made by: the 
Supreme Court (2 appointees); the president of the State Bar (3); the Pres-
ident of the Senate (1); the Speaker of the House (1); and, the Governor (4 
appointments, but they must be nominated from organizations representing: 
(a) indigent persons, (b) Native American interests, (c) people with mental 
illness, and (d) people with addictions).238
• New Mexico: The New Mexico Public Defender Department is an 11-member 
commission appointed by diverse authorities: Governor (1 appointee); Chief 
Justice (3); dean of University of New Mexico School of Law (3); Speaker of 
the House of Representatives (1); Senate President (1); and, the majority floor 
leaders of each chamber (one each).239
• North Carolina: The North Carolina Office of Indigent Defense Services 
(IDS) is an independent 13-member commission appointed by: Chief Jus-
tice (1 appointee, current or retired judge); Governor (1 – non-attorney); 
President Pro Tempore of the Senate (1 attorney); Speaker of the House of 
Representatives (1 attorney); North Carolina Public Defenders Association (1 
attorney); North Carolina State Bar (1 attorney); North Carolina Bar Asso-
ciation (1 attorney); North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers (1 attorney); 
North Carolina Association of Black Lawyers (1 attorney); North Carolina 
Association of Women Lawyers (1 attorney); and, the IDS Commission itself 
(3, one non-attorney, one judge, and one Native American).240
• North Dakota: The North Dakota Commission on Legal Counsel for In-
digents (CLCI) is a seven-person commission appointed by: Governor (2 
appointees, one from a county of less than 10,000 people); House of Repre-
237 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §780.987 (1)(a-k).
238 Mont. Code Ann. § 2-15-1028(2)(a-g).
239 N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-15-2.1(A)(1-6).
240 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-498.4 (b)(1-11).
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sentatives (1); Senate (1); Chief Justice (2 appointees, one from a county of 
less than 10,000 people); and, North Dakota State Bar Association (1).241
NSC Guideline 2.10 (The Defender Commission) continues on to state that the “Com-
mission should not include judges, prosecutors or law enforcement officials.” Addi-
tionally, more and more states have found it a conflict to have any member that stands 
to benefit financially from the policies of the commission. This means that some states 
have banned criminal defense lawyers who handle public cases. Again, here are a few 
examples of states on this point:
• Louisiana: “Persons appointed to the board shall have significant experience 
in the defense of criminal proceedings or shall have demonstrated a strong 
commitment to quality representation in indigent defense matters. No per-
son shall be appointed to the board that has received compensation to be an 
elected judge, elected official, judicial officer, prosecutor, law enforcement 
official, indigent defense provider, or employees of all such persons, within a 
two-year period prior to appointment. No active part-time, full-time, con-
tract or court-appointed indigent defense provider, or active employees of 
such persons, may be appointed to serve on the board as a voting member. 
No person having an official responsibility to the board, administratively or 
financially, or their employee shall be appointed to the board until two years 
have expired from the time the person held such position and the date of 
appointment to the board.”242
• Montana: “While serving a term on the commission, a member of the com-
mission may not serve as a judge, a public defender employed by or under 
contract with the office of state public defender … , a county attorney or a 
deputy county attorney, the attorney general or an assistant attorney general, 
the United States district attorney or an assistant United States district attor-
ney, or a law enforcement official.”243
• New Mexico: “A person appointed to the commission shall have: (1) signifi-
cant experience in the legal defense of criminal or juvenile justice cases; or (2) 
demonstrated a commitment to quality indigent defense representation or to 
working with and advocating for the population served by the department. 
The following persons shall not be appointed to and shall not serve on the 
commission: (1) current prosecutors, law enforcement officials or employees 
of prosecutors or law enforcement officials; (2) current public defenders or 
other employees of the department; (3) current judges, judicial officials or 
employees of judges or judicial officials; (4) current elected officials or 
241 N.D. Cent. Code § 54-61-01 (2).
242 La. Rev. Stat. §15:146(B)(2).
243 Mont. Code Ann. §2-15-1028(7).
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employees of elected officials; or (5) persons who currently contract with or 
receive funding from the department or employees of such persons.”244
These prohibitions are only on sitting judges, defenders, and prosecutors. States often 
find that former judges, former defenders, former prosecutors, and former law enforce-
ment officials make very good commission members.
The ABA reports: “experience shows that there is no clear advantage to location in the 
judicial or executive branch.”245 The ABA’s position is underscored by the fact that the 
21 statewide commissions with complete oversight of all aspects of indigent defense 
services are divided evenly between the executive and judicial branches of government. 
Ten house their commissions in the judicial branch of government, while ten estab-
lished their commissions as part of the executive branch of government. One state, 
Michigan, has two commissions: the commission overseeing trial-level services re-
sides in the executive branch, while the appellate commission is housed in the judicial 
branch.
What the ABA does conclude as important to the success of an indigent defense com-
mission is that statutory language ensures the commission is “independent,” no matter 
in which branch of government it is placed. For example, Connecticut statutes state 
that its Public Defender Commission is an “autonomous body within the judicial 
department for fiscal and budgetary purposes only.” Similarly, in Montana, statutory 
language establishes the Public Defender Commission in the department of adminis-
tration of the executive branch “for administrative purposes only.” The most recently 
created public defender commission, that of Idaho, places the entity within the De-
partment of Self-Governing Agencies – though technically still in the executive branch, 
under a provision of Idaho’s constitution this means that the commission does not 
have to answer directly to the governor.
There is wide variance in state commission powers. For example, Louisiana statutes 
explicitly say: “Except for the inherent regulatory authority of the Louisiana Supreme 
Court provided for in Article V, Section 5 of the Constitution of Louisiana regarding 
the regulation of the practice of law, the Louisiana Public Defender Board shall have all 
regulatory authority, control, supervision, and jurisdiction, including auditing and en-
forcement, and all power incidental or necessary to such regulatory authority, control, 
supervision, and jurisdiction over all aspects of the delivery of public defender services 
throughout the courts of the state of Louisiana.”246 Most other states simply empower 
their commissions: 1) to promulgate uniform standards; 2) to hire the executive direc-
tor to run the central office; 3) to authorize the executive director to hire appropriate 
staff to accomplish the work of the commission; and, 4) to require data collection from 
all local indigent defense systems. 
244 N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-15-2.2.
245 The Spangenberg Group, American Bar Association, State Indigent Defense Systems 
(Dec. 2006).
246 La. Rev. Stat. §15:147.
95Conclusion & Recommendations
Both the Montana and Michigan Acts are rather lengthy, but excerpts regarding the 
commissions’ critical task of establishing standards are included below. The Montana 
Act delineates those areas for which the commission must promulgate standards:
Section 6. Commission -- duties -- report -- rules. 
(2) Establish statewide standards for the qualification and training of attorneys pro-
viding public defender services to ensure that services are provided by competent 
counsel and in a manner that is fair and consistent throughout the state.
The standards must take into consideration:
(a) The level of education and experience that is necessary to competently handle 
certain cases and case types, such as criminal, juvenile, abuse and neglect, civil 
commitment, capital, and other case types in order to provide effective assistance of 
counsel;
(b) Acceptable caseloads and workload monitoring protocols to ensure that public 
defender workloads are manageable;
(c) Access to and use of necessary professional services, such as paralegal, investiga-
tor, and other services that may be required to support a public defender in a case;
(d) Continuing education requirements for public defenders and support staff;
(e) Practice standards;
(f) Performance criteria; and
(g) Performance evaluation protocols.247
Michigan was even more direct with their recent reform legislation:
Sec. 11. (1) The MIDC shall establish minimum standards, rules, and procedures to 
effectuate the following:
(a) The delivery of indigent criminal defense services shall be independent of 
the judiciary but ensure that the judges of this state are permitted and encour-
aged to contribute information and advice concerning that delivery of indigent 
criminal defense services.
(b) If the caseload is sufficiently high, indigent criminal defense services may 
consist of both an indigent criminal defender office and the active participa-
tion of other members of the state bar.
(c) Trial courts shall assure that each criminal defendant is advised of his or 
her right to counsel. All adults, except those appearing with retained counsel 
or those who have made an informed waiver of counsel, shall be screened for 
eligibility under this act, and counsel shall be assigned as soon as an indigent 
adult is determined to be eligible for indigent criminal defense services.
(2) The MIDC shall implement minimum standards, rules, and procedures to guar-
antee the right of indigent defendants to the assistance of counsel as provided under 
amendment VI of the constitution of the United States and section 20 of article I of 
the state constitution of 1963. In establishing minimum standards, rules, and proce-
dures, the MIDC shall adhere to the following principles:
247 Mont. Code Ann. § 47-1-105.
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(a) Defense counsel is provided sufficient time and a space where attorney-cli-
ent confidentiality is safeguarded for meetings with defense counsel’s client.
(b) Defense counsel’s workload is controlled to permit effective representation. 
Economic disincentives or incentives that impair defense counsel’s ability 
to provide effective representation shall be avoided. The MIDC may develop 
workload controls to enhance defense counsel’s ability to provide effective 
representation.
(c) Defense counsel’s ability, training, and experience match the nature and 
complexity of the case to which he or she is appointed.
(d) The same defense counsel continuously represents and personally appears 
at every court appearance throughout the pendency of the case. However, in-
digent criminal defense systems may exempt ministerial, nonsubstantive tasks, 
and hearings from this prescription.
(e) Defense counsel is required to attend continuing legal education relevant to 
counsel’s indigent defense clients.
(f) Defense counsel is systematically reviewed at the local level for efficiency 
and for effective representation according to MIDC standards.248
It is recommended that all indigent defense attorneys should be made to track their 
time. Montana requires time-tracking as part of the rules promulgated by the commis-
sion under its inherent authority to set policies for manageable caseloads. In Louisiana, 
they codified this by requiring the Louisiana Public Defender Board to develop an 
empirical case-weighting system (a term of art requiring time-tracking).249 Delineating 
the areas requiring uniform standards, it states the LPDB must create:
Manageable public defender workloads that permit the rendering of competent rep-
resentation through an empirically based case weighting system that does not count 
all cases of similar case type equally but rather denotes the actual amount of attorney 
effort needed to bring a specific case to an appropriate disposition. In determining 
an appropriate workload monitoring system, the board shall take into consideration 
all of the following: (i) The variations in public defense practices and procedures 
in rural, urban, and suburban jurisdictions; (ii) Factors such as prosecutorial and 
judicial processing practices, trial rates, sentencing practices, attorney experience, 
extent and quality of supervision, and availability of investigative, social worker, and 
support staff; and, (iii) Client enhancers specific to each client such as the presence 
of mental illness. 
248 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §780.991.
249 La. Rev. Stat. §15:148(1)(a).
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Recommendation 2
Prohibit contracts that create financial incentives for attorneys to fail to 
provide effective representation.
Not all contract systems produce financial conflicts of interests. Oregon is the only 
statewide system in the country that relies entirely on contracts for the delivery of 
public defense services. ORS 151.213 establishes the Oregon Public Defender Services 
Commission (“OPDSC”) as an independent body in the judicial branch that is re-
sponsible for overseeing and administering the delivery of right to counsel services in 
each of Oregon’s counties. The commission is statutorily responsible for promulgating 
standards regarding the quality, effectiveness, and efficiency by which public counsel 
services are provided.250
With all funding for direct services provided by the state, the commission’s central 
Office of Public Defense Services (OPDS) handles the day-to-day management of the 
system. OPDS lets individual contracts with private not-for-profit law firms, individual 
private attorneys, and consortia of private attorneys working together. The contracts 
are the enforcement mechanism for the OPDSC performance standards. Should indi-
gent defense providers fail to comply with their contractual obligations, the contract is 
terminated and not renewed.
Importantly, the contracts set a precise total number of cases each contractor will han-
dle during the contracting period, thereby ensuring that attorneys have sufficient time 
to fulfill the state’s performance criteria. But more than that, the contracts safeguard 
the local service providers as well, by allocating cases across case types according to the 
number of hours generally required to meet the performance demands of each type 
of case. In other words, rather than focusing solely on the number of cases assigned, 
the Oregon system is built around the concept of “workload” by assigning “weights” 
to specific types of cases, adjusted for availability of non-attorney support staff and for 
other non-representational duties of the attorney (such as travel or attending continu-
ing legal education training).
Each service provider’s workload is tracked on an ongoing basis, down to the week, 
enabling the contract defenders to accurately predict when they will reach their work-
load maximums for a given month, all the while keeping the local court informed. In 
practice, a service provider can project that he will reach his maximum allowed under 
the contract on a Tuesday and will inform the court that he will be declaring unavail-
ability starting Wednesday and onward through the end of week. With all stakeholders 
kept informed, there are no surprises – the extra cases are simply assigned to one of the 
other service providers available in that county under contract with the OPDS.
250 Or. Rev. Stat. §151.216.
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The contracts currently employed in Utah create financial incentives for indigent de-
fense attorneys that cause financial conflicts of interest. Utah should follow the lead of 
other states that have banned these practices, including:
• Idaho: Idaho Code 19-859 states that the board of county commissioners 
shall provide representation through a public defender office or by contract-
ing with a defense attorney “provided that the terms of the contract shall not 
include any pricing structure that charges or pays a single fixed fee for the 
services and expenses of the attorney.”251
• Michigan: The Michigan Indigent Defense Commission is authorized to es-
tablish minimum standards, rules, and procedures for the delivery of right to 
counsel services, but is statutorily barred from approving local indigent de-
fense plans that provide “[e]conomic disincentives or incentives that impair 
defense counsel’s ability to provide effective representation.”252
• South Dakota: SDCL 23A-40-7(2) requires local government in South Dakota 
to pay public defense lawyers “a reasonable and just compensation for his 
services and for necessary expenses and costs incident to the proceedings.”253 
South Dakota Unified Judicial System Policy 1-PJ-10, issued by the state Su-
preme Court, interpreted this statute to ban all flat fee contracts. In 2000, the 
court set public counsel compensation rates at $67 per hour and mandated 
that “court-appointed attorney fees will increase annually in an amount equal 
to the cost of living increase that state employees receive each year from 
the legislature.”254 In 2015, assigned counsel compensation in South Dakota 
stands at $90 per hour.255
• Washington: Washington Court Rule 1.8 states that such contractual ar-
rangements create an “acute financial disincentive for the lawyer” and “in-
volve an inherent conflict between the interests of the client and the personal 
interests of the lawyer.”256
• Nevada: Announcing that the “competent representation of indigents is vital 
to our system of justice,” the Nevada Supreme Court issued Administrative 
Order ADKT-0411 on July 23, 2015 banning the use of flat fee contracts that 
fail to account for extraordinary cases or trial-related expenses.
251 Idaho Code §19-859.
252 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §780.991-11(2)(b).
253 S.D. Codified Laws §23A-40-7(2).
254 South Dakota Unified Judicial System Policy 1-PJ-10.
255 Memorandum from Kim Allison, 1st Circuit Court Administrator, to 1st Circuit Attorneys and 
County Commissioners (Dec. 16, 2014) available at http://www.ujs.sd.gov/uploads/firstcircuit/Court_
Appointed_Attorney_Fee_Memo.pdf.
256 Washington Court Rule 1.8.
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“Thus, the adversarial process protected by the Sixth Amendment requires that 
the accused have ‘counsel acting in the role of an advocate.’ The right to the ef-
fective assistance of counsel is thus the right of the accused to require the pros-
ecution’s case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. When a 
true adversarial criminal trial has been conducted - even if defense counsel may 
have made demonstrable errors - the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth 
Amendment has occurred. But if the process loses its character as a confronta-
tion between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated.”
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1984).
[internal citations omitted]
appendix a
Study committee standards
[republished with permission]
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Evaluating the Health of Utah’s Indigent Defense System
[A memorandum prepared for the Utah Judicial Council’s Committee on Indigent Defense]
Fourth District Court Judge Derek P. Pullan
dpullan@utcourts.gov
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have
the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
--U.S. Const., Amend. VI
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel.
--Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12
—oo0oo—
Enshrined in the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution is the right of 
the accused to the assistance counsel.1 This right is “necessary to insure fundamental 
human rights of life and liberty.”2 It is an “essential barrier against arbitrary or unjust 
deprivation of human rights.”3 “It embodies the realistic recognition of the obvious 
truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect 
himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or liberty.”4
The need of the accused for a lawyer was “no better stated than in [these] moving 
words” of United States Supreme Court Justice Sutherland:
1 U.S. Const, Amend. IV; Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12. See also, Utah Code 77-1-6(1)(a) (“In all criminal 
prosecutions the defendant is entitled to appear in person and defend in person or by counsel.”).
2 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
3 Id.
4 Id., 304 U.S. at 463.
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The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend 
the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small 
and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, 
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He 
is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be 
put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, 
or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the 
skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he may have a 
perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings 
against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction 
because he does not know how to establish his innocence.5
Sadly, not every person charged with a crime has equal opportunity to retain coun-
sel. In Gideon v. Wainwright, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged this “obvious 
truth”—“in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who 
is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided 
for him.”6 The ideal of equality before the law cannot be realized if the “the poor man 
charged with a crime [must] face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.”7 Thus, 
the Sixth Amendment requires the States to provide indigent criminal defendants with 
legal counsel at public expense.8 
The right to counsel at public expense is one that touches more Utah citizens than one 
might expect. In 2000, the U.S. Department of Justice estimated that “poor people ac-
count for more than 80% of individuals prosecuted.”9
While the duty to provide legal counsel to the indigent ultimately rests with the State 
of Utah, the Utah Legislature has delegated this responsibility to counties, cities, and 
towns.10 The Legislature has allowed political subdivisions broad discretion in deter-
mining how to provide indigent defense counsel.11 Still, the Legislature encourages 
counties and cities to “enter into inter-local cooperation agreements . . . for the provi-
sion of legal defense.”12
5 Gideon, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963), quoting, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
6 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 796.
7 Id., 372 U.S. at 796-97.
8 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a fundamental right made obligatory upon the State by the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., 372 U.S. at 795-96.
9 Backus, Mary Sue & Marcus, Paul, “The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis,” 57 
Hastings L. J. 1031, 1034 (2006).
10 Utah Code § 77-32-301(1).
11 Utah Code § 77-32-306(1)(2)(6) (permitting counties to [1] contract with a defense service provider, 
[2] authorize the court to appoint qualified attorneys, [3] create a legal defender’s office, or [4] “provide 
for some other means which are constitutionally adequate for legal defense of indigents.”).
12 Utah Code § 77-32-306(4).
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Finally, consistent with U.S. Supreme Court case law,13 the Legislature has recognized 
that the right to counsel encompasses more than representation at trial. It also includes 
the right to adequate defense resources at public expense. These resources include “a 
competent investigator, expert witnesses, scientific or medical testing, or other appro-
priate means necessary for an effective defense.”14
Around the country, state indigent defense systems face a constitutional crisis.15 Utah’s 
own system has been the subject of recent public criticism.16 The fundamental question 
presented to the Committee is how to assess the health of the Utah’s indigent defense 
system— what factors or principles indicate constitutional health or disease? In differ-
ent terms, through what lenses may one view an indigent defense system to determine 
its constitutional sufficiency?
In identifying relevant factors, the Committee should remember this observation from 
Professor Emily Chiang: 
Evidence of systemic shortcomings in the jurisdiction—such as violations of guide-
lines, checklists, or administrative standards on issues like caseloads, training, or ac-
cess to investigators—is relevant insofar as it demonstrates the probability of harm 
that indigent criminal defendants face, but such probabilistic evidence does not in 
and of itself constitute constitutional injury. In other words, the fact that caseloads 
are high or that none of the public defenders receive any training in a given juris-
diction does not mean any injury has necessarily taken place—individual criminal 
defendants do not have a right to a public defender with a caseload below a certain 
limit or who has attended a certain list of training sessions.17
In assessing the health of a patient, the doctor considers a host of symptoms which
together may indicate illness, injury, or disease—(i.e. temperature, blood pressure, 
elevated white blood cell counts, location and intensity of pain). In a similar way, the 
Committee has been tasked with assessing the health of Utah’s public defense system. 
13 See, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 note 14 (1970) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
presumes the right to effective assistance of counsel); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel envisions counsel’s playing a role critical to the ability of the adversarial 
system to produce just results and a fair trial); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932) (Sixth Amend-
ment required that defendants be afforded the right to consultation, thorough-going investigation, and 
preparation prior to trial); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (counsel engaged in deficient 
performance by failing to advise client that guilty plea to drug charges would result in client’s automat-
ic deportation); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to 
consideration of a plea bargaining).
14 Utah Code § 77-32-101(3)(defining defense resources); 77-32-303(3) (outlining circumstances under 
which defense resources shall be provided at public expense when the accused has retained private coun-
sel).
15 See, Backus, 57 Hastings L. J. 1031 (2006); Chiang, Emily, “Indigent Defense Invigorated: A Uniform 
Standard for Adjudicating Pre-Conviction Sixth Amendment Claims,” 19 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 
443 (Spring 2010) (seen footnotes 30-38).
16 “Failing Gideon—Utah’s Flawed County-By-County Public Defender System,” American Civil Liber-
ties Union of Utah, www.acluutah.org.
17 Id.
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In examining the patient, the following factors are relevant to determining constitu-
tional health:
1.  Independent representation. The defense service provider must be free to 
defend zealously the client without concern for retaliation (i.e. termination 
of employment, reduction in pay, reduction in personnel, or reduction in 
defense resources).
2.  Representation without conflicts of interest. In deciding whether an attor-
ney provided ineffective assistance of counsel, courts presume prejudice to 
the client when counsel is burdened with a conflict of interest.18 These con-
flicts of interest can be personal to the defense provider, or systemic. Sys-
temic conflicts of interest can arise in the contract terms of engagement, the 
manner of selection, funding, and payment of defense counsel. 
3.  Representation without interference. In deciding whether an attorney pro-
vided ineffective assistance of counsel, courts presume prejudice if the state 
interferes with the assistance of counsel. State interference can take many 
forms. Obviously, it occurs when custodial authorities deny an attorney 
meaningful access to his or her client at the jail. However, interference can be 
more subtle. Delay in notifying the defender of appointment or the lack of a 
private place for consultation can interfere with effective representation.
4.  Representation at all critical stages. The accused is entitled to legal counsel 
at all critical stages of the proceeding. The Sixth Amendment right extends to 
custodial interrogation, lineups, initial appearance, bail hearings, preliminary 
examination, arraignment, plea bargaining, sentencing, and the first appeal 
of right.19
5.  Representation That Ensures Meaningful Adversarial Testing Of The 
State’s Evidence—“The Fair Fight.” In 1984, the United States Supreme 
Court held: “The right to effective assistance of counsel is thus the right of 
the accused to require the prosecution’s case to survive the crucible of mean-
ingful adversarial testing. When a true adversarial criminal trial has been 
conducted . . . the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment has 
occurred. But if the process loses its character as a confrontation between 
adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated.” The following factors 
materially impact the adversarial nature of proceedings:
a.  Qualified Counsel—Ability, Training, and Experience. The Sixth Amend-
ment does not guarantee the individual right to a public defender with 
a certain number of continuing legal education hours. However, it does 
contemplate counsel with ability, training, and experience commen-
surate to the complexity and seriousness of the case. Public defenders 
fresh 
18 Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
19 See, Chiang, E., 19 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. at 452, footnotes 46-52.
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from the bar exam should not be representing clients charged with rape 
of a child or aggravated murder.
b.  Access To Defense Resources. By statute, counties and cities are required 
to provide defense resources at public expense. These include “a compe-
tent investigator, expert witnesses, scientific or medical testing, or other 
appropriate means necessary, for an effective defense.”20
c.  Reasonable Caseload Standards. The Sixth Amendment does not enti-
tle the accused to a public defender with a particular number of cases 
annually. But the “fair fight” is clearly impacted by the amount of time 
a public defender can devote to each case. National caseload standards 
may be instructive, but not outcome determinative for Utah. As Pro-
fessor Backus observed: “Although national caseload standards are 
available, states should consider their own circumstances in defining a 
reasonable defender workload. Factors such as availability of investi-
gators, level of support staff, complexity of cases, and level of attorney 
experience all might affect a workable definition. Data collection and a 
consistent method of weighing cases are essential to determining cur-
rent caseloads and setting reasonable workload standards.”21
6.  Fair Compensation and Proper Incentives. Public defenders should be fair-
ly compensated for their work. The public defender system should not create 
incentives that undermine the effective assistance of counsel.
a.  Fair Compensation Rather Than Parity. Some have argued for parity in 
compensation and benefits for prosecutors and public defenders. Exam-
ining the pay and benefits afforded to prosecutors may be instructive, 
but fair compensation, not parity should be the ultimate goal. This is 
true for several reasons. In a complex system, fair compensation can 
turn on a host of legitimate factors. The prosecution and defense func-
tions are dissimilar in material ways. Parity in compensation with a 
prosecutor who is not herself fairly compensated achieves little. Finally, 
parity on its own is a principle that may be hijacked by self-interest.
b.  Proper Incentives. Contracts for defense services should not create 
incentives that undermine the effective assistance of counsel. For exam-
ple, a public defender may be paid a lump sum from which the costs of 
investigation, expert witnesses, scientific or medical testing, and appeal 
must be deducted. This defense contract creates a financial incentive not 
to investigate, hire experts, test evidence, and appeal. Concrete caps on 
total compensation per assigned case can have the same effect.22
20 Utah Code § 77-32-201(3).
21 Backus, 57 Hastings L. J. at 1125.
22 Section 77-32-305 of the Indigent Defense Act caps total compensation at: (1) $3,500.00 for each 
assigned attorney in felony cases; (2) $1,000 for each assigned attorney in misdemeanor cases; and (3) 
$2,500.00 for each assigned attorney in the representation of an indigent in an appellate court on a first 
appeal of right. Defense counsel can seek court approval to exceed these caps. However, the uncertainty 
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7.  Case-Specific and Systemic Quality Control. Any public defense system 
should safeguard against both case-specific and systemic violations of the 
right to counsel. Individual public defenders should meet minimum perfor-
mance standards and be meaningfully supervised. Data should be collected 
so that the health of the public defender system can be regularly evaluated.
of having a request for excess compensation granted by the court may deter qualified attorneys from 
seeking defense appointments.
appendix b
Salt Lake County Early Case Resolution Program
The notion that certain cases are less serious than others, and thus require less attention 
and less time to dispose of, caused Salt Lake County to create an early case resolution 
(ECR) program.1 ECR programs have been introduced in a handful of jurisdictions 
across the country. When considering its own ECR program, Salt Lake County looked 
to other jurisdictions for ideas (e.g., Spokane, Washington, Napa County, California, 
and Washington County, Oregon). Although, after four years, it was subsequently and 
independently terminated in 2015, Salt Lake County’s ECR program serves as a cau-
tionary tale for other jurisdictions looking to implement similar programs.  
The theory behind most ECR programs is that there are certain cases that, if isolated, 
would resolve in a quick plea agreement but, when bundled with more serious cases, 
become lost in the shuffle and no one stands to benefit – not the prosecutor, the judge, 
the defense lawyer, the defendant who has to languish in jail pretrial, and not the 
taxpayers who bear the cost. ECR programs, therefore, seek to unbundle the criminal 
process whereby the prosecution flags for the defense certain cases for a quick one-
time-only, take-it-or-leave-it plea offer. 
Many criminal justice system stakeholders theorized there is no reason a case that 
resolves by plea on the eve of trial should not have been able to resolve right away.2 In 
Salt Lake County’s version of the ECR program, a defendant entered into the program 
had 30 days or three court appearances to have the case resolved in ECR. Failing that, 
the case got assigned to a trial judge, and it proceeded from there just like any other 
felony. 
It is reasonable for the courts to seek ways of managing dockets more effectively, just as 
county officials seek the most efficient use of the taxpayers’ dollars. But neither interest 
1 “ECR was developed as a systemic approach to address challenges faced by the criminal justice system 
in Utah. ECR is a collaborative process that aims to: (1) increase the speed of processing for all cases filed 
in Third District Court; (2) reduce jail overcrowding; (3) reduce caseloads for judges, prosecutors, and 
defense counsel by early resolution of certain cases; and (4) provide criminal defendants with appropri-
ate sentences in a timely manner.” Robert P. Butters, et al, Evaluation of Early Case Resolution (ECR): 
Year 2 Report, Utah Criminal Justice Center (March 2014), at 1.
2 Of course, some cases resolve on the courthouse steps the day of trial, because the defense has devel-
oped a strong case that the prosecutor has recognized, or a key witness does not appear or changes his 
testimony.
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outweighs the Constitution’s due process demands and the defendant’s right to a fair 
day in court. The extraordinarily high demand on the public defenders to try to provide 
effective representation for each client was at the root of the problem with Salt Lake 
County’s ECR program.
The Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association assigned a team of eight lawyers to a special 
ECR unit, supported by two secretaries. Together, the eight lawyers handled all cases 
flagged for the ECR program by the prosecution. 
Some of the ECR defenders felt many of their clients were well served by the program. 
For some defendants, a quicker disposition meant earlier access to treatment for sub-
stance abuse. For others, it was the opportunity not to lose their jobs or housing. And 
for others still, sometimes the plea being offered was simply a good deal for the client. 
The defenders likely felt they were getting good outcomes for some of their clients, but 
they were certain they could never achieve good outcomes for all. 
But, quick resolutions have built-in problems. Said one ECR attorney: “There is noth-
ing worse than getting a case that morning, and the prosecutor offers the defendant to 
get out of jail today. If you feel they’ve overcharged to begin with, or it’s a bad offer, the 
client’s still begging to get out.” An ECR program creates new artificial pressures that 
unfairly incentivize defendants to make bad choices. The prosecution’s perspective is 
the defendant can opt out of the ECR program at any time. The defendant, however, 
understands that by opting out of ECR, he likely will remain incarcerated pending trial. 
The compressed allotment of time – 30 days to resolve the case at ECR – is not neces-
sarily problematic by itself. For a defense lawyer with only one client, 30 days may be 
plenty of time to handle the case effectively and achieve an effective plea agreement. 
But the utter volume of cases the ECR lawyers tried to handle within those time con-
straints created significant structural conflicts, as defendants vied with each other for 
their lawyers’ time and attention.3
The structural conflicts caused by the volume of cases are compounded when the 
complexity of the cases are factored in. “My concern is that ECR would be okay if it 
were truly low hanging fruit, and mainly misdemeanors,” said the LDA director. LDA 
was included in the planning process for the ECR program, which included site visits 
to Washington County, Oregon, and Spokane, Washington. “Those programs worked 
because they were hearing misdemeanors. We’re almost exclusively felonies here.” 
Furthermore, the LDA director suggested the ECR program was weighted toward drug 
cases. Drug cases in general require more time for the type of investigation and analysis 
than the 30-day time constraints allow. 
3 “We’ve asked that it be capped at 60 cases per ECR calendar,” said the LDA director, but such limits 
were never imposed upon the program. “We sometimes have more than 100 hearings in a morning,” 
said the ECR unit supervisor. The supervisor kept track of her team’s cases. The average calendar, which 
ran from 8:30am to noon, gave her lawyers approximately 10 minutes per client.
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With so little time, the ECR program prevented the public defenders assigned to such 
cases from conducting the consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation 
required to be truly effective. Through no fault of their own, the attorneys had too little 
time to be the zealous advocates that each defendant has as his privilege. What good 
is it then from the client’s perspective that her ECR attorney is provided early in the 
process, if her attorney lacks sufficient time to assist her effectively? 
As problematic as such a program might be for the clients directly involved in ECR, the 
Legal Defender Association felt the structural impact of the ECR program on the rest 
of its services. For example, LDA leadership expressed concern that the ECR program 
was relied upon to resolve a higher proportion of the total criminal caseload than was 
originally envisioned or proposed. 
Additionally, LDA data suggests ECR might have caused a systemic change in the pros-
ecution’s charging practices. “There’s been a notable increase in prosecutions of en-
hanceable offenses,” said the LDA director.4 (See charts showing increase in case filings, 
this page and next.)
But perhaps the most significant struc-
tural flaw is the program interfered with 
the early appointment of actual trial 
counsel. Because the ECR program was 
purported as a voluntary opportunity 
– opt out at any time – the trial court 
anticipated restarting the criminal pro-
cess after 30 days. All the while, defense 
counsel was structurally prohibited from 
providing representation of the sort 
envisioned by the Constitution because 
of the high volume of cases and the extremely limited time available per client. And 
trial counsel – the lawyer truly prepared to take the case – was delayed from becoming 
active on that case until the defendant opted out or ran out of time.
A lawyer must be appointed early to represent the accused so that he can work with the 
client to develop the level of trust that is essential to his ability to be effective – what the 
Supreme Court has described as “those necessary conferences between counsel and ac-
cused which sometimes partake of the inviolable character of the confessional.”5 Some 
ECR proponents argued that, but for the ECR program, participating defendants would 
not have had access to early appointment of counsel.6 The ECR program, however, 
forced LDA to provide representation in assembly-line fashion.7
4 This means the ECR program increased the overall LDA caseload, and the intensity of that workload.
5 Id.
6 “We certainly have seen a reduction in incarceration,” said a district court judge. “And LDA is receiv-
ing discovery [from the prosecution] much more rapidly than they would otherwise.”
7 Commonly referred to nationally as horizontal representation – a system where one attorney rep-
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The ECR unit supervisor said the defendant’s case file was passed from the ECR team 
to the trial lawyer if the defendant opted out of the ECR program. “It shows: spoke with 
the client on this date, received this offer from the prosecutor, filed this motion.” But 
what good is it from the defendant’s perspective, however, if the lawyer provided early 
in the case is taken away, and replaced 
with someone else? After all, the “con-
fessional” is not some article, like a sheet 
of paper, which can be passed from one 
attorney to another.
Indeed, there was increased concern that 
the ECR program interfered with the 
community’s broader therapeutic goals 
that were institutionalized through prior 
initiatives of the district court, like its drug 
court program.8 Many criminal justice 
stakeholders expressed concern that ECR’s 
emphasis on accelerated outcomes diminished the likelihood of the defendants finding 
access to successful treatment. This, in return, may have negatively impacted recidivism 
rates of ECR participants. In fact, data showed disappointing returns on the recidivism 
of ECR participants.9
Furthermore, for judges there was a dual concern of the general increase in the total 
number of filings by the prosecution on the one hand, and the high volume of cases 
being handled by LDA attorneys at each ECR calendar. 
Under the Constitution, there is only one measure of any criminal court program’s 
effectiveness: due process. As long as the due process rights of the individual are pre-
served, then the courts have wide latitude to try new ideas and to seek cost efficiencies 
wherever they might be found. Unfortunately, Salt Lake County’s early case resolution 
program failed to meet basic constitutional demands because there was not enough 
time for the lawyers to do their job effectively.
resents the client during one court proceeding before handing off the client’s case to another attorney to 
cover the next stage.
8 “Drug court cases have dropped dramatically in the same time as ECR has been in existence,” said the 
LDA director.
9 “Around one-fourth of Pre-ECR (24%) and Non-ECR (27%) cases had a defendant who recidivat-
ed within one year of disposition, compared to one-third (33%) of ECR Resolved cases.” Butters, et al, 
supra Appendix B note 1. (Their final report found recidivism was about the same.) Despite the negative 
outlook, the authors cautioned: “Although the percent of ECR Resolved cases with recidivism in the 
year following disposition is higher than that for Non-ECR and Pre-ECR cases, it is also known that the 
ECR group included qualitatively different cases (as well as defendants) who were processed through a 
qualitatively different process (e.g., plea offers, timelines, dispositions, and sentences).” Supra Appendix 
B note 1, at 34.
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Studying U.S. Supreme Court case law, we can see a simple formula develop: the right 
to counsel at each critical stage plus the right to effective representation equals the right 
to effective representation at each critical stage. And, in case there was any doubt, the 
U.S. Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this notion. Citing Powell, Cronic, and count-
less other decisions, the Supreme Court confirmed with Lafler v. Cooper10 and Missouri 
v. Frye11 the defendant’s right to “effective assistance of competent counsel” during 
plea negotiations.12 “The right to adequate assistance of counsel cannot be defined or 
enforced without taking account of the central role plea bargaining plays in securing 
convictions and determining sentences.”13
Salt Lake County’s early case resolution program was set up to elicit rapid plea agree-
ments. But with dozens of cases to handle, all at the same time, and only minutes to 
meet with each client, how could any lawyer be effective to any client? Where the 
“consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation” that is so “vitally import-
ant” is absent, because the attorney is left trying to represent in plea negotiations clients 
they have only met for a handful of minutes that morning, the clients “do not have the 
aid of counsel in any real sense.”14 Providing counsel purely for the purpose of relaying 
the prosecutor’s plea offer, but without providing that lawyer with the necessary time 
and resources to effectively represent that defendant at an artificially accelerated plea 
calendar is tantamount to providing the defendant with no lawyer at all.
10 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 182 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2012).
11 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 182 L. Ed. 2d 379 (2012).
12 It is not necessary for the Supreme Court to revisit each critical stage and ask the question for each: 
is the right to counsel here in this stage of the case in fact the right to effective representation? Existing case 
law on this question is clear enough.
13 Frye, supra Appendix B note 11, citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771 (1970).
14 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
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